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Conflict Resolution is a process in which two or more
players, holding dissimilar perceptions of a central issue in
a dispute, employ strategies consonant with the resources they
hold to obtain their goals in the conflict.
This thesis examines this process in three contemporary
conflicts on the African continent--the Sudan civil war, the
Zimbabwe/Rhodesia independence crisis, and the continuing con-
flict in Namibia. A checklist was developed to establish a
theoretical framework for examining the key elements in each
conflict. The interaction of these elements--the issues, goals,
strategy, resources and limitations and the patterns that evolve
from this interaction is analyzed from the perspective of the
African continent and within the context of conflict resolution.
The primary objective of this project is to provide a com-
parative analysis of the three conflicts selected for study to
gain increased insight into the dynamics of each case and to
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When a conflict arises between two players in the inter-
national system, there are two principal ways in which the dis-
pute is settled. Either one party, through a clear and
overwhelming victory, dictates the terms of a settlement to the
second party, or as is more often the case, the conflict is
resolved through negotiation. The main focus of this thesis is
on conflict resolution, and how various elements influence the
course and outcome of a conflict. This thesis, though not a
strict study of conflict in Africa, examines three conflicts
on the African continent as a base to further understand con-
flict resolution in general, and to analyze the process of
conflict resolution.
This thesis has three main purposes. First, to develop a
simple, but effective checklist as a tool for examining inter-
national conflicts that have been resolved or have the poten-
tial to be resolved. The checklist was initially designed to
be used by a negotiator or a mediator to grasp the essential
elements of a conflict either as it was occurring or for a
retrospective study of a particular conflict. The checklist
is intended to expand the theoretical understanding of conflict
resolution to a practical interpretation of real life conflict
resolution. The second purpose is to examine three inter-
national conflicts using the checklist to identify the main
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elements of each individual conflict. And, third, to expand
an understanding of conflict negotiation through a comparative
analysis of the three conflicts examined. A secondary aim in
examining these conflicts is to test the applicability and
effectiveness of the conflict resolution checklist.
It should be made clear that this thesis views conflict
resolution, as it applies to the cases studied, as a competi-
tive relationship between two players, each seeking to maximize
his gains and minimize his concessions. Although it is recog-
nized that the process of negotiation is a problem solving
activity by nature, and an entire school of thought exists
that - emphasizes the cooperative elements of negotiation, this
analysis will be concerned primarily with the competitive
aspect of conflict resolution.
This thesis is structured in the following manner. The
introductory chapter will include a brief explanation of why
the Sudan Civil War, the Rhodesia/Zimbabwe independence crisis,
and the current conflict in Namibia were selected as case
studies. In addition, a brief review of the conflict resolu-
tion checklist is included in this chapter. Chapters II, III,
and IV will examine the Sudan, Zimbabwe and Namibia cases
respectively. A brief review of each case is provided later
in this chapter. And a fifth and final chapter will provide a
comparative analysis of these three cases and will contrast
the key elements found in each conflict.
This thesis is not intended to be a historical or chrono-
logical presentation of each conflict, nor is it a comprehensive
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analysis of all the elements involved in each case. As such,
a chronology of significant events in each conflict is pro-
vided in Appendices A, B, and C. The purpose of each chronology
is to introduce those readers who are unfamiliar with Sudan,
Zimbabwe, and Namibia cases to the general sequence of events
in each conflict. Although each conflict is complex, a
chronological perspective aids in examining and analyzing each
case. Appendix D will provide a brief review of the positive
and negative aspects of the conflict resolution checklist follow-
ing its practical application to each of the conflicts examined
in this thesis. In addition, a bibliography is included at
the end of the thesis to assist those interested in further
examining each conflict.
Three cases were selected for study, and although they are
similar, each contains several dissimilar elements, displays
varying levels of violent conflict, and addresses different
sets of issues. International conflicts can be divided into
one of three general categories: (1) conflict which was re-
solved by a negotiated resolution, (2) conflict where negotia-
tion has either not been initiated or where negotiation has
failed to produce a settlement (and subsequently the conflict
either continues or stalemates), and (3) conflict in which a
single party, through an overwhelming victory, dictates the
terms of a settlement. The cases selected for study in this
thesis fall into categories one and two. The Sudan and the
Zimbabwe conflicts represent cases where a successful settlement
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to a violent conflict was reached through negotiation. The
Namibian conflict was selected as a case where negotiation had
failed to produce a settlement, and where, at the time of this
writing, conflict continues.
It should be noted that this analysis omits a case that
fits category three. The main reason for this is that a situa-
tion where one player is the clear victor, the scope of nego-
tiation is often limited between the players and the process
of conflict resolution through negotiation is constrained.
In general this type of conflict is resolved by one player
weakening his opponent's position to the point that the opponent
no longer has any leverage in negotiating. As such, the terms
of the settlement are dictated by the dominant player. The
usefulness of including this type of case into this analysis
is limited.
For the purposes of this thesis, a successful settlement
has two essential elements. First and foremost, the settle-
ment must address the immediate subjective issues of the con-
flict. That is to say, the agreement reached between the two
players does not have to be a comprehensive document that
addresses all future problems that may later arise. Although
an agreement can include provisions that address these possi-
ble problems, it should not be considered a final document
designed to address all difficulties that each player may face.
For example, the settlement should include provisions for a
ceasefire if military forces are involved, but it does not
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necessarily need to address all circumstances from which armed
conflict may arise. In addition, the status of opposing politi-
cal opponents should be addressed and the position of these
individuals at the end of the conflict should be considered.
Here again, long term arrangements for these individuals is
not essential.
Second, the agreement should establish a base from which
a future non-conflict oriented relationship can develop be-
tween the players. One key aspect of this second element is
that the settlement should be structured so that sufficient
time is allowed for implementation of alternative solutions
that address the objective issues.
The three cases selected for analysis are sufficiently
different to permit testing of the conflict resolution check-
list and provide a wide range of elements to compare and
analyze. Chapter two examines the Sudan civil war. Fought
between the predominantly Arabic North and the African South,
the main features of the Sudan conflict are: (1) the conflict
was resolved through negotiation (the Addis Ababa Accords),
(2) there was a relative absence of external players and
forces, and (3) there was a low but increasing level of force
being employed by both players. Essentially, chapter two
examines a conflict resolved through negotiation that was
relatively free of external interference and influence.
Chapter three focuses on the Rhodesia/Zimbabwe conflict.
This conflict initially developed between Great Britain and
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the white minority in Rhodesia, but as the dispute progressed,
black African nationalists began to assume a major role in the
conflict. The main features of this case are: (1) the con-
flict was resolved through negotiation, (2) the conflict in-
volved several players, both internal and external to Zimbabwe,
(3) outside political and military forces played a role in the
conflict, and (4) the level of violent conflict in Zimbabwe
had reached intense proportions. Therefore, chapter three is
a study of a conflict resolved through negotiation involving
several external players and forces.
Chapter four examines the current conflict in Namibia be-
tween the United Nations and the Republic of South Africa.
Similar to the Zimbabwe case, black African nationalists within
the territory have played a prominent role in the conflict.
In addition, several other players, most notably the United
States and Angola have assumed important, but secondary posi-
tions in the conflict. The main features of the Namibian case
are: (1) extensive negotiations have yet to resolve the con-
flict, (2) many external players and forces are involved, and
(3) several external political and military forces have major
roles in the conflict. Thus, chapter four will examine a con-
flict that has not been resolved through negotiation and where
several external players have become involved.
Before proceeding it is necessary to explain the key points
of the conflict resolution checklist and to provide a brief
review of the questions that arise from a comparative analysis
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of the elements identified by the checklist. As noted, the
checklist was designed to be used by negotiators as a practi-
cal tool for identifying key elements of any conflict where
negotiation had occurred, was presently underway, or had the
potential to be resolved through negotiation. The checklist
provides a theoretical framework wherein the specific elements
of an individual conflict can be substituted in order to
obtain a clear understanding of the conflict. A negotiator
that identifies the specific elements of a conflict, and
understands the relationships of these elements can then adopt
a strategy that best reflects his individual goals. For a
negotiator representing a single party this means maximizing
his position, obtaining the best outcome, and minimizing his
concessions. For a third party mediator this means being
able to reconcile differences and promote concessions from
each of the players he is operating between.
The conflict resolution checklist is given in Table 1.
The following is a brief explanation of each element. STEP
I is the most basic element of the checklist. It identifies
each player in the conflict. A player is defined as any group
of individuals, acting as a unitary force. A player may take
the form of a state, a territory, a nationalist organization,
or a multinational regime that is involved directly or in-
directly in the conflict. Players fall into two general cate-
gories; (1) Primary players--those unitary actors who are in
direct conflict and who are directly affected by the main




I. Identify each of the players: Primary/Secondary.
II. Identify the issues:
A. Objective issues—what does the conflict center on?
B. Subjective issues--what does each side perceive as
the center of the conflict?
C. Identify each player's goals.
1. Stated.
2. Perceived maximum they can obtain.
3. Minimum they can accept.
D. Does each player:
1. prefer conflict to obtain its goals?
2. prefer negotiation to obtain its goals?
III. Identify each player's initial strategy.
IV. Identify resources available to each player to implement




V. Identify adjustments in each player's:
A. Strategy.
B. Changing resources.
C. Goals: (1) Stated. (2) Perceived Min/Max.
VI. Identify the final outcome/resolution.
If no solution is reached, repeat steps II, D through VI.
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that are affected by the course and outcome of the conflict
but are not a part of the main objective issue.
As the conflict develops, new players may become involved,
a secondary player may be elevated to a primary player, and
conversely a primary player may assume a secondary rule. The
evolving positions of each player will influence the objective
and subjective issues in the conflict. Therefore, it is
important to be cognizant of each player's position in the
conflict when analyzing the issues and the goals and strategy
of each player.
It should be noted that individuals are not considered
"unitary actors" and thus are not identified specifically as
"players." This analysis focuses on groups of individuals,
and therefore, single individuals are considered sub-units of
these groups. As such, the role that key individuals have in
influencing their respective groups and affecting the course
and outcome of the conflict will be examined separately in
chapter five. It is anticipated that key individuals will
have great influence on the process of conflict resolution.
However, do individuals serve as mere symbols, or can they
have significant practical influence on the course of the
conflict itself? Are those individuals with the greatest
amount of influence most often the leaders of each group, or
can individuals that hold less formal, less public positions
have major impact on a conflict?
STEPS II A and B identify the objective and subjective
issues in the conflict. The central question in identifying
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the objective issue is, what does the conflict center on? In
other words, on what central issue do both players share the
same perception. The subjective issues reflect the dissimilar
perceptions that each player holds towards the central issue.
Therefore, the main difference between objective and subjective
issues is in how each player perceives the central issue of
the conflict. Moreover, a clear understanding of the issues
is essential, since the issues will have great influence on the
goals and strategies of each player.
As each conflict progresses it will be important to identi-
fy any changes in the objective and subjective issues. Since
the objective issues are similarly perceived by both players,
it would seem unlikely that there would be a drastic redefini-
tion of the objective issues. Although one way in which objec-
tive issues may be redefined is when other primary or secondary
players become involved in the conflict. On the other hand,
since subjective issues vary from player to player, they may
be subject to several adjustments. These adjustments will
affect the goals and strategy of each player.
In preparing the conflict resolution checklist it was
assumed that the subjective issues would define the respec-
tive goals of each player. Essentially, goals are a practical
definition of the issues. In STEP II C, the goals of each
player are identified. Each player has three sets of goals;
stated, maximum, and minimum. Within this range each player
seeks to obtain the best possible outcome. Figure 1 is a
simplified linear model of a range of goals between two players
19
+ + + +
A, max B,min A,min B,max
Figure 1
The area between B,min and A,min is the area of compro-
mise—that area where negotiation is possible. Each player
seeks to obtain a settlement that is as close to his maximum
as possible. For player A this means obtaining an agreement
in which the provisions reflect a point as far left as possi-
ble within the area B,min/A,min. Player A may employ strate-
gies and resources to force player B's minimum position more
to the left to obtain a settlement that is closer to A's
maximum goals. Conversely player B would resist the efforts
of player A and would attempt to push A's minimum position to
the right. One key to understanding conflict resolution is
to comprehend the relationship between each player's initial
stated goals and the perceived minimum-maximum range of goals
each player adopts. Chapter V will examine how these stated
goals reflect the subjective issues and how they influence
the strategy of each player.
A player establishes a range of goals by taking into con-
sideration the issues of the conflict and the resources he
has available. On the one hand, maximum goals generally
reflect an optimistic view and may at times ignore the reali-
ties of the conflict itself. For example, maximum goals may
ignore the goals and capabilities of the opponent, and may
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represent the best possible outcome. On the other hand,
minimum goals reflect a less than optimistic view of the con-
flict, and more often are based on the realities of the politi-
cal and military environment. They represent a very conservative
estimate of one's own resources and may in fact over-estimate
an opponent's strengths.
STEP II D, simply identifies whether the players chose
conflict or negotiation to obtain their respective goals. In
all of the cases reviewed at least one, if not both players,
had decided that conflict was preferred over negotiation.
That is, that one player must perceive the cost associated with
negotiating (concessions and acceptance of the other players'
goals) , as higher than the cost of standing firm. A fundamen-
tal step in the conflict resolution checklist is to continually
assess each case in order to determine whether the costs of
standing firm are higher than the costs of conceding for both
players and to assess whether a player's changing abilities
have diminished relative to his goals. This will be the point
in the conflict where a negotiated settlement is possible.
STEP III examines each player's initial strategy. Simply
stated, strategy is the way in which a player applies his re-
sources to obtain his goals. The strategy a player employs is
driven by two primary considerations--goals and resources.
Just as a player's goals are a practical definition of the
issues, strategy is a direct reflection of goals. If during
a conflict a player's goals change, a similar adjustment in
21
strategy would be likely. One way in which a player can as-
sess his opponent's true goals is to study his strategy, and
since his strategy reflects his goals, insight into an oppo-
nent's principal objectives in a conflict can be gained.
However, a player should be cautious, since his opponent may
be intentionally employing a strategy designed to deceive.
Strategy also reflects the interactive nature of conflict.
A player's strategy is not only designed around his own goals
and resources, but also considers his opponent's goals, re-
sources, and strategy. How does a change in one player's
strategy affect the other player? What portion of a player's
strategy is aimed at resisting and combatting the strategy of
his opponent? How does a player's perceptions affect his
selection of strategy? In general limited consideration is
given to an opponent's strategy when a player is first
initiating his own strategy. However, as the conflict
progresses greater consideration is given to an opponent's
strategy. In the cases selected for study, understanding the
relationship between initial and subsequent strategy is key
to obtaining a clear perspective on the process of conflict
resolution.
STEP IV identifies each player's resources. Resources
are any political, psychological, economic, or military means
that a player possesses to: (1) implement his own strategy,
and (2) resist the strategy of his opponent. How do resources
influence strategy and how do they affect the eventual outcome
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of the conflict? As noted, the types of resources a player
holds, coupled with his goals, will drive his strategy. For
example, if a player has a strong and effective political
organization (and a forum to exercise this political resource)
,
and his military resources (troops, equipmient, etc.) are
limited, it would be likely that his strategy would center on
resolving the conflict through political vice military means.
In this example a political settlement also would put that
player in the strongest position to obtain the best settlement
for himself.
In general, each player holds a mix of resources, and
accordingly uses them in a strategy that makes the most effec-
tive use of these resources. Of the types of resources a
player holds (military, political, economic, psychological)
can one be identified as the most valuable? Or is the employ-
ment of resources in the proper manner and at the right time
the essential point?
STEP IV also identifies the limitations imposed on a player
This step was not included in the original design of the check-
list. However, following a precursory look at each case, it
became clear that certain elements constrained the action of
players. And in fact limitations .were found to be a factor in
determining a player's strategy. In general limitations pre-
vent a player from implementing all aspects of his strategy
-
For example, limitations may come in the form of limited
military supplies, lack of player cohesion within a group, or
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political or military pressure from another player that de-
flects a player from pursuing a specific course of action.
Limitations are essentially the reverse of resources, and in
general a limiting element of one player is a resource for
his opponent.
STEP V is the most difficult and perhaps the most important
step in the checklist. It examines the changing goals,
strategy, and resources of each player. Does each player ad-
just his initial goals? If so what prompts this adjustment?
Is it in response to changing resources and the type of strategy
adopted by his opponent? What effect does time have on a
player's strengths and weaknesses? These are central questions
in understanding the dynamics of any conflict. The relative
position of each player will change and evolve, and as we will
see the level and nature of each conflict continually changes
as a result of changing goals, resources, and strategy. STEP
V is crucial in understanding conflict resolution since it
is the step that attempts to clarify a dynamic and most often
complex set of elements that define the parameters of a conflict.
STEP VI applies only to those conflicts that have been
resolved through negotiation. This step is an examination of
the final settlement of the conflict. How the final resolu-
tion reflects the initial and changing goals of each player
can provide some insight into how the actions of each player
influence the outcome of the conflict. From the vantage point
of hindsight, the positive and negative aspects of a player's
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strategy can be evaluated. If no settlement is reached it
is necessary to go back to STEP II D and ask whether conflict
or negotiation is preferred. In general, if the dispute is
unresolved, then conflict continues to be preferred by at
least one primary player.
It is important to remember that the checklist is de-
signed as a tool for examining conflict. It establishes a
general framework for looking at each case. As each case
is examined it is anticipated that several patterns will
emerge. These include: (a) initially weak players gaining
strength over time and conversely dominant players diminishing
in strength as the conflict progresses, (b) the use of
nationalist guerrilla movements when political solutions be-
come unlikely or impractical, (c) the rise of key individuals
that become crucial to the course and outcome of a conflict.
Chapter V will analyze these patterns and hopefully provide
some insight into the general trends of conflict resolution
and into the key elements of each case examined.
Armed with the theoretical framework of the conflict
resolution checklist, the following three chapters will
examine the Sudan, Rhodesia/Zimbabwe, and Namibia conflicts.
25
THE SUDAN
Source: Best, Alan, G.G., and deBlij , Harm J
African Survey . New York: John
Wiley and Sons, 1977.
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II. THE SUDAN CONFLICT
In February 1972, representatives from North and South
Sudan reached an agreement over the debilitating and protracted
conflict that had plagued Sudan since its independence. The
Sudan conflict is a case where a long and difficult struggle
between two players was resolved through negotiation. The
immediate results of the settlement, known as the Addis Ababa
accords, included: (1) ending the military confrontation
between the North and the South, (2) allowing Sudan to begin
reconstructing its economy, (3) integrating the southern Anya-
Nya guerrillas into the Sudanese armed forces, and (4) strength-
ening Colonel Jafar el-Nimeiri's position as the leader of
the Sudan. The agreement, set against the backdrop of the
long Afro-Arab conflict in the Sudan, is an impressive diplo-
matic accomplishment.
It should be noted that the time period addressed in this
examination of Sudan begins in the mid-19 50 's and ends in
1972. Sudan's recent history would suggest that many of the
same problems that Sudan faced in the period examined have
resurfaced in the 1980 's. However, this chapter is not a
comprehensive examination of Sudan's political, social, and
military problems, but instead is limited to a discussion of
the issues and events prior to 1972.
To gain a deeper understanding of the Sudan conflict
within the context of conflict resolution, the conflict
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resolution checklist, developed in the previous chapter,
will be applied to this case. This checklist is a useful
tool in analyzing how elements of the conflict have combined
to produce an agreement. The strategies and resources of the
North and the South are analyzed in two respective sections.
This chapter is structured this way to emphasize the separate
nature and dissimilarities between the two players and to
underline the overall disregard the North had toward the
South. Appendix A provides an historical chronology of the
conflict.
A. THE PLAYERS
The Sudan conflict centers around two main groups--the
predominantly Arabic North, and the mainly African South.
Among these two major groups, several sub-groups have played
important roles in the Sudan conflict. The northern provinces
are mostly Muslim (Sunni), and the main ethnic groups "that
exhibit strong tribal cohesiveness and act as political
pressure units are the Nubians (originally Hamites), the Beja
of the eastern region (also Hamite)." [Ref. l:p. 11] Vari-
ous groups occupy the central region, the most notable of
these are the Fur and the Nuba. The southern Sudanese can
be classified into three groups: (1) the Sudanic, (2) the
Nilo-Hamitic , and (3) the Nilotic [Ref. l:p. 11 and Ref. 2:
pp. 15-32] . The important point to be made about these groups
is that political parties in Sudan draw upon different ethnic
divisions for support.
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Within these major ethnic divisions, various individual
sects in the north act as cohesive political units, and
political loyalties generally follow traditional religious
lines. The impact of divergent political groups in the North
on the Sudan conflict cannot be overstated. The ethnic divi-
sions in the South have not had as great an impact on the
overall course of the conflict in Sudan as the political
rivalries in the North have had. However, tribal divisions
have been a primary factor in limiting southern political and
military cohesion.
During the transition to independence several political
groups developed in the North. The two main parties in 19 56
were the National Unionist Party (NUP) led by Ismail al-
Azhari and supported by the Khatima sect, and the Umma Party,
which received its support from the Ansars and was led by
Abdullah Khalil. In June of 1956, a third political party was
formed when members of the NUP split over the issue of Sudan's
relationship with Egypt. The new party, the People's Demo-
cratic Party (PDP), led by Murghani Hamza, received allegiance
from twenty-one members in the National Assembly. [Ref. 3:
pp. 44-45] The PDP and the Umma party formed a coalition and
voted against Azhari and the NUP. On 5 July 19 56, Khalil
became Premier.
This political reshuffling was the beginning of a larger
political competition in the North. An analysis of the Sudan
conflict must be set in the context of the intense political
rivalry in the North. As we will see, the political instability
29
that results from this rivalry will be a primary catalyst in
bringing about a settlement in 1972.
B. THE OBJECTIVE ISSUE
The objective issue in this case is the unification of
Sudan following independence. Since 1930 the British had
administered the North and South separately under the "Southern
Policy." The British considered the South as a separate
territory from the North and accordingly administered each
region differently. "This policy was based on two premises:
(1) that the Negroid Africans of the South are culturally
and, to some extent, racially distinct from the northern Arab
Sudanese; and (2) that the Southern provinces would either
develop eventually as a separate territorial and political
entity or be integrated into what was then British East Africa."
[Ref. 2:p. 35]
In 1946, the British, anticipating the eventual indepen-
dence of Sudan, reversed its Southern Policy. The new British
policy was designed to establish Sudan as a "united state as
independent as possible of Egypt." [Ref. 4:p. 163] The
northern nationalists, while pressing for independence, were
simultaneously pushing for the unification of the North and
South. From 194 6 onward, the future of the South was inex-
tricably bound to the North.
Several elements separate the North from the South. The
Arabic and African ethnic character of the North and South
respectively, and the accompanying cultural, social, and
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language dissimilarities is the most striking difference be-
tween the two regions. The Arabic language and culture of
the North and its indissoluble link with Islam contrasts
sharply with the multi-tribal, non-Muslim South.
The language difference also contributes to the dissimi-
larity in the educational experience of the two regions. The
key factor relating to the conflict was in the intense compe-
tition for government jobs. This conflict was particularly
bitter since very few southerners are educated in Arabic and
thus could not obtain a government post because of the North's
Arabic language requirement. Moreover, preventing southerners
from obtaining those posts vacated by the British following
Sudan's independence was a major source of resentment in the
South.
Economic inequality was another distinguishing element
between the two regions. The North had experienced greater
development under the British Administration. Most funds for
development were channeled to the North. By comparison the
South experienced little growth.
Each of these elements combined to reinforce the percep-
tion held by most northerners of their superiority over the
South. The North, through religious, educational, social, and
economic differences came to view the South as inferior. This
in turn fostered a mood of resentment and suspicion in the
South. Moreover, the South was resisting the idea of a united
Sudan governed from Khartoum, especially since they perceived
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the level of northern domination would grow. Uniting the
North and the South under a single government was the objec-
tive issue in the Sudan conflict.
C. SUBJECTIVE ISSUES
For the North and the South the issues are very subjective
and their reasons for pursuing their respective policies are
quite divergent. The North has traditionally dominated the
Sudan. This Arab dominance was reinforced in 1946 at the Juba
Conference. Here it was decided that Arabic would be the
official language, essentially ensuring that those government
positions vacated by the British would be filled by Northerners
since, as noted, very few Southerners spoke Arabic. [Ref. 3:
p. 35]
For most northern politicians the "Southern question" was
a sub-issue at best. For them the issue was not the form and
degree of autonomy for the South after independence, but
first, how each politician could promote his own political
party, and second, how to fully Arabicize Sudan.
As noted, southern resentment towards northern domination
had developed. This early resentment was not the result of
an indigenous concept of being a southerner or "of a wider
African world, or of political ideals." [Ref. 4:p. 165]
Instead, it was directly related to the filling of all of
the government posts vacated by the British by Northerners, and
the general abuse many Southerners received under these new
administrators. Azhari rushed to consolidate his political
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security by moving quickly towards Sudanization of the South,
and "by imposing alien Northerners he set the stage for- an
internal crisis." [Ref. 5:p. 467] In 1952, the Umma Party-
dominated legislature negotiated a "Self-Determination Agree-
ment" with the British. The North proceeded with establishing
a government under the new agreement. And although the South
was given a voice in the new government, they were relegated
to a secondary position. From this point, southern political
grievances with the independence government expanded rapidly.
By the mid-1950 's, southern political consciousness began
to grow. An outward display of the growing discontent among
many Southerners was the 1955 mutiny of the South ' s Equatoria
Corps. On 19 August 19 55, the army and police refused the
orders of their northern officers to open fire on a labor
demonstration protesting the trial of a southern politician.
The mutiny set off uprisings in all three southern Sudan
provinces. These uprisings were not a pre-planned response,
but instead were a "spontaneous expression of discontent." •
[Ref. 5:p. 466]
By late 19 55, Azhari's government was pushing for indepen-
dence, and in order to broaden its base of support, had
promised the southern politicians that federation for the
South would be fully considered. On 1 January 19 56 Sudan
became an independent state. A year later Azhari led the
National Assembly in a vote that set up a constitutional com-
mittee to examine the possibility of a federal structure for
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Sudan. However, only three Southerners were on the forty-six
member committee. [Ref. 3:pp. 45-46] The chances that the
committee would recommend federation for the South were
remote
.
It is important to note that the North never considered
the South a full partner in the future of Sudan. Northern
politics and politicians dominated Khartoum. Southern repre-
sentatives had limited influence on Sudanese politics and it
would not be until 1956 that the southern politicians would
form an effective voting bloc in the legislature. The North
had complete disregard for the South and northern politicians
only used the South and southern representatives to further
their own political self-interest.
Thus for the South, the issue initially centered on career
resentment, and fierce discontent with northern domination.
But by the later-1950's the issue developed into a question
of Southern autonomy and self-rule. For both the North and
the South the subjective issues will define their respective
goals.
D . GOALS
The North's primary goal in the Sudan conflict was to
retain control over southern Sudan. At no time in the con-
flict did northern politicans believe that southern Sudan
should be allowed to secede and become an independent state.
An important assumption among most northern politicians was
that the North would always subsume the South. As such.
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retaining as much control over the South was paramount for
the North.
As noted earlier, the Southern problem for northern
politicians was at best a distraction, and the South in their
eyes was never considered an equal partner in the Sudan. The
southern politician's significance in Sudanese politics lay
not in their representation of the South, but in their ability
to tip the scales in political battles among northern
politicians
.
A secondary goal of the North, which reinforced their
primary goal, is the desire on the part of virtually all
northern politicians to Arabicize the entire Sudan--including
the South. Although there was disagreement over the nature of
Sudan's relationship with other Arab states (most notably
Egypt), the consensus was that Sudan should be fully Arabicized
The early goals for the South stemmed from their desire
to free themselves from northern domination. The initial goal
of the South was not to obtain complete independence, but in-
stead they sought a form of federation that would allow them
some autonomy. Members of the Southern Liberal Party, Saturino
Lohure and Elia Lupe , campaigned for autonomy for the South.
[Ref. 3:p. 46] Pursuit of this goal by southern political
leaders attracted little attention from northern politicians.
In February 1962, exiled southern leaders formed the Sudan
African Closed Districts National Union (SACDNU) . By now the
primary goal for the South had evolved so that the stated
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policy of SACDNU, "was to obtain complete independence for the
South." [Ref. 3:p. 53] It is from this point onward that
southern political leaders will split over whether the South
should seek independence or opt for federalism. In 1963
SACDNU changed its name to the Sudan African National Union
(SANU)
.
In summary, the North wanted to retain control over southern
Sudan and to Arabicize the entire country. And for the South,'
the initial goal of autonomy in the form of federalism, evolved
into a call for independence.
Did this divergence in goals result in direct confronta-
tion, or did the North and South believe that negotiation was
the key to a solution? Although the North had been trying to
suppress the "bandits" in the South, up until the early 1960 's,
negotiation, not military intervention, was the preferred route
to a settlement. Clearly neither side had the ability nor the
resolve to force a settlement in their favor. Throughout the
conflict, even as the level of military activity increased,
southern politicians operated openly in Khartoum, and a nego-
tiated settlement was always a possibility. Southern politicians
continued to seek a political agreement with Khartoum up until
November 19 58 when, following Ibrahim Abboud ' s military coup,
all overt political activity in Sudan came to a halt. Six
years later, when the Abboud regime was replaced by the civilian
government of Mohammed al-Khalifa, southern political parties
re-emerged to further the Southern cause.
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The North's initial response to the outbreaks of violence
in the mid-19 50 's was to take a moderate stance against the
southern rebels. Through the mid-19 60 's Khartoum had sought
only to control the rebels and maintain peace in the South.
And while southern rebels were able to "tie down about 15,000
Sudanese regulars, and absorbed a major portion of Khartoum's
$60 million annual defense budget," [Ref. 5:p. 470] the North
did not seek an outright military solution to the "Southern
Problem" in part because the problem had not become critical
and because most northern leaders were completely preoccupied
with the politics of Khartoum.
Both sides still viewed the conflict as variable-sum. In
March 1965, representatives from the North and South met in
Khartoum "to discuss the Southern Question with a view to
reaching an agreement which shall satisfy the regional inter-
ests as well as the national interests of the Sudan." [Ref.
6] Both parties came to the conference with the desire to
settle the conflict through negotiation. The North proposed
to set up a regional government in the South [Ref. 7:p. 948]
.
The southern representatives were divided throughout the
conference and this division directly contributed to the failure
of the conference. Although the Round Table Conference was
unable to resolve the Southern question, it is significant in
that both sides were seeking a dialogue, and each perceived
that through negotiation, a settlement might be possible.
By the end of 1964 the political situation in the North
had changed, and as the "Southern Problem" gained more
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prominence, adjustments to the North's strategy followed. The
South too was changing. A growing political consciousness
coupled with the growth of the southern Anya-Nya guerrilla
organization, set the stage for increased southern militancy
and a corresponding adjustment in the North's strategy. What
was each player's initial strategy, and how did this strategy
change? What were the resources that influenced the strategy
that each side employed?
E. STRATEGY
The strategy used by the North and South changed through-
out the conflict. Adjustments in strategy and tactics were
the result of both changing perceptions and resources. In
this section, a brief review of the strategies used by each
player and the corresponding resources and perceptions that
influenced the choice of strategies used will be examined.
1. The North
There are three distinct phases in the strategy
employed by the North. These phases roughly correspond to
the changes in political leadership in the North.
Phase One. The first phase in the North's strategy
occurred between 1955 and 1965. Immediately following the
1955 mutiny in Equatoria, the North took a moderate stance
towards the rebels [Ref. 5:p. 465]. The North did not per-
ceive the rebels as a major threat in the South once the
immediate disruption caused by the mutiny had ended. In
addition, the North did not believe that much of the discontent
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felt by the Southerners was the result of their Arabization
policy. Instead much of the blame for increased southern
hostility was placed on the Christian missionaries who were
active in the South. "Khartoum's continuing fear that Chris-
tian missionaries were increasing separatist sentiments among
the Southern peoples," led to the enactment of the Christian
Missionaries Act in February 1957 [Ref. 5:p. 468]. The Act
called for the eventual government takeover of all mission-
ary schools in the South. The strategy here was aimed at
decreasing what the North believed was the catalyst of
discontent.
Military action in the South was limited and was de-
signed to suppress rebel activity immediately following the
1955 mutiny, not to force the South into submitting to northern
domination. What prevented the North from exercising a mili-
tary option in the South earlier in the conflict? There are
three factors that precluded use of a concentrated military
strategy during this phase.
First, building a consensus and achieving the resolve
required to exercise a military strategy would have been
difficult in light of the fierce division among northern
politicians. Second, generally most Sudanese preferred a
parliamentary form of government. Control of the government
is based in large part on political coalitions in Khartoum,
and in general national and regional problems were solved
using political means. The problem with the South is no
exception. Third, using military force in the South would
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only have further antagonized the southern people. This would
have- generated a militant reaction from the South much sooner
in the conflict, and would have cuased the North to focus
resources and attention on the Southern problem--something
most Northern politicians sought to avoid.
The North's strategy was also built around a limited
measure of accommodation. Southern politicians were allowed
to lobby for autonomy in the National Assembly. And clearly,
while the North would not have allowed the secession, "the
idea of federation was gaining support among certain majority
groups in the North." [Ref. 3:p. 47]
During this phase the North continued with its policy
of Arabization. As early as 1954 a "Sudanization Committee"
was appointed by Azhari to place Sudanese into administrative
posts vacated by the British. During this phase, out of the
roughly 800 posts available, only 6 were obtained by Southerners
[Ref. 3:p. 37] Part of the reason for this tremendous in-
equity in distribution of posts is related to the Arabic
language requirement imposed on the South by the North. In
addition, the North looking to Arabicize the entire country
and to further its control in the South placed northern
proxies in the South to establish direct lines of control in
the southern provinces.
The North had two major resources in this phase.
First, no matter how hard the South pushed for independence,
the North believed that it was its right to maintain Sudan's
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territorial integrity. The South would never be allowed to
secede. The North could consistently rely on the support of
the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in preventing a com-
plete split in the Sudan. The OAU views secession as "detri-
mental to African interests because it is considered to be
incompatible with the (OAU's) goal of African Unity." [Ref.
2:p. 127-134] In addition, the North had the support of Egypt
and other Islamic states along with the tacit support of the
international community. While at times, this support did not
translate into direct aid, it did support the North's percep-
tion of its legitimacy in keeping Sudan united.
The second resource that the North had in this phase,
which can also be considered a southern limitation, was the
lack of southern political consciousness and the absence of
an organized political movement in the South. While the South
had representatives from various political parties operating
in Khartoum, these representatives operated in comparative
isolation from the South.
Political consciousness first emerged in the secondary
schools in the mid to late-1950's. However, spreading this
political consciousness among the relatively uneducated vil-
lages was difficult. "Students had only limited impact upon
political awareness in their home communities; more often
they were regarded as work shy townsfolk." [Ref. 4:p. 168]
It would not be until 1964, when political parties in Sudan
began to reemerge , that the North would have to contend with
a strong political movement in the South.
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Along with these two resources, the northern strategy-
was also influenced by two main limitations. The first limi-
tation was the well-documented, intense political rivalries
that existed in the North. Throughout the conflict, northern
political maneuvering distracted political leaders from con-
centrating on the Southern problem. This limitation will be
present in all three phases of northern strategy, and will
continue right up until the time when Nimeiri actively seeks
a solution to the conflict.
The second limitation constraining the North was the
generally poor performance of the Sudanese economy during this
period. Much of the dissatisfaction w^th the Azhari, Khalil,
and Abboud regimes in the late 19 50 's, early 19 60 's, was a
result of the inability of each administration to promote
consistent economic growth. Contributing to the problem was
Sudan's heavy reliance on cotton as a source of revenue. Poor
marketing coupled with several weak harvests led to sharp down-
turns in Sudanese economic performance. Without a strong
growing economy the North could not finance any long-term
social programs to appease the South, nor could it financially
support a comprehensive military campaign. In addition, poor
economic performance contributed to the instability of each
of the regimes in this period. Many Northerners were dis-
satisfied with the way the economy was being managed, and this
diminished the support given to those in power.
Phase Two. The Round Table Conference in March 1965,
marked the end of phase one. In phase two the North took a
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much more militant stance towards the South. This was brought
about by two changing realities. First, the southern rebel
organization, the Anya-Nya , increased its guerrilla activity
in the South. And second, continued frustration with the
Southern problem had changed northern perceptions. For over
ten years following independence, a moderate approach in the
South had not solved the problem. Most northern politicians
partially attributed Sudan's difficulty with formulating a
constitution and its inability to promote economic and social
development since the British withdrawal to the continuing
problem with the South.
Following the 1964 "October Revolution," when the
country returned to party politics. General Abboud was re-
placed by Mohammed al-Khalifa. Khalifa was genuinely sympa-
thetic to the Southern cause, and his administration actively
pressed for a negotiated settlement. [Ref. 2
: pp . 105-106]
However, Khalifa's regime was short-lived, and the new govern-
ment, formed from a coalition established between the Umma
Party and the NUP , changed northern strategy in the South.
The new coalition leader, "Prime Minister Mohammed Ahmed Mahgoud
had an antipathy for the southern Sudan and argued persistently
that the only language Africans in the South can understand
is force." [Ref. 2:p. 109] This perception is reflected in
the North's adoption of a new military policy in the South.
Mahgoub launched an extensive counter-offensive in the South,
and he had "given the Southern Army Command a free hand to
destroy the Anya-Nya." [Ref. 4:p. 175]
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Early in 1965, the North had tried to limit the Anya-
Nya ' s capability by cancelling permission for the transhipment
of Soviet arms to rebels in the northeast Congo. These arms
were being intercepted enroute by the Anya-Nya. Additional
arms were obtained from Congolese rebels who traded their arms
for radios, Sudanese beer, and other goods. [Ref. 5:p. 470]
By this time the North was faced with two stark options. With
the growing capability and strength of the Anya-Nya, coupled
with their refusal to negotiate anything less than the dis-
solution of the Union, the North could only respond by either
acquiescing to Southern demands for independence or by meeting
the Anya-Nya guerrilla attacks with force. It chose the
latter
.
Raw power struggles dominated northern politics during
this phase. In early July 1966, Mahgoub was replaced by Sadiq
al-Mahdi. And, while Sadiq 's political orientation was much
different from Mahgoub ' s his policy towards the Southern
problem was similar to that of his predecessor. Sadiq advo-
cated the spread of Islam and Arabic, and following his tour
of the South in November 1966, reaffirmed a tough policy
against the Anya-Nya. [Ref. 2:p. 118]
The North's inability to secure a military victory in
the South was limited by a number of factors. The most nota-
ble of these were the deteriorating relationships Sudan was
experiencing with its neighboring states. From 1964 to mid-
1965, Khartoum adopted a radical foreign policy. [Ref. 8:
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p. 301] This policy antagonized the surrounding states and
contributed to the ineffectiveness of the North's military
strategy
.
By 1965 the Anya-Nya received support from Moise Tshombe
in the Congo. The Anya-Nya was now helping the Congolese
government track down Congolese rebels who had been armed by
Sudan. The Congolese troops ignored the Sudanese border as
they pursued rebels fleeing into the Sudan. One positive
aspect of the Congo revolt for the North was that it gave
Khartoum an excuse to send a great number of troops to the
South. [Ref. 3:p. 79] This alleviated some of the external
criticism the North was starting to receive as a result of
its brutal military offensive in the South.
Also in 1965 problems with Chad started to surface.
Since its independence in 1960, Chad had experienced problems
with Islamic tribes in the east who had tribal links with the
western Sudan. Angry at the support the Chadean exiles were
receiving from Khartoum, President Tombalbye publicly threatened
reprisals against those Sudanese living in Chad. Of signifi-
cance for the North was the inference that Chad might open up
its borders to southern Sudanese rebels. [Ref. 8:p. 304]
The Sudanese shift in policy further "exacerbated a
long standing source of tension on the Ethiopian border."
[Ref. 8:p. 303] Several border incidents occurred during this
period and the level of antagonism between Addis Ababa and
Khartoum increased. As insurance against aggressive Sudanese
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behavior, Ethiopia formed an alliance with the Anya-Nya
.
Active support for the Anya-Nya could only increase the
North's difficulty with combatting the Southern rebels.
The original intention of Sudan's foreign policy in
1964 was to encourage revolutionary activity within Africa,
and the politicians in Khartoum believed that Sudan should
support other revolutionary movements. However, the result
of this policy was that surrounding states, threatened by
Sudanese supported rebels in their own countries, diverted
Sudan's resources and attention by supporting the Anya-Nya.
By late 1965, as a reaction to the mounting pressure the
North received from its neighboring states, it adopted a
moderate policy in aiding rebels in other states. Khartoum
sought neutrality in the region in hopes that support for the
Anya-Nya would diminish. In addition, those factions in the
North that had originally advocated a radical policy were
losing their influence. The North took a more pragmatic
approach and adjusted its policy accordingly.
By 1968 relationships with neighboring states had im-
proved. In October, the Congo agreed to halt the flow of arms
and troops across the Sudan-Congo border [Ref . 5:p. 472]
.
The Anya-Nya had already experienced difficulty in obtaining
arms and ammunition, and this reduction in support diminished
the fighting capacity of the rebels. This was an important
resource for the North.
In sum. Northern efforts to win militarily in the South
had proven fruitless. What was needed was a new approach to
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the Southern problem and with the overthrow of the Mahgoud
government by Jafar el-Nimeiri in 1969, the second phase ended
Armed with the lessons gained from the failure of the civilian
government to resolve the Southern problem, the new military
government adopted a different strategy for resolving the
conflict.
Phase Three. The shift away from a military solution
to the Southern problem by a military government might, at
first, seem unusual. However, Nimeiri had first hand experi-
ence at fighting the southern rebels, and he understood the
difficulty with winning militarily in the South. [Ref. 9:
p. 4] His perceptions shaped the North's new strategy.
Nimeiri realized the importance of incorporating the
southern provinces into a united Sudan. To gauge the dynamics
of the southern problem more accurately, Nimeiri established
the "Office of Southern Affairs" headed by a southerner. In
addition, Nimeiri sought to gain the trust of southern leaders
and reduce the intense resentment the South held for the North
by promoting greater social and economic development in the
southern provinces. Both of these steps were designed to
influence southern perceptions and make southerners more recep-
tive to an agreement with Khartoum. The key point here is
that Nimeiri understood the role that perceptions play in a
conflict. And although his programs in the South could only
begin to redress two decades of inequality, they would go far




Nimeiri's strategy had two basic points. First, the
South would never be allowed to secede. Nimeiri stated that,
"We do not believe in secession, we consider such an event as
a crime that should not be forgiven." [Ref. 10] Second, the
new regime focused on a political vice military solution in
the South. Nimeiri recognized, "the existence of historic
discrepancies between the South and North, especially in tra-
ditions and culture." The new regime granted "regional
autonomy to southern provinces within the framework of a new
integral socialist Sudan." [Ref. 11] By granting the South
autonomy, and allowing southerners to have some control over
their own affairs, Nimeiri gave them the security they would
need in order to accept a united socialist Sudan. In addition,
the political option was pursued in part because the war was
draining the limited financial resources of Sudan. "The
Nimeiri regime came to realize the enormous amount of borrowed
money spent on sustaining the war could be used beneficially
in social and economic development, to which it was committed."
[Ref. 2:p. 162]
The Nimeiri regime was able to focus on the Southern
problem more than the preceding regimes because of two princi-
pal reasons. First, Nimeiri barred all political parties in
Sudan, and established the Sudan Socialist Union (SSU) which
would subsume all former political organizations. This
diminished the constant political fighting in the North, and
allowed him to consolidate his power. The constant political
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divisiveness in the North that had precluded any unity in
solving the Southern problem was reduced. Second, pressures
from Sudan's surrounding states had diminished. During this
period Sudan slipped back into its traditional isolation in
foreign affairs. Therefore, Nimeiri was not distracted with
many external problems and could concentrate on domestic issues
By the beginning of 1970, the new regime was headed
towards a solution in the South. Clearly the North now per-
ceived the conflict as variable-sum, and believed that a
solution in the South would benefit both sides. Progress
towards a settlement was slow. Breaking out of old patterns
of behavior and changing perceptions throughout the North
though not impossible, would be difficult. However, in mid-
1971, a single event accelerated the new regime's drive for
a settlement in the South.
On 19 July 1971, a military coup was staged by offi-
cers within Nimeiri 's regime who wanted to move Sudan away
from Nimeiri 's form of socialism to a system which incorporated
a (Soviet) communist orientation. For three days Nimeiri was
held prisoner in the Presidential Palace. Realizing that
Sudan would be dominated by communists, the overwhelming
majority of Sudanese supported the counter-coup that returned
Nimeiri to power. [Ref. 12:pp. 12-15]
The coup attempt changed Nimeiri 's perceptions and
forced him to reorder his priorities. Prior to the coup, the
Soviet Union had been Sudan's main arms supplier. But after
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the communist-supported coup, the relationship between Nimeiri
and the Soviets deteriorated. Nimeiri looked to the West
for support and aid. Though sympathetic, the Western powers
wanted a more stable Sudan before they would completely sup-
port Nimeiri. They convinced him that the key to a stable
Sudan (the condition for aid and support) was a settlement in
the South.
Nimeiri realized that his most ardent supporters dur-
ing the attempted coup were Egypt, Libya, and Syria—his
Arab brothers. His desire to Arabicize Sudan was as strong
as his predecessors, however, he was "aware of the need to
anchor the Sudan firmly in the realities of its African
environment." [Ref. 12 :p. 15] This awareness prompted Nimeiri
to actively push for a settlement with the South, and to shift
Sudan's foreign policy to promote this goal.
During phase three, Nimeiri 's adjustments to Sudan's
foreign policy as it related to the conflict with the South
were designed to signal to the South the North's commitment
to maintaining a united Sudan and to prevent Sudan's neighbors
from further encouraging or supporting any secessionist activity
in the South. To support this policy Nimeiri expressed his
commitment to both the OAU and the Arab League, and to non-
intervention and self-determination for African states.
Nimeiri began to establish Sudan as the link between
the Arabic and African states in the region. This tended to
deemphasize and postpone the North's rapid move to Arabicize
the entire country and was designed to establish firmer ties
50
with the black African states in the region. This was a
critical reorientation in the North's policy, and while the
Anya-Nya continued to be suspicious of Nimeiri's intentions,
this reorientation laid the foundation for a future agreement.
In addition, this policy adjustment was aimed at pro-
moting stability and cooperation in the region so that Khartoum
could pursue its strategy in the South without the apprehension
that external forces would undermine its efforts to resolve
the conflict.
Nimeiri appointed a new Minister for Southern Affairs,
Abel Alier, to replace Joseph Garang , a communist purged from
the administration as a result of his involvement in the abor-
tive coup. Alier enjoyed the confidence and trust of many
Southerners, and he had consistently encouraged negotiations
with the Anya-Nya. [Ref. 2:p. 163] In 1971, working through
the World Council of Churches (WCC) , Alier opened preliminary
talks with the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM)
.
These talks would eventually lead to the Addis Ababa accords.
While these changes were occurring in the North, what
were the factors that brought the South to the negotiating
table? What was the South ' s strategy in the conflict, and what
resources and perceptions did they hold that would influence
their strategy?
2. The South
The South ' s strategy and resources, like the North's,
can be separated into three general phases. The time periods
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each of these phases encompass coincide roughly to the phases
in the North's strategy. The changing strategy of the South
is a response to shifting northern strategies and of its own
changing resources and perceptions.
Phase One. From the time of independence until mid-
1964, the South 's strategy had consistently focused on the
attainment of autonomy through peaceful means. Immediately
following independence most southerners believed autonomy
would come in the form of a federal system with the North. But
by the early 1960 's a push for independence replaced the call
for federation. Southern politicians operating in Khartoum
at the time of independence had been promised that autonomy
for the South would be considered. Prior to 19 58, when Abboud '
s
military regime outlawed political parties, southern politicians,
under the leadership of Stanislaus Peysama, were able to form
an effective voting bloc in the National Assembly. And while
they could not challenge the power of northern political coali-
tions, they "had a potentially decisive strength, in a parlia-
ment based on fragile coalition governments." [Ref. 3:p. 46]
Many southern politicians were accused by their Southern
political constituencies (who were far removed from Khartoum)
of betraying the Southern cause. However, many politicians
did in fact push for autonomy. "Both Saturino Lohure and Elia
Lupe of the Federal Party openly campaigned for complete
autonomy for the South." [Ref. 3:p. 46] In a speech to the
House, "Saturino had spoken openly of the South separating
from the North." [Ref. 4:p. 170] On the eve of the Abboud
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coup, many southerners felt that federation was in their reach.
Southern politicians had worked hard towards obtaining the
support of many northern politicians in their push for autonomy.
When Abboud abolished all political parties in Sudan, effec-
tively limiting the power of the northern politicians, the
Southerners saw their chance for autonomy slip away.
The banning of political parties in Sudan may at first
seem detrimental to Southern goals of autonomy. This is true
in the short term. However, in retrospect, the banning of
political parties fostered a spirit of unity among those
leaders in exile and in fact prompted the formation of the
Sudan African Closed District National Union (SACDNU) . SACDNU '
s
declared policy was "to obtain complete independence for the
South, through diplomatic and political means." [Ref. 3:p. 53]
In 1963 SACDNU changed its name to the Sudan African National
Union (SANU)
.
This newly formed political organization represented
the core of southern leadership. They pursued this peaceful
strategy because of two main factors. First, during this
initial phase the South 's guerrilla force was just starting to
form. Small sporadic resistence movements had sprung up
throughout southern Sudan, and it would not be until 1963,
when the Land Freedom Army (LFA) organized these diverse groups
into a single coherent military force that the South could
challenge the North militarily. The military option during
the first phase was infeasible.
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Second, the perception that parliamentary means could
still be used to obtain autonomy for the South persisted.
Even with the setbacks imposed by Abboud ' s regime, many
southern politicans still believed that they could press the
North into agreeing to autonomy using internal and external
political pressure. The resurgence of political activity
following the 1964 "October revolution," gave many political
leaders one more opportunity to seek autonomy through political
means.
During this phase, the South had a limited number of
resources. The political cohesion within Khartoum that the
South enjoyed in the late-1950's would not be repeated in 1964
when Sudan returned to party politics. However, a grass roots
political movement was growing in the South, and many southern
politicians formed provisional governments in exile throughout
the three southern provinces. In addition, the South was
expanding three resources during this period that would shape
its strategy in the second phase. First, career resentment and
dissatisfaction with the North was continually growing among
a wide cross section of Southerners. This would provide
southern leaders with a broad base with which an organized
resistence movement could be formed. Second, aside from being
dissatisfied with the North, a real political consciousness
was developing in the South. "Alongside a tribal identity, a
Southern identity was rapidly developing, and with it inchoate
but real political aspirations for the future of the Southern
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people as a whole." [Ref. 4:p. 175] Third, the LFA which
by 1963 had become the Anya-Nya (snake poison) guerrilla
organization, was increasing its support and gaining in
strength
.
Thus, by 19 64 the Southern push for independence had
evolved from a movement originally supported by southern
intellectual politicians, with limited resources, to a move-
ment that was supported by a majority of the Southern peoples,
with increasing support and the growing will to seriously
challenge the North. The next phase in the Southern strategy
reflects these changing resources and the reorientation of
southern perceptions.
Phase Two. The shift in the South 's strategy at the
start of phase two was based on an important perception--that
the only way the South would obtain independence was through
military force.
The first Anya-Nya guerrilla campaign occurred in Janu-
ary 1964. Due to a number of factors, the first campaign ended
in failure. The leader of the Anya-Nya force, Captian Berdan-
dino, and sixty of his men were captured. This operation had
shaken the confidence of the Anya-Nya and would make them
timid about attacking northern troops for some time to come.
[Ref. 3:p. 60] However, the South was now committed to a
military solution and it would be difficult to turn back from
this course of action.
During this period the effectiveness of the South '
s
strategy was limited by a number of factors. First, the
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Southern Sudan Provisional Government (SSPG) which was formed
in 1967, had claimed, without foundation, authority over the
Anya-Nya. In reality most Anya-Nya guerrillas were loyal only
to their local commanders. Without the coordination between
political and military efforts, the South would be unable to
maximize its impact in the North, and would not be able to
increase the costs to the North of standing firm on autonomy.
Second, from 1968 to 1969 the SSPG itself was riddled
with factionalization. Three splinter groups were formed from
the SSPG: The Anyidi Revolutionary Government, the Sue River
Revolutionary Government, and the Azania-Sudan Government in
East Africa. This division only served to weaken the Southern
cause and made a political settlement much harder to coordinate
Third, with the degeneration of the political effort,
the Anya-Nya became the primary resource for the South. And
while, as noted earlier, the Anya-Nya was able to obtain arms
and ammunition from Congolese rebels fleeing across the Congo-
Sudan border, problems with obtaining the necessary arms to
seriously challenge northern troops persisted. By the end of
19 64 the Anya-Nya had roughly 5,000 troops, but only 10 per-
cent had firearms. [Ref. 3:p. 79] And by 1969, when Anya-Nya
troop strength doubled to 10,000, only about one-fifth had
firearms of any type [Ref. 3:p. 97]
.
A continuing resource that the South could rely upon
to resist northern pressure was the North's political insta-
bility. This factor had long prevented the North from focusing
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on the Southern problem. Had the North been able to concen-
trate earlier on the Southern problem, the course and outcome
of the conflict may have been different. Between 1964 and
19 69, the Sudan had undergone six changes in government. The
North's inability to clearly address the Southern problem
allowed the South to develop its guerrilla force and provided
southern leaders with the time necessary to build a political
consciousness. The result of this was that the goals of both
the North and the South had shifted. For the North, pursuing
a policy of Arabization in Sudan had taken a back seat to the
paramount goal of maintaining a united Sudan. The South had
also shifted its goals. No longer satisfied with obtaining
autonomy in the form of federation, complete independence
became the minimum acceptable goal.
The third and final phase of the South ' s strategy is
really an extension of the second. What occurred in the third
phase was not so much an adjustment in strategy, as a consoli-
dation and reorientation of resources.
Phase Three. The principal factor that distinguishes
phase three from phase two is the ability of southern leaders
to strengthen the organization and the discipline of the Anya-
Nya, and to unite the political and military efforts of the
South. The individual primarily responsible for this was
Colonel Joseph Lagu [Ref. 3:pp. 132-141]. Lagu was able to
consolidate all effective military and political power in the
three southern provinces. In August 1971, Lagu announced the
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formation of the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM)
.
This was the first time since the beginning of the conflict
that political and military power was formally linked in the
South.
During this phase the South relied on two sources of
external support. First, as a result of Nimeiri's militant
policy towards Israel, "Israeli support for the Southern
Sudanese cause was translated into military supplies for the
Anya-Nya." [Ref. 2:p. 139] The Israelis gave the Anya-Nya
arms that they had captured during the 19 67 war. These arms
boosted the morale of Anya-Nya troops and improved their fight-
ing capability. They were now "able to effectively control
the countryside and render the northern Sudanese soldiers
ineffective." [Ref. 2:p. 139]
Second, Idi /ynin in Uganda, in retaliation against the
northern Sudanese support of his rival Milton Obote, became a
strong supporter of the South. Amin threatened to give mili-
tary aid to the Anya-Nya. And this, coupled with Israeli
military support to the guerrillas, was a factor in prompt-
ing Nimeiri to seek a settlement with the SSLM. [Ref. 2:
p. 165]
By the time the Addis Ababa meetings convened, the
South had developed an effective military force capable of
controlling many areas in the South. Perhaps more importantly,
the political liability this force posed for any northern
political regime would seriously threaten the stability of
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that regime. This would force those northern leaders in power
to actively seek a settlement with the South.
F. THE ADDIS ABABA AGREEMENT
By mid-1971, both sides seemed ready to talk. Working
through the WCC, Alier had arranged to meet with leaders of
the SSLM. The eventual outcome of these talks was a settlement
to the Sudanese conflict--the Addis Ababa Accords. What were
the principal factors that made each player perceive the con-
flict as variable-sum? Why was the North and South willing
to reconcile their differences and accommodate one another
after such a long and bitter struggle? Why was the conflict
"ripe for resolution" in 1971?
First, both sides realized that neither could win mili-
tarily. Northern troops controlled the towns in the South
and the southern guerrillas had command of the countryside.
Anya-Nya strength had increased since 1970, but their future
growth was uncertain, and this coupled with the military stale-
mate forced southern leaders to reevaluate their strategy.
[Ref. 2:p. 162] For the North the war with the South was in-
creasing in cost. The southern provinces had great economic
potential for Sudan, but as long as the war continued the
South would remain a liability.
Second, each side could negotiate as a unitary actor.
Nimeiri had firm control in the North. The abortive coup in
May 1971 had shaken his authority, but by late-1971, he was
clearly the unchallenged leader in Khartoum. The South could
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also speak with one voice. The SSLM, under Joseph Lagu , had
the wide support of the southern people. Thus, each side
could focus its negotiating efforts in one direction, without
the problems often posed by multilateral negotiations.
Third, Abel Alier was able to convince key southern leaders
that their best chance for a peaceful settlement was with
Nimeiri [Ref . 2:p. 155] . The South ' s efforts at obtaining a
settlement with northern regimes since independence had con-
sistently proven fruitless. And with the possible exception
of the Khalifa regime, northern rulers had never seriously
negotiated with the South. Even when Nimeiri had granted a
system of autonomy for the South, most southern Sudanese re-
mained skeptical of northern sincerity. However, with the
great trust that Alier enjoyed among southern Sudanese, he
was able to convince the southern leaders that Nimeiri 's
government was sincerely moving in a positive direction.
Fourth, Alier also played a key role in convincing Nimeiri
to recognize the Anya-Nya as a force that must be included in
any settlement. When Lagu realized that his troops would be
part of a settlement, he supported the WCC negotiating efforts.
Fifth, after the attempted coup, Nimeiri realized that he
must consolidate his power and broaden his base of support.
For the moment he was in complete control and he took the
initiative to solve the Southern problem.
Sixth, of special note is the role that Emperor Haile
Selassie played in the negotiations in Addis Ababa. Although
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Ethiopia had remained neutral in the conflict since the late-
1960 's, Selassie intervened in the negotiations at crucial
times, when major stumbling blocks developed. [Ref. 3:p. 142
and Ref. 2:p. 165] He used his impressive reputation to ease
the apprehension both sides were experiencing and opened the
way to accommodation.
The final step (VI) in the negotiation checklist is to
identify the outcome of the conflict and to examine the solu-
tion. The Addis Ababa Agreement, signed on 28 February 1972,
represents a crossroad in the conflict between the North and
South. This negotiated settlement addressed the objective
and subjective issues of the conflict and includes concessions
and reconciliation moves from both players. The provisions of
the Addis Ababa accords are provided below, followed by a
brief review of each provision.
1. Upon ratification between Nimeiri and Lagu, a cease
fire would come into effect.
2. Following the cease fire, the three southern provinces
would be united under its own regional President.
3. The regional President would be chosen by an Executive
Council appointed by the Sudanese Head Council upon
recommendation by a Regional Assembly. The Council
would control all aspects of southern policy except
defense, foreign affairs, currency and finance, and
economic and social planning. These would remain
under the control of the central government in Khartoum,
which included the South.
4. The Regional Assembly would be elected through universal
adult suffrage.
5. The Anya-Nya would eventually be incorporated into the
Sudanese Army Southern Command. The South would set
up its own armed police force to maintain law and order.
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6. The official language in Sudan would be Arabic, the
cominon language would be English and would be taught
in the schools in the South. [Ref. 3:pp. 163-164]
How closely do these provisions mirror the initial goals
of each side? Were any of the goals that were modified as
the conflict continued met by the settlement? The following
is a brief review of each of the provisions.
The first provision calls for a cease fire. This is in
both sides best interest. Although there were times in the
conflict when military force was the preferred strategy for
both sides, the military stalemate that had developed only
increased the costs incurred by each side without providing
any significant additional benefits. The first priority of
this type of settlement is to stop the fighting and to build
an atmosphere of trust and security. Following this, the other
articles of the agreement can be implemented.
The second provision grants regional autonomy for the
South. This fulfills the South ' s initial goal first articu-
lated in the late-1950's. However, as the conflict developed
the South began to push for complete independence. This goal
is not met by the settlement and represents a measure of
accommodation by the South.
The third provision coupled with the second reinforces
the South ' s goal of autonomy, and satisfies the North's goal
of unifying Sudan. Here each player seems to realize that the
conflict is variable-sum, and that a settlement in which both
the North and the South have confidence, will ultimately be
in each player's best interest.
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Provisions four and five are really designed to win the
confidence of the South. Agreeing to universal adult suf-
frage and incorporating the Anya-Nya into the Sudanese Army,
elevates the South to a position of equality with the North.
This legitimizes the South ' s struggle and builds southern
self-respect. This gives the South the opportunity to make
concessions to the North from a position of perceived strength
and equality.
Provision six is based in reality. The desire of the
North to Arabicize the Sudan is officially recognized by
making Arabic the official language. In some respects this
places the Arabic culture in Sudan above the African culture
in the southern Sudan. However, by recognizing English as
the common language, it takes into account the resistance the
South would have to universal adoption of Arabic.
G. CONCLUSION
The Addis Ababa accords represent a successful settlement
to a long and violent conflict. The cultural, ethnic, reli-
gious, and political differences that divide the North and
the South are unlikely to allow Sudan to become a homogeneous
state. Since the Addis Ababa Agreement was signed, Sudan
has been plagued by continuing fierce political factionaliza-
tion and persistent religious and ideological rivalries. In
the 1970 's Nimeiri faced repeated coup attempts, and by the
1980 's tensions between the North and South had resurfaced.
In an April 1985 bloodless coup, the Nimeiri regime was
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overthrown by a military junta led by General Abdel-Rahman
Swareddahab. The General faces many of the same problems
that Nimeiri himself confronted in the late 1960 's and early
1970 's. [Ref. 13] Politics in the Sudan have continued to
be volatile, a volatility which cannot be altered by an
Agreement
.
Yet in a very real sense, the Addis Ababa settlement was
a success. The accords represent true accommodation by both
sides. Settling the conflict allowed Nimeiri to consolidate
his power in the North and allowed for some economic and social
development in Sudan. Most importantly the settlement brought
together two very divergent groups, each with their own goals
and perceptions, and allowed each to come away from the con-
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III. THE RHODES IA/ ZIMBABWE CONFLICT
In December 1979, the Lancaster House Agreement was signed
ending the fourteen year conflict in Rhodesia. Similar to
Sudan the Rhodesian conflict was also resolved by a nego-
tiated settlement. The settlement came after many years of
violence and after many failed attempts to obtain a nego-
tiated resolution. However, unlike Sudan where there was a
relative absence of external players, the Rhodesian conflict
involves several external players
.
The Rhodesian conflict was well documented in the world
press. Because of the abundance of information and analysis
about the Rhodesian conflict, the conflict resolution check-
list was especially useful in identifying those key elements
which had the greatest impact on the course and outcome of
the conflict. This chapter applies the negotiation checklist
to the Rhodesian conflict from the time of the Rhodesian
Unilateral Declaration of Independence in November 19 65 until
the Lancaster House Agreement fourteen years later. Using
the framework of the conflict resolution checklist, this chap-
ter first identifies the key elements, then analyzes subse-
quent adjustments in strategy, goals, and resources. Appendix





The Rhodesian conflict involved several primary and secon-
dary players, both internal and external to Rhodesia. The
initial conflict developed between Rhodesia's white settlers
who had control of Rhodesia and the British government, which
exercised a form of sovereignty over the colony. The white
minority had settled in Rhodesia in the late 1880 's under a
Royal Charter granted to Cecil John Rhodes' British South
Africa Company. The white settlers set up their own adminis-
tration and effectively controlled Rhodesia and its black
African population. Rhodesia was never administered directly
by the British despite the fact that it was considered a
British colony in Africa. Britain had retained certain legis-
lative options in Rhodesia but never effectively exercised
them. [Ref. 14:pp. 5-6]
At the time of UDI Rhodesia's Prime Minister, Ian Smith,
was the symbol and leader of the white settlers. Throughout
this chapter. Smith's perceptions mirror those of the white
community in general. Smith remained Prime Minister and
leader of the dominant white party in Rhodesia (the Rhodesian
Front), until April 1979, when Able Muzorewa, a black Rho-
desian bishop, became Prime Minister in Smith's internal
settlement. Smith retained effective control in Rhodesia
until after the Lancaster House settlement. The continuity
of leadership provided by Smith's tenure as Prime Minister
contrasts with that of Britain's where six British Prime
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Ministers had to address the conflict in Rhodesia. These
changes in British administrations will be a resource for
Smith.
The third primary player in the conflict is the Rhodesian
Black nationalists. Comprising roughly 97 percent of the total
population, the African population is dominated by two main
ethno-linguistic groups, the Shona (75 percent) , and the
Ndebele (16 percent). [Ref. 15:p. 16] Although the main
objective issue centered around the role the black majority
should play in Rhodesia, they did not become effective influ-
ential players until the mid-1970 's. The two major political
parties, the Shona-based Zimbabwe African National Union
(ZANU) led by Robert Mugabe, and the Ndebele-dominated
Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) led by Joshua Nkomo
,
were not united until 1974 when the two groups formed the
Patriotic Front (PF) . But it would not be until the end of
1978 that each organization's military wing would be consoli-
dated under a single command. However, by the early-1970's
the black nationalists had assumed the role of primary player
in the conflict, and supported by a number of external players,
the PF became a major party in the final settlement in Rhodesia
The Rhodesian conflict is filled with secondary players.
At the time of UDI, the most important were South Africa and
Portugal. South Africa always has been the dominant regional
power. Linked spiritually to the Rhodesian white settlers.
South Africa's interests are tied to the entire region. Thus
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throughout the conflict South Africa took an active role in
the conflict, pushing for an outcome that would be in its
best interests.
Portugal's role as a secondary player stems from its pre-
1974 colonial holdings in Mozambique and Angola. It will be
Portugal's exodus from the region as a colonial power that
will mark a major turning point in the conflict. A third
secondary player that emerged early in the conflict was the
United Nations. While the UN did not actively participate in
direct negotiations with Rhodesia, UN-sponsored sanctions
were a primary resource for the British.
By the mid-1970 's, two additional secondary players emerged
From the time of UDI until 1970, the United States played a
passive role, preferring to keep free of direct responsibility
in the region. In 1970, the Nixon administration adjusted
US policy in southern Africa. National Security Study
Memorandum (NSSM) 39 outlined a policy that gave tacit sup-
port to white minority regimes in southern Africa . [Ref. 16]
The new policy was designed with South Africa in mind, but
the white settlers in Rhodesia also benefitted [Ref. 17]
.
By 1974, following the military coup in Lisbon that prompted
Portugal to relinquish control in the region, the US began
to reevaluate its policy in southern Africa. The US, headed
by US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, became a principal
secondary player.
Following their independence Mozambique and Angola, along
with other states in the region (Tanzania, Botswanna, and
69
Zambia), joined together to form the Frontline States. The
Frontline States became a secondary player in the conflict,
lending active support to the black nationalists in Rhodesia
and in many cases urging them to negotiate a settlement. The
Frontline States will play a major role in the Lancaster House
negotiations
.
The Rhodesian conflict involved several players, and as
in all conflict each player has its own goals and interests
defined by the issues. What then are the objective and sub-
jective issues in the Rhodesian conflict?
B. THE ISSUES
to put it simply, the main objective issue of the Rhodesian
conflict is who will control Rhodesia following independence.
By 1965 Great Britain had granted independence to virtually
all its colonies in Africa. Rhodesia posed a unique problem
for Great Britain since it had to deal with a white settler
population firmly in control of the government in Salisbury.
For Great Britain, the subjective issue was how to grant inde-
pendence to Rhodesia based on majority rule to appease black
Africans in Rhodesia and throughout Africa, while avoiding a
prolonged military struggle between British and Rhodesian
forces. The initial catalyst for Great Britain's program of
decolonization was that the costs of holding African colonies
were outweighing the benefits. However, Great Britain was
not prepared to lose those benefits gained from established
relations with its former colonies in Africa. Antagonizing
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black elites in Africa by not recognizing black rights in an
independent Rhodesia would reduce some of the benefits gained
from decolonization.
The subjective issue for Rhodesia's Whites was how to in-
sure their security following independence. As settlers, the
white Rhodesians were physically and psychologically bound to
the land, and they controlled nearly all of the country's
economic resources. For them, their continued security was
threatened by a black African government in Rhodesia. The
white community perceived their security as being dependent
upon control of the government and all of the administrative
apparatus in Rhodesia. Through a series of acts and proclama-
tions they had secured White domination in Rhodesia. More-
over, control equaled security in their view. The costs of
allowing black majority rule in Rhodesia were higher than the
costs of standing firm.
Like the conflict in Sudan, the subjective issues will
define each player's goals. What goals did the white com-
munity, led by Ian Smith, hope to achieve? What were Great
Britain's goals at the time of UDI?
C . GOALS
For Smith and the white Rhodesians the initial stated goal
is expressed in the Unilateral Declaration of Independence
(UDI), which called for complete independence from Great
Britain. Here the stated goal and the perceived maximum goal
possible are the same. Most white Rhodesians did not believe
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that UDI would be an end in itself. Instead UDI was a tool
for ensuring White control. The minimum goal that they would
accept would be independence based on the 1961 constitution.
The constitution did incorporate the principle of majority
rule, however, the white minority controlled the rate in
which majority rule would be achieved. The constitution was
"rigged with loopholes that negated any possibility that it
would serve to curb the authoritarian propensities of the white
government." [Ref. 18 :p. 40] In addition, the constitution
relinquished Britain's right to veto legislation that affected
Rhodesia's black population [Ref. 15:p. 40]. The 1961 con-
stitution guaranteed continued white control in Rhodesia, and
as stated earlier, control equaled security in white Rhodesian
minds.
Great Britain's maximum goal was a quick transfer of power
in Rhodesia from the white minority to the black African
majority at the time of independence. The minimum the British
would accept would be the safeguarding of black rights, the
expansion of black political participation, and the eventual
transition to majority rule. Initially put forth as conditions
for independence, the so-called five principles, made public
in October 1965, reveal the essential British goals in Rhodesia.
The principles are:
1. The principles and intention of unimpeded progress to
majority rule, at least as outlined in the 1961 Con-
stitution, would have to be maintained and guaranteed.
2. There would also have to be guarantees against retro-
gressive amendment of the Constitution.
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3. There would have to be immediate improvement in the
political status of the African population.
4. There would have to be progress toward ending racial
discrimination.
5. The British government would need to be satisfied that
any basis for independence was acceptable to the
people of Southern Rhodesia as a whole. [Ref. 16:
p. 19, and Ref. 18:p. 75]
These five principles formed the basis for negotiations
between Rhodesia and Great Britain. They were in effect the
minimum goals that Great Britain would accept.
In sum, for the white Rhodesians, their maximum goal was
complete independence from Great Britain with no immediate
concessions regarding the black majority. The minimum they
would accept would be the maintenance of white control in
Rhodesia. For Great Britain its maximum goal would be the
expedient transition of power in Rhodesia. The minimum the
British would accept would be the expansion of black political
rights and the guarantee of an eventual move to majority rule
in Rhodesia.
D. CONFLICT OR CONCESSION
At the time of UDI, British and white Rhodesian goals did
not overlap. Thus there was little chance that an agreement
would be reached. For the white Rhodesians the situation was
zero-sum. Every concession made to Great Britain would trans-
late directly to reduced security. Their perception was that
the costs of standing firm were low compared to the costs of
conceding power to blacks in Rhodesia. For Great Britain, the
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conflict was also zero-sum. The British could not be seen
by other black African states to be relinquishing their respon-
sibility to blacks in Rhodesia. In 1965 they were unprepared
to adjust their stated goals as embodied in the five princi-
ples. While each side believed that the conflict was zero-
sum, neither believed that a direct military confrontation
would result. This is partially attributed to the strong
cultural and ethnic ties between white Rhodesia and Great
Britain. The white community in Rhodesia also realized that
the use of military force would "endanger the Labour Party's
slender one vote margin" in the British Parliament. [Ref. 19:
p. 9] Initially the British would respond to UDI by imposing
economic sanctions. The Whites in Rhodesia perceived that the
economic pressures resulting from sanctions could be managed,
and were a small price to pay for their continued political
and economic hegemony in Rhodesia. What were the initial
strategies employed by Great Britain and Rhodesia to obtain
these goals?
E. INITIAL STRATEGIES
In order to obtain their goals the white Rhodesians needed
to either eliminate the British from the independence process
or force Great Britain into accepting terms more favorable to
the white settlers. UDI was the strategy that Smith and the
Rhodesian Front used. From a Rhodesian viewpoint, UDI
eliminated Great Britain from the independence process even
though the declaration was considered illegal by Britain and
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the majority of the international community. In fact Great
Britain was still very much involved in the conflict, and UDI
helped the British pass some of the responsibility for Rhodesia
onto the UN. Moreover, UDI was a gamble by Smith that even-
tually Britain would offer better terms. In effect UDI bought
time for Smith, and since his administration was under no
internal pressure they could sit and wait until London was
ready to resolve the conflict on Rhodesian terms.
The British strategy in response to UDI was to internation-
alize the conflict. London attempted to deflect pressure
caused by the Rhodesian conflict by requesting that the UN
impose economic sanctions against Smith and the white regime
in Rhodesia. In November 1965 the UN Security Council adopted
Resolution 217 which called for a selective embargo on petroleum
products and in May 1968 UN Security Council Resolution 253
imposed mandatory comprehensive sanctions on Rhodesia. [Ref.
20:pp. 409-410]
By requesting support from the UN, Great Britain was able
to diffuse some of the pressure created by the Rhodesian con-
flict. However, the UN sanctions initially had marginal
political effect and in fact strengthened the white community's
resolve. The sanctions did not increase the costs of standing
firm beyond the point acceptable to most white Rhodesians-
What resources did each player have to support its strategy




At the time of UDI , the white Rhodesians were in a command-
ing position. They had five main resources they could tap to
resist British political and economic pressure and to carry
out their strategy. First, the internal cohesion among the
Whites in Rhodesia was solid. Smith could rely on the complete
support of the Rhodesian Front (RF) . He was unencumbered by
internal political division and was able to act without having
to address demands from several divergent sectors. He only
had to satisfy the concerns of one group. As noted, the ex-
ternal pressure leveled against Rhodesia, unified the white
community, and the shared perception that they were standing
firm against the entire world in order to secure their present
way of life reduced almost all traces of division. "What
little liberal opposition existed within the white community
was politically powerless." [Ref. 19 :p. 10]
However, once it was clear that the white community could
handle the sanctions, the urgent necessity for unity eased.
Shortly after UDI, some disagreements emerged over which tac-
tics should be used to ensure white security. But the support
for the Rhodesian Front remained very strong and the white
community, under Smith's leadership, maintained a high level
of unity throughout the conflict.
Second, Rhodesia was able to dampen the effect of economic
sanctions. South Africa and Portugal did not comply with UN-
imposed sanctions and became major conduits for Rhodesian
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imports and exports. Part of the reason that South Africa
did not comply with the sanctions was that it, "Could not
admit the use of sanctions or boycotts for political aims any-
where because of its own sensitivity to such pressure."
[Ref. 21] In fact Rhodesian trade with South Africa steadily
increased between 1966 and 1975 [Ref. 20:p. 413]. In addition,
Rhodesia was able to circumvent certain trade restrictions
and developed alternative markets. [Ref. 16:pp. 158-270]
Although economic pressures would seriously build later in
the conflict, for several years following UDI economic sanc-
tions had only minor political effect on Rhodesia, and in
some. sectors stimulated the Rhodesian economy.
Third, "South Africa, Portugal, and Rhodesia allegedly
had plans for a common defense of the entire region against
'communism' and 'nationalism'." [Ref. 19 :p. 14J While South
Africa may have not believed that UDI was the best strategy,
Rhodesia could rely on South African and Portuguese support
in maintaining white domination and resisting British politi-
cal and economic pressure.
Fourth, at the time of UDI, the black nationalist movement
was underdeveloped; it posed little threat to the white regime.
Existing nationalist organizations were banned and sent into
exile. The immediate threat of a black military uprising did
not exist. However, the white Rhodesians perceived the need
to tighten further their control over the black community.
The two most important developments in increasing white control
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were the new constitution, and the Land Tenure Act, both
introduced in 1969. The 1969 Constitution explicitly intro-
duced tribalism into Rhodesian politics which the whites be-
lieved would divide the African population, making white
control easier. The Land Tenure Act further reinforced the
racial segregation defined by the 1940 Land Apportionment
Act, and further restrained movement by black Rhodesians.
[Ref. 18:p. 142]
Maintaining political and physical control over the black
population allowed the white Rhodesians: (1) to identify
potential nationalist leaders (who could then be forced into
exile), (2) to break up dissident groups by forcibly separat-
ing members by sending them to different areas of the country,
and (3) to limit blacks from gaining economic stability and
influence. Controlling the black community will not prevent
the nationalist movement from growing in Rhodesia, but will
forestall its development.
The fifth resource that the Whites possessed was time. A
main feature of the UDI strategy is that it stalled any deci-
sive action on the part of Great Britain. Smith was confident
that while Prime Minister Wilson's government would oppose
UDI, it would not make a resolute move to settle the conflict.
UDI allowed Rhodesia to wait for a time when a new administra-
tion would accept terms of independence more favorable to the
VJhites in Rhodesia. Thus, time became a resource as provided
by the UDI strategy.
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The resources that Great Britain possessed were limited.
As noted earlier. Great Britain sought to internationalize
the conflict, and did so by asking the UN to impose sanctions.
Great Britain found wide support among members of the UN.
However, Rhodesia was still primarily Britain's responsibility,
and other states, including the US, were reluctant to become
more involved in Rhodesia by broadening their efforts there.
Internationalizing the conflict was a strategy aimed more
at deflecting pressure than it was at forcing Rhodesia into
accepting British terms. Great Britain was operating under
two main limitations. First, domestic political opinion was
divided over how to deal with Rhodesia. Wilson's Labour Govern-
ment was constrained in the British Parliament where they
enjoyed only a one-vote majority. [Ref. 19 :p. 9] Wilson could
not act decisively for fear of severe criticism that would
weaken his political position domestically.
Second, the use of military force to coerce the white
Rhodesians into accepting British terms was unlikely. While
Britain was receiving pressure from several African states to
use force against the white regime, military intervention
would have threatened British economic interests in the region,
and a move to use the military option in Rhodesia would have
met strong domestic opposition. However, Prime Minister Wilson
did not even need to propose the use of military force to
Parliament, just make its use uncertain. Had Wilson encouraged
the perception among white Rhodesians that use of force was
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being considered, he may have been able to use this as a
"stick" to gain concessions. Instead the use of military
force was not a viable option and could not be used as a
credible threat against Smith and the white regime in
Salisbury.
Wilson continued to negotiate with the white regime in
Rhodesia throughout the late 1960 's. His attempts at coercing
Smith into a settlement based on British terms was unsuccess-
ful. In 1970 two new administrations were in control in London
and Washington. The new Conservative Prime Minister, Edward
Heath, and his Foreign Minister, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, had
vowed to resolve the Rhodesian conflict.
British perceptions had changed, and both Heath and
Douglas-Home perceived that a quick resolution of the conflict
was in British best interests, even if the settlement highly
favored Rhodesia's white regime. A settlement under Smith's
terms would weaken British credibility and perceived resolve.
However, swallowing this pill was made easier for the British
for two reasons. First, Smith had tacitly agreed to proposals
that satisfied British interpretation of their previously
proposed five principles. Thus, Britain could be seen as ob-
taining its initial goals in Rhodesia. However, the proposals
agreed upon supported a liberal interpretation of the princi-
ples and ensured the continuation of white domination in
Rhodesia. Second, Britain had correctly sensed that the Nixon
administration had made a shift in US policy that favored the
80
white regime in southern Africa. This shift in policy would
later clear the way for the passage of the Byrd Amendment,
which while its primary intention was not to support the white
regimes in Rhodesia, did in fact have that effect. Thus in
November 1971, perceiving the need for a quick resolution of
the conflict, and armed with the promise of US approval,
Douglas-Home and Prime Minister Smith concluded an agreement
which highly favored the white regime in Rhodesia. However,
a key element of the settlement, one that Smith had to capitu-
late on, was that the Smith-Home Agreement be acceptable to
the entire Rhodesian community, including Blacks in Rhodesia.
In January 1972, a commission headed by Lord Pearce was dis-
patched to Rhodesia to assess the acceptability of the settlement
The Pearce Commission would be the first substantial re-
source the black African nationalists in Rhodesia could ex-
ploit. Up until this time Blacks were not directly involved
in the negotiations, and although they had been previously
consulted, they had not yet become a primary player in the con-
flict. The blacks in Rhodesia had already received resources
in the form of international (UN) and Frontline State support.
However, the black community had not coalesced into a "unitary
actor" and thus could not take complete advantage of these
resources. The Pearce Commission affirmed and highlighted
Great Britain's realization that the blacks must be an active
participant in any final settlement in Rhodesia.
The Pearce Commission marks a watershed in the conflict
and as a result of the findings of the commission, Great Bri-
tain cancelled the Smith-Home Agreement. From this point on,
the British, though closely involved in the negotiations, will
become a secondary player, and the conflict will evolve into
a black nationalist-white community conflict vice a British-
Rhodesian conflict. What then was the black nationalist's
strategy as they stepped forward as a primary player opposing
Smith and the white regime in Rhodesia?
G. THE BLACK NATIONALISTS
As early as 1957, black nationalist groups were forming
in Rhodesia. As noted earlier, there were two main black
nationalist groups--ZANU and ZAPU. Their primary goal was to
overthrow the white regime in Salisbury and replace it with a
black African government. Both groups had been banned and
forced into exile, and while the Pearce Commission elevated
the black Africans to a primary position in the conflict, they
were not yet able to assert any pressure on Smith and the white
community.
The guerrilla forces of ZANU and ZAPU were the main resource
held by the black nationalists. The strategy employed by the
nationalists centered around this resource. Their principle
option was to engage in a guerrilla war in Rhodesia. This
strategy had three operational goals. First, in order to un-
seat the white regim.e that was firmly entrenched in Rhodesia,
both ZAPU and ZANU required mass support. Therefore, their
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immediate goal was to "win the support of the black rural
population." [Ref. 22] Second, the strategy was designed to
change the white community's perception of invulnerability.
Bringing violence to the white settlers' doorstep in effect
increased the perceived costs of standing firm. And third, the
guerrilla attacks would further increase the economic pressures
already being absorbed by the white community.
During the late-1960's to mid-1970 's the black nationalists
were deeply divided. This was their main limitation. The
split had occurred in the early 1960 's and seems not to have
been based on tribal or political lines but was caused by
Nkomo ' s leadership [Ref. 18:p. 55]. The two groups that sur-
vived the split, ZAPU and ZANU would not unite until 1974,
when they formed the Patriotic Front (PF) . However, through-
out the 1970 's, the individual efforts of the Zimbabwe African
National Liberation Army (ZANLA), and the Zimbabwe People's
Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA), ZANU ' s and ZAPU ' s military wings
respectively, were able to increase the costs to the white
community of standing firm. Deep animosity existed between
these two groups and this division most certainly limited
their ability to coordinate action, and essentially retarded
their military effectiveness. In light of their individual
successes, one can only speculate on their potential to in-
crease the costs of the white community had they united sooner.
While ZANU and ZAPU were waging the guerrilla war, the
African National Congress (ANC) , headed by Bishop Abel Muzorewa
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was reformed in 1971 to articulate the African opposition to
the Smith-Home Agreement. [Ref. 18 :p. 137] The ANC was
able to draw upon the intense anger most blacks felt toward
the white regime and build a nationalist consciousness among
black African Rhodesians.
In sum, the nationalists were a growing force in Rhodesia.
Their main resource was the guerrilla forces of ZANU and ZAPU,
and the strategy they used centered around these guerrilla
forces. Limited by factionalization , the nationalists were
still able to increase the costs to the white regime of
standing firm.
H. EVOLUTION OF PERCEPTIONS
The growing guerrilla insurgency coupled with the increas-
ing political consciousness of blacks caused Smith and the
white community to change their perceptions. Smith now realized
that he must deal directly with the nationalists, however,
virtually no one in the white community was ready to accept a
Rhodesian government dominated by Blacks. Smith's strategy
reflected the change in primary players and altered percep-
tions. The new strategy was to gain acceptance of the Smith-
Home Agreement by black nationalists and to make only minor
concessions that would have limited effect on white Rhodesian
power and security.
The costs of standing firm were increasing but not to the
point where Whites in Rhodesia were willing to make any signi-
ficant concessions. Two elements kept the cost from rising
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further. First, as noted, the nationalist groups were still
divided. Had the blacks effectively united earlier in the
conflict they might have been able to raise the cost to Whites
sooner. Second, passage of the Byrd Amendment in November
1971 eased some of the economic pressures placed on the white
regime by allowing the US to import $212 million of ferro-
chrome and other strategic minerals from Rhodesia [Ref. 20:
p. 410] . In addition, the Byrd Amendment was a signal to
Salisbury that the new administration in Washington was sup-
portive of white regimes in southern Africa, and was a boost
to the morale of the white community.
In 1974, the coup in Portugal would alter perceptions and
resources for both the Whites and the nationalists in Rhodesia.
Following the coup, Portugal relinquished control of its
colonies in Africa. As a result, the black nationalists in
Rhodesia gained a resource when black nationalist groups in
Mozambique and Angola gained control of the governments in
those countries. First, Mozambique, under the control of the
Frente de Liberatacao de Mocambique (FRELIMO) , opened up its
entire eastern border with Rhodesia to ZANU and ZAPU guerrillas
Second, prior to the coup, ZANU and ZAPU received aid from
Zambia and the OAU, now they could look to Mozambique for
additional support. Third, black states in southern Africa
gained leverage in the region as a result of Mozambique's
independence. While black African states in the region could
not dominate South Africa, the balance of power was beginning
to shift in their favor. It is clear that Mozambique's inde-
pendence brought additional support to the blacks in Rhodesia,
and changed the perceptions held by the white community.
Prior to the coup, South Africa had given substantial
assistance to Rhodesia to suppress the nationalist movement.
Their goal was to forestall the "communist" and "nationalist"
tide in Rhodesia before it reached South Africa. However,
events in Mozambique and Angola, and the subsequent shift in
black influence in the region changed South African perceptions.
The government in Pretoria now believed that a prolonged
guerrilla struggle would only jeopardize South Africa's
security. They now realized that the white regime in Rhodesia
could not expect to win a protracted guerrilla struggle, and
that a continuation of the war was damaging South Africa's
relations with other black states in Africa. South Africa
was willing to accept strained relations so long as its security
was assured. This no longer being the case, they opted for
a swift termination to the war. South Africa pressed Smith
into negotiating with the blacks hoping that a negotiated
settlement, under South African encouragement would improve
Pretoria's political standing with other states in Africa.
In addition, they believed that there was a greater possibility
that a more moderate black government would be installed in
Salisbury under a negotiated settlement.
South Africa could get Smith to the negotiating table,
however, he still would not bargain seriously. Smith came to
86
the table to demonstrate to the West his government's
"reasonableness," and if he could be' certain that the talks
would break down because of division among the nationalists,
there would be little possibility that he would have to make
serious concessions. [Ref. 20 :p. 16] In addition. Smith
wanted to show the West that Rhodesia was battling the ground-
swell of communist influence in Mozambique and Angola. All
of these tactics were designed to gain Western support.
In August 1975, talks between Smith and the black national-
ists were held in a railway car parked over Victoria Falls,
halfway between Zambia and Rhodesia. Smith's goal was to make
minor concessions to appease blacks and deflect pressure from
Western states. The talks ended in stalemate but reinforced
the white perception that they could make conciliatory reforms
in Rhodesia, while retaining their overall control. [Ref. 23]
This perception will later be the basis for Smith's "internal
settlement" strategy.
As noted earlier, division among the nationalists was a
primary limitation for them. This division widened even further
When the PF was formed in 1974, ZAPU and ZANU did not fully
integrate. In theory, both groups had united under the PF
banner, but in practice, each operated semi-autonomously with
only minimal cooperation between them. ZANU ' s leader, Robert
Mugabe, was attracting more militant nationalists, and his
preferred strategy was to continue the war. For him, conflict,
not negotiation, was the way to gain control in Rhodesia.
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ZAPU's leader, Joshua Nkomo , had a different view. Nkomo
preferred negotiation, and he and Smith had conducted a series
of talks in 1976. However, it is unlikely that Nkomo would
have been able to end the conflict since Mugabe, and his mili-
tant followers, would have continued the war. Thus while both
Nkomo ' s and Mugabe's goal was to gain control of the government
in Rhodesia, their respective strategies for accomplishing
this were quite different. Without a unified strategy and a
pooling of resources, the possibility that the nationalists
could force Smith into making substantial concessions was
unlikely
.
Throughout 197 6, ZANU and ZAPU increased the level of
guerrilla activity. In April ZANU guerrillas cut a rail link
between Rhodesia and South Africa at the Beit Bridge. This
attack altered white perceptions of invulnerability. [Ref.
19 :p. 18] However, this change in perception still did not
raise the costs of standing firm above the point where Smith
was willing to make serious concessions.
The conflict in Rhodesia is as much about changing resources
as it is about changing perceptions. In 1976 several other
factors altered white perceptions. First, South Africa was
pressing Smith to negotiate. And while it was almost certain
that South Africa would not stand by idly if there were in-
creased threats to white lives in Rhodesia, they did make it
clear that they would not lend Rhodesia any further military
support. [Ref. 21:p. 3]
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Second, as a result of the civil war in Angola, the US had
readjusted its policy in southern Africa. US Secretary of
State, Dr. Henry Kissinger, in a speech delivered in Lusaka
in April, stated that the US was clearly opposed to the white
regime in Salisbury, and that the US was cominitted to supporting
a negotiated settlement based on majority rule. [Ref. 19 :p. 21]
Previously, white morale had been buoyed by the perception
that they could count on US support by promising to beat back
the wave of communism that was spreading in southern Africa.
Kissinger was successful at altering Smith's perceptions by
declaring US intentions to support majority rule. While this
change in perceptions was still not great enough to prompt
Smith into handing power over to blacks completely, it did get
him to the negotiating table. This was something that the
blacks could not do by themselves.
In October 1976, Smith, Mugabe, Nkomo , and representatives
from the US and Great Britain met in Geneva to work out an
agreement. Again a meeting between the primary and secondary
players failed to result in a resolution of the conflict. The
principal reason that the talks failed was that both the white
community and the black nationalists believed that each could
get the best terms by standing firm. For Smith, the cost of
standing firm was rapidly rising, but the cost of conceding
was still higher. The nationalists had two options, they could
either lower the costs that Smith and the white community
faced if they were to concede, or they could raise white costs
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of standing firm. The nationalists chose the later. Thus
conflict, not negotiation, was preferred by both sides.
February 1977 marks a turning point in the Rhodesia con-
flict. It is here that Smith, with the encouragement and
support of South Africa, announces his plans to proceed with
an internal settlement in Rhodesia. The internal settlement
is a major shift in Smith's strategy. Up until this point
Smith had participated in talks sponsored by external actors.
The internal settlement was an attempt by Smith to eliminate
external actors from the negotiation process and to deal with
those black leaders over whom Smith perceived he had the
greatest leverage.
The tactical goal of the internal settlement was to show
the West that a majority-rule elected government was in con-
trol in Salisbury. The hope was that once the West was con-
vinced that solid progress was being made, they would be
inclined to drop the sanctions and provide assistance to
Rhodesia. In addition. Smith had reason to believe that Bishop
Muzorewa would be the likely winner of any open election in
Rhodesia. He realized that the election in itself would not
end the guerrilla war since Muzorewa did not have the support
of a guerrilla organization. However, Smith believed that the
US and Great Britain, seeing that free and fair elections had
been held would be forced into supporting the new government
and would provide aid to suppress the guerrilla movement.
By mid-1977 Smith realized that the cost of the war was
increasing. Gaining the support of the Western powers as soon
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as possible was becoming crucial. In March 1977, the Byrd
Amendment was repealed, signaling US resolve to support the
black nationalists and majority rule. This also increased the
economic costs absorbed by the white community. Smith had
come to the conclusion that he would have to deal seriously
with blacks, and his main goal was to limit the concessions
he would have to make.
In September, the US and Great Britain put forth a plan
to resolve the conflict in Rhodesia. Both Smith and the black
nationalists approached the plan with caution. Nkomo and
Mugabe decided to commit themselves to at least the first step
of the plan, while Smith's reaction to the plan was negative.
[Ref. 24] The US and Great Britain had little direct leverage
in bringing Smith and the black nationalists to the negotiat-
ing table. It was clear that any UK-US proposals must have
the support of South Africa and the Frontline states. Only
the former was in a position to pressure Smith effectively and
the latter was the key to bringing the Patriotic Front to the
negotiating table.
Smith rejected the UK-US plan and forged ahead with his
internal settlement. The response of the Patriotic Front to
the internal settlement was to step up the guerrilla war. By
this time the PF had the active support of the Frontline states
and the OAU. This was their major resource for carrying on
the war. However, the Frontline states led by Julius Nyerere
of Tanzania and Mozambique's Samora Machel were pressuring the
91
PF into negotiating within the framework of the UK-US plan
[Ref. 25]. While they clearly wanted the PF to obtain control
of the Rhodesian government, a quick end to the conflict was
in their best interests. In December Smith engaged in talks
with Muzorewa, Sithole, and with two traditional leaders,
Chiefs Jeremiah Chirau and Kayisa Ndiweni.
In March 197 8 a settlement was reached between Muzorewa
and Smith. Both Nkomo and Mugabe denounced the talks. Nkomo
called the resulting settlement, "the greatest sellout in the
history of Africa," while Mugabe reaffirmed his preference for
direct military confrontation stating that, "the only way for
the restoration of the dignity of the Africans is armed
struggle." [Ref. 26] The settlement highly favored the Whites
The new constitution was based on universal suffrage, but out
of the 100 seats in Parliament, 28 were guaranteed for Whites.
This provided Whites with a veto over changes to the constitu-
tion, and ensured continued White control. Smith had the sup-
port of both South Africa and the moderate blacks. All that
was left was to gain the support of the Western powers.
In July 1978, the US Senate adopted the Case-Javits Amend-
ment to the International Security Assistance Act of 1978.
This provided a major resource for Smith. The amendment called
for the removal of sanctions against the white regime in Rho-
desia when the President determines that: (1) the government
of Rhodesia demonstrates its willingness to negotiate in good
faith with all parties. (2) that a government has been
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installed, chosen by free elections in which all political
parties participate, and is monitored by impartial international
observers. [Ref. 27]
The amendment was a resource for Smith and the white com-
munity for two reasons. First, the morale of the white com-
munity was given a boost by this amendment and another amendment
passed by the US House. The promise that economic sanctions
would be lifted after free elections were held provided a
light at the end of the tunnel. The increase in white morale
helped Smith stand firm against mounting pressure.
Second, the Case-Javits Amendment provided Smith with a
tool to ensure white security. Smith was pushing ahead with
his internal settlement, and as noted earlier, he felt confi-
dent that Muzorewa would win a free election. Smith believed
that he had enough leverage over Muzorewa to ensure continued
control of the government. Later in December, white Rhodesian
security was secured when Muzorewa and two other tribal leaders
agreed to an arrangement whereby Whites had a veto power in
the Parliament and held the largest single block in the Cabinet.
[Ref. 28]
On 29 April 1979 elections were held in Rhodesia. Muzorewa
was the clear winner, capturing 67 percent of the vote. In
elections held earlier in the month. Smith's party, the Rho-
desia Front secured all 28 of the white seats in the cabinet.
[Ref. 15 :p. 65] The elections were boycotted by the PF. How-
ever, it should be noted that the voter turnout for a country
that was deeply involved in a guerrilla war was relatively
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high (64.5 percent). In this context Muzorewa's victory would
seem to signal the willingness of many blacks in Rhodesia to
accept the internal settlement. But it appears that many
blacks were voting not so much for Muzorewa than they were for
an end to the war. Had they realized that Muzorewa's election
would not end the war, the voter turnout would probably have
been much lower.
A new coalition government was formed with Muzorewa as
Prime Minister. However, his power was limited by the struc-
ture of the Parliament and the Cabinet. Why was Muzorewa
willing to accept this arrangement? First, he had no guerrilla
force to challenge the white regime or to secure a prominent
role in a settlement that was dominated by the PF. Second,
once elected, Muzorewa's position as Prime Minister depended
upon the Rhodesian Army's ability to combat the PF guerrillas.
Smith's main leverage over Muzorewa here was the threat that
Whites, seeing their security diminishing, would flee Rhodesia,
adding to the already large number of Whites that had left
Rhodesia. [Ref. 29] This would leave no one to help Muzorewa
hold back the PF , and the last thing that he wanted was a
violent overthrow of his government by other black nationalists
Following the elections the Whites were gaining confidence,
and they perceived that their situation in Rhodesia was secure.
First, the elections had turned out as planned and with the
built-in guarantees, the white community believed that its
political position in Rhodesia was secure. Second, with the
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election of Margaret Thatcher and the Conservative Party vic-
tory in British Parliamentary elections held in May, many
white Rhodesians believed that this new government in London
would be more sympathetic. Third, five bills and resolutions
had been introduced in the US Congress, calling for the lift-
ing of sanctions against Rhodesia [Ref. 19:p. 42]. Most white
Rhodesians believed it was only a short time before they would
be relieved of the economic hardships that had developed since
sanctions were first imposed.
There was one element that prevented the white Rhodesians
from becoming too buoyant in their morale. In May 1979, ZIPRA
and ZANLA forces united to coordinate their activities. This
unification was a major resource for the black nationalists
and a primary factor in raising the cost to Whites of standing
firm. From the start of the conflict the subjective issue
for white Rhodesians concerned their physical and economic
security, and the increase in guerrilla activities focused
pressure on this issue. With the unification of guerrilla
forces and the increased difficulty the white Rhodesian Army
was having combatting them, the threat to white Rhodesian
physical security increased drastically. And while the guer-
rillas could not control the urban areas, they had made sub-
stantial gains in rural areas where many white Rhodesian
farmers lived and worked. This forced many in the white com-
munity to reevaluate their goals so that the principal goal
now became ending the war. Seeing that the internal settlement
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and the April elections had not ended the war, a new strategy
had to be followed.
A new Anglo-American posture was formulated in May 1979
by British Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington and US Secretary
of State Cyrus Vance. On 1 August a Commonwealth Conference
was held in Lusaka. The Conference produced a basic outline
for a comprehensive settlement involving all parties. The
PF and Smith agreed to meet in London in December to attend
an all parties conference. What then were the factors that
brought Smith and the PF to the negotiating table?
Smith and the white community had three basic reasons for
negotiating. First, the war had reached a stalemate, and was
continuing to be a financial burden to the regime. The only
options the white regime had were to either step up the war
effort in the face of growing support for the PF by the Front-
line states or hope to end the war through negotiation. Second,
decreasing morale and increasing economic pressures were push-
ing the regime into negotiating. Without a lifting of sanctions,
the Rhodesian economy would continue to stagnate. The belief
that the US was ready to lift sanctions was shattered when
Cyrus Vance was able to convince the US House that the prema-
ture lifting of sanctions would not be in the US best interest.
Legislation abandoning the Case-Javits Amendment was adopted
by the House on 28 June. [Ref. 19 :p. 45] Third, Smith was
now facing severe pressure from Western states and South Africa
to negotiate. Great Britain and the US were committed to an
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all parties settlement, and would have gone ahead with the
conference with or without the white regime. Most certainly
any settlement over Rhodesia in Smith's absence, that is
without the white community's agreement, would be quite shallow
and have little impact. This was Smith's last resource.
However, had Smith not attended it is likely that this would
have fostered the impression that the black nationalists were
willing to compromise and that no amount of political or diplo-
matic pressure could sway the white regime, and that other
forms of coercion were necessary.
There were two elements that brought the Patriotic Front
to the Conference. First, as noted earlier the war had reached
a stalemate. One of the tactical goals of a guerrilla war
is to increase your opponent's cost of standing firm so that
he will be forced to resolve the conflict on terms favorable
to your side. It was unlikely that the PF guerrillas would
win an outright military victory in Rhodesia. Thus, getting
Smith to seriously negotiate under terms acceptable to the PF
and supported by Great Britain and the US was desirable. They
believed that the Conference would put both themselves and
Smith's white regime on equal footing, and that from this
position an acceptable settlement would be hammered out.
Second, the leaders of the Frontline states continued to
pressure the PF to negotiate. The guerrilla war was becoming
very costly for the Frontline states, and economic progress
in the region as a whole was tied to peace in Rhodesia. The
Frontline states were able to exercise leverage on the PF
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primarily because they were their main source of military
assistance and their primary source of legitimacy. When the
Lancaster House Conference was held in December 1979, both
Smith and the PF, "were in the weakest position to resist ex-
ternal pressure to negotiate." [Ref. 19 :p. 47] The cost of
standing firm had become very high for Smith and the white
community. The PF perceived that the gains obtained by con-
tinuing the war were offset by the threat of potential costs
of standing firm and the gains obtained in a negotiated settle-
ment. This was the first time that both sides perceived the
conflict as variable sum, and it is here that both sides
will .be motivated to negotiate in good faith.
I. THE LANCASTER HOUSE SETTLEMENT
The history of the Lancaster House Conference is an exam-
ple of third party negotiation [Ref. 30] . Great Britain
assumed the role of mediator, and aided by the US and the
Frontline states was able to pressure both Smith and the PF
into progressing through the talks to a final settlement.
Lord Carrington assumed direct control of the negotiations,
and he was committed to producing an agreement from the start.
He used primarily four tactics as a third party mediator.
First, he induced each side into committing themselves to the
negotiating process. The idea here was to get both parties
deeply involved in the talks so that the gains obtained by
each side if a settlement was agreed upon would offset the
desire to pull out of the talks. This tactic was designed to
98
gain enough momentum in the talks to carry each side through
to a settlement.
Second, Lord Carrington used a series of carrots and sticks
on both sides. He publically praised them when they made a
move that contributed toward a settlement, and openly criticized
them when their actions threatened the success of the negotia-
tions. He pulled "together all the strings that each party
brought to the conference table." [Ref. 31]
Third, he used the "train is leaving the station" ploy to
maintain each party's interest in the negotiation. This was
especially true when dealing with the PF . Towards the end of
the conference, when the PF hesitated over the exact terms of
the ceasefire, the British threatened to go ahead with the
settlement, leaving the PF behind. Fearing that they would
lose out completely, the PF agreed to the settlement.
Lastly, throughout the conference Great Britain relied on
support from the US, the Frontline states, and South Africa.
It was the combined pressure from all these external players
that moved the negotiations toward a successful conclusion.
It is important to remember that while Lord Carrington had
executed a well-designed strategy through skillful use of
diplomacy, the bottom line is that the costs of standing firm
were now unacceptable, and negotiation, not conflict would
secure for them the most advantageous outcome. In other words,
the ingredients for resolving the conflict were already
present, it just took the British recipe to bake a settlement
palatable to both parties.
99
On 21 December, the Lancaster House Agreement was signed
ending the fourteen year conflict in Rhodesia. The settlement
included an arrangement for a general ceasefire and agreement
on a draft constitution. How did the agreement reflect the
goals of each player?
The constitution that was agreed to at Lancaster House
addressed many of the subjective issues of the conflict. The
constitution ensured majority rule in Rhodesia, and this ful-
filled Britain's initial goal of granting independence based
on majority rule. The constitution also fulfilled the national-
ist goal of gaining control of the government in Rhodesia.
Provisions in the constitution ensured African control of the
100 member House and the 40 member Senate. [Ref. 32 :p. 257]
However, certain provisions did give the white community a
disproportionately large share of the available legislative
seats. Smith's party, the Rhodesian Front, obtained all 20
of the "European" seats in the House.
Initially, the white community could not conceive of relin-
quishing any real power to the black Africans . They had stood
firm in the face of tremendous political and economic pressure,
only to have to concede in the end to majority rule. However,
it is important to note that the issue that had defined the
white community's goals was the need for security, and the
agreement did address this issue. Provisions in the consti-
tution maintained the administrative and legal status quo of
the white community, and safeguards built into the constitution
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protected the rights of the white coininunity . In addition,
provisions in the constitution and declaration of rights make
it difficult for the government to substantially change the
Constitution in areas concerning land resettlement, nationali-
zation of commerce and industry, and property and pension
rights. [Ref. 32:pp. 288-289] Change to the constitution in
the first 10 years requires a unanimous vote in Parliament.
Thus, the white community is assured of their lifestyle at
least until 1990.
Lastly, the Lancaster House Agreement established a cease
fire between Rhodesian security forces and the Patriotic Front
guerrillas. This was a goal that each side implicitly sought
by coming to the negotiating table.
J. CONCLUSION
There have been two underlying themes to this chapter.
The first has to do with the role of external players in a
conflict. It is clear that several external players have had
a role in the Rhodesian conflict. Each has, at different times,
had direct influence on the primary players in the struggle
and each had influenced the eventual outcome of the conflict.
South Africa was able to exert pressure on the white regime
in Salisbury because of their military, economic, and psycho-
logical ties with Rhodesia. When Pretoria realized the futility
of Smith's persistent course of action, they actively pressed
him into negotiating a solution. The US also influenced the
conflict. Its most effective resources were both its ability
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to bring economic pressure on Rhodesia, and perhaps more
importantly, to influence the white community's perception of
their own diminishing legitimacy and purpose. Without strong
moral support from the West, Salisbury had a difficult time
maintaining the will to resist outside pressure over the long
run.
The black nationalists in Rhodesia received the majority
of their support from the Frontline states and, without this
aid, it is unlikely that they would have been able to substan-
tially raise the costs to the white community of standing firm.
Thus, when most leaders of the Frontline states realized the
need to end the war and proceed with reconciliation, the PF
was pushed into negotiating with Smith and the white regime.
And lastly, the skillful diplomatic influence displayed
by Lord Carrington and the British mediating team had great
impact on the Lancaster House negotiations, and then steered
both players down the path to a settlement.
It is likely that without the pressure applied on Smith
and the black nationalists, from these external players, the
Rhodesian conflict would have been prolonged even further.
The second theme of this chapter has been that the Rhodesian
conflict ended with a successful negotiated settlement. The
settlement was successful in that it addressed the immediate
issues of the Rhodesian conflict. First, it ended the violence
that had begun to increase steadily over the course of the con-
flict. Both players were deeply affected by the war, and its
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termination benefitted each side. Second, the settlement
satisfied the subjective issues of Great Britain, the black
nationalists, and the white community in Rhodesia. Great
Britain and the black nationalists were satisfied in that
the settlement established majority rule. This satisfied
Britain's desire to grant independence based on majority rule
and allowed black nationalists to express their right to self-
determination. For the white community their primary subjec-
tive issue--secur ity--was addressed. The settlement guaran-
teed their security, but the white regime had to concede the
sub-issue of relinquishing control in Rhodesia to the Blacks.
The Lancaster House Agreement, like the Addis Ababa
Accords, is an impressive accomplishment and represents true
accommodation from both players. However, in the five years
following independence, the situation in Rhodesia/ Zimbabwe
has not been ideal. Following his overwhelming victory in
the 1980 pre-independence elections, Robert Mugabe sought
reconciliation in Rhodesia. Mugabe again reaffirmed his
leadership and ZANU secured its domination in the Zimbabwe
Parliament by winning 63 of the "common roll" seats in the
1985 elections [Ref. 33:p. 572]. Ironically, the greatest
threat to Mugabe and the most serious source of insecurity
for Zimbabwe does not come from an external force, nor from
disgruntled white Rhodesians, but instead comes from Joshua
Nkomo and ZAPU.
Resistence to a one-party state and ZAPU's resentment of
ZANU's increased dominance in Zimbabwe, has the potential to
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expand into a conflict that would again place Zimbabwe in a
state of turmoil. It should be stressed that the Lancaster
House Agreement addressed only the issues of the original
conflict. It was not designed to be a comprehensive document
to address all future problems in Zimbabwe.
Relations among and within states are characterized by
series of negotiated agreements which overlay the changing
political and economic realities that exist. The Lancaster
House settlement is a strong link in the chain of agreements
that have defined Zimbabwe's domestic relations. For the
Lancaster House Agreement to have continued positive impact
on Zimbabwe, other solid agreements (a Zimbabwe Constitution,
agreement among black nationalists and between blacks and
whites) need to be strengthened. If Zimbabwe fails to live
up to its potential or if conflict again becomes the pre-
ferred road, it will be because the links on either side of










Source: Konig, Barbara. Namibia: The Ravages of War
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IV. NAMIBIA: A CONTINUING CONFLICT
The forty year dispute over Namibia is a case in which
active diplomacy has failed to produce a negotiated settlement.
This chapter will examine the current conflict in Namibia by
applying the conflict resolution checklist to this case in
the same manner as was done for the Sudan and Zimbabwe con-
flicts. However, unlike Sudan and Zimbabwe where the con-
flict was resolved, the Namibia conflict continues. Therefore,
in place of an analysis of a settlement, this chapter will
end with a brief analysis of the possible elements that have
prevented a settlement in Namibia. In addition. Appendix C
provides a chronological history of the key events in the
Namibian conflict up to 1985.
A. THE PLAYERS
The Namibia conflict involves several internal and external
players. The initial dispute over South West Africa (SWA),
as Namibia was formerly called, was between the United Nations
(UN) , and the Republic of South Africa (RSA) . The UN and
RSA were the initial primary players in the conflict. In the
early 1960 's they were joined by the black African nationalists
in Namibia, and they will come to play a more central role as
the conflict develops.
The growth of African nationalism in Namibia began in the
1950 's. The early nationalist groups were organized along
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tribal and ethnic lines. Most notable were the South West
African National Union (SWANU) , the Heroro Council, and the
Ovamboland People's Organization (OPO) . In 1960, the South
West African People's Organization (SWAPO) was founded by
Herman Toivo ja Toivo. In 19 67, Sam Nujoma became leader of
SWAPO when Toivo was placed in jail in Robben Island. [Ref.
34:pp. 155-156] SWAPO is generally considered the most power-
ful and influential nationalist organization in Namibia. It
draws support and membership from the Ovambo tribe, the
largest single ethnic group in Namibia, comprising over half
of the territory's total population. By the mid-1970 's,
SWAPO became a primary player in the conflict, and will mirror
the goals and aspirations of most blacks in Namibia.
The whites in Namibia will also become important players.
In 1975 they will form the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA)
.
In November 19 83 the DTA expanded its membership and reformed
as the Multi-Party Conference (MPC)
.
Several external players will have a role in the Namibian
conflict. The two most influential have been: (1) the Western
members of the UN Security Council (US, UK, France, West Ger-
many, and Canada) commonly referred to as the Western Contact
group headed by the US, and (2) the Frontline states (Angola,
Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, and Botswanna) . Both the US
and Angola have been very influential operating separately
from their respective groups.
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In sum, the Namibian conflict has centered around three
primary players, the Republic of South Africa, the United
Nations, and the black nationalists, mainly represented by
SWAPO. The external players in the Namibian conflict have
been primarily the Frontline states, the Western Contact group,
the US, and Angola. What then are the objective and subjec-
tive issues of the Namibian conflict?
B. THE ISSUES
The conflict in Namibia initially centered around the
objective issue of whether Namibia would be incorporated into
South Africa or whether it would become an independent state
through the UN trusteeship system.
South West Africa was colonized by Germany in 1884. At
the end of WWI all former German colonies were placed under
the newly found League of Nations mandate system. The mandate
system had three classes of mandates: class A, B, and C.
Class A countries were deemed to be the closest to achieving
independence from the mandatary and required little supervision.
Class C countries needed the most assistance at establishing
an infrastructure and mechanism leading to independence. SWA
was designated a class "C" mandate territory under article 22
of the League Covenant, and the Union of South Africa was
appointed the mandatary. [Ref. 35 :p. 62] SWA was adminis-
tered as an integral part of South Africa and the government
of South Africa was required to submit annual reports to the
League on the status of SWA.
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By 1933, South Africa was seeking to incorporate the
territory of SWA into the Republic. The League however,
consistently opposed this move. In 1946 the League of Nations
was dissolved, and its successor, the United Nations set up
the trusteeship system. Article 77 of the UN Charter states
that all territories formerly held under the mandate system
would be placed under trusteeship agreements. [Ref. 36:
p. 119 2] Even though South Africa became a member of the
United Nations in November 194 5, it refused to sign a trustee-
ship agreement over SWA.
In 1966 the UN decided that the mandate over the territory
should be taken away from South Africa and resolved that the
responsibility for SWA should be assumed by an 11 nation, UN-
appointed Council for Namibia. The council was to arrange
for the transfer of the administration of the territory and
in June of 1968 the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution
to rename the territory Namibia.
There are two subjective issues for South Africa in this
conflict. First, South Africa perceives that control in
Namibia is crucial to its regional security. This perception
was reinforced in 1975 following the independence of the
former Portuguese colonies of Angola and Mozambique. Surrounded
by hostile states, South Africa's white regime believes that
Namibia is integral to its security for two reasons: First,
from a tactical viewpoint, Namibia serves as a buffer between
South Africa and Angola. Pretoria would prefer to hold back
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what it perceives as the nationalist onslaught at the Cunene
rather than the Orange River. Second, because of its domestic
policies toward blacks within its own territory, South Africa
is fearful that a black nationalist victory in Namibia will
demonstrate to South African blacks the efficacy of armed
struggle in obtaining political goals. In addition, Pretoria
perceives, "the installation of a hostile regime in Windhoek
would make the maintenance of order in South Africa more
difficult." [Ref. 37:p. 101]
The second subjective issue for South Africa involves
their right to annex Namibia. Pretoria believed that Namibia
was not ready nor would be ready in the near future to become
an independent state. Furthermore, since South Africa had
administered Namibia for 26 years under the League of Nations
mandate, they believed that it was their right to incorporate
Namibia into the Republic once the League was dissolved. This,
coupled with the large number of South African whites that
had already settled in Namibia, reinforced their perception
that Namibia should become the fifth province.
There is also a subjective sub-issue for South Africa, this
involves the status of Walvis Bay—Namibia's major port and
rail center. South Africa believes that since Walvis Bay
was not a part of the original German colony (it was adminis-
tered under British authority) , it should not be considered
part of the territory. Thus they assert that any dispute over
Namibia should not include Walvis Bay. Walvis Bay is important
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to South Africa because it is the key to Namibia's economic
growth. And to control Walvis Bay is to control Namibia's
future. [Ref. 35:p. 72]
For the UN the subjective issues centered on its credi-
bility and authority as the premier international organization.
As the successor to the League of Nations, the UN believed it
had full authority to assume the activities and responsibili-
ties of the League. This extended to its responsibility for
the League's former mandate territories. As long as South
Africa refused to accede to UN requests, UN authority was
challenged. If South Africa had succeeded early in the dis-
pute in incorporating Namibia into the Republic, UN credibility
would have been damaged. Throughout the 19 50 's, the UN was
measuring the extent of its practical authority, and its
dispute with South Africa was one of the yardsticks with which
it measured this authority.
Like the Sudan and Zimbabwe cases, the subjective issues
will define each player's goals.
C . GOALS
South Africa's initial goal was to incorporate Namibia into
the Republic as a territory. This goal was both their stated
and the perceived maximum goal obtainable. Their minimum goal
was to maintain de facto control of the territory. South
Africa's perception was that maintaining the status quo in
the region was the next best option to establishing international
recognition for Namibia's incorporation into South Africa.
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Both the minimum and maximum goals addressed South Africa's
subjective issues.
The initial goal of the UN was to bring Namibia under UN
trusteeship, leading to independence based on majority rule.
This goal is an extension of the original League of Nations'
mandate and is a stated goal of the UN trusteeship program.
The initial maximum and minimum goals of the UN coincide, and
there is little latitude on either side of this position.
Was conflict or negotiation preferred early in the dis-
pute? The goals of the UN and South Africa clearly do not
overlap and there was little common ground with which to nego-
tiate. South Africa preferred conflict since the cost of
standing firm was relatively low. There was limited danger
at this point of armed conflict, and the UN's only realistic
option was to push for a settlement through diplomatic means.
What were the initial strategies of each player?
D. STRATEGIES
South Africa's strategy was to continue its occupation
of Namibia, ignoring UN requests to submit reports required
by the mandate on the status of the territory. South Africa
further tightened its control of the territory by passing the
South West Africa Affairs Act of 1949 to transfer control of
native affairs from the Administration for SWA to the South
African Parliament. This had the practical effect of incor-
porating Namibia into the Republic and tied the territory to
South African politics. [Ref. 35:p. 63]
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In 1962, South Africa established the Odendaal Commission
to define the aspects of apartheid as it pertained to Namibia.
The report issued by the commission recommended that separate
homelands (Bantustans) be established to isolate, by tribe,
the black Africans in Namibia. The Bantustans would occupy
rpughly 40 percent of the territory for about 91 percent of
the total population. [Ref. 38 :p. 627]
In 1969, South Africa further expanded its control of the
territory by enacting the South West African Affairs Act of
1969. This act allowed South Africa to take control of
revenue, social services, commerce, mining, and other indus-
tries, and coupled with the existing South African adminis-
tration over Namibia's foreign affairs, defense, police,
immigration and customs sealed its control over the territory.
[Ref. 38:p. 627]
The UN's strategy was to challenge the legality of South
Africa's occupation of Namibia and to apply diplomatic pressure
on South Africa. In 19 50, the UN sought an advisory opinion
from the International Court of Justice (ICJ), asking what
was the international status of Namibia and what were the
international obligations of South Africa in this case? In
its advisory opinion, the ICJ stated that, "South Africa con-
tinued to have international obligations under the (League of
Nations) mandate and was obliged to submit reports and transmit
petitions to the United Nations." [Ref. 39 :p. 221] The court
also declared that South Africa was not under legal obligation
to place Namibia under the UN trusteeship system.
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However, the court also made it clear that South Africa
could not unilaterally alter the status of the territory.
The practical effect of this ruling was that it made South
Africa's continued occupation of Namibia illegal and clearly
reinforced the UN's claim over the League mandate. However,
in the 1960 's a series of contradictory ICJ rulings weakened
the UN's position. In 1960, Ethiopia and Liberia (former
League members), with the encouragement of the UN, filed a
case against South Africa for not complying with the welfare
clause of the original League mandate. They hoped to trans-
form the earlier 1950 ruling into judicially binding orders.
South Africa countered with four preliminary objections.
"It claimed specifically that the Namibian mandate was no
longer a treaty in force; that neither Ethiopia nor Liberia
had standing to sue; that Ethiopia and Liberia lacked material
interest in the conflict; and that the alleged dispute was
one which could 'be settled by negotiation'." [Ref. 39:
p. 222]
In 1962 the Court ruled on South Africa's second and third
objections stating that Ethiopia and Liberia had sufficient
standing and proceeded to consider the merits of the case.
The review of the case was inordinately lengthy and the case
was not disposed of until 1966. In its decision the Court
ruled that neither Ethiopia nor Liberia had sufficient legal
interest in the case; in effect, the Court reversed its 1962
ruling and dismissed the case. [Ref. 40:pp. 67-68] This
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reversal runs contrary to the "well established legal princi-
ples of res judicata, which for all practical purposes would
require the court to be bound by its earlier pronouncements."
[Ref. 39:p. 222]
The reversal of the Court is attributed not to any inade-
quacy of the UN/Ethiopia-Liberia legal brief or on the strength
of South Africa's legal efforts, but instead is found in the
"judicial conservatism of the court and the fortuitous circum-
stances surrounding the proceedings." [Ref. 39 :p. 222]
The cumulative effect of these non-definitive ICJ rulings
was that they weakened the UN position and made it easier for
South Africa to resist UN pressure. The General Assembly was
dismayed over the Court's decision and in fact opposed the
ruling by passing UNGA Resolution 2145, which terminated South
Africa's mandate over the territory.
In sum. South Africa's strategy was to ignore UN demands
and to further tighten its control of Namibia. The UN coun-
tered by attempting to build international pressure on South
Africa and to challenge the legality of South Africa's occupa-
tion of the territory. What then were the resources that
aided South Africa in standing firm against UN pressure, and
what were the UN's limitations and resources for dealing with
South Africa?
E. RESOURCES AND LIMITATIONS
South Africa had three main resources it could use to
implement its strategy. First, South Africa is the undisputed
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power in the region. All other states in southern Africa are
economically dependent upon South Africa and are weak mili-
tarily when compared to the South African Defense Force (SADF)
.
[Ref. 34 :p. 160] Thus direct challenges to South Africa by
neighboring states, in support of UN policies, were not suffi-
cient to significantly raise South Africa's cost of standing
firm. It would not be until the mid-1970 's when black national-
ist groups, with the aid of surrounding states, will be able
to effectively confront the white regime in South Africa.
Second, South Africa was able to resist economic pressures
brought on by sanctions. The use of sanctions against South
Africa was still being debated during the early-1960's and the
threat of sanctions was not yet credible. However, when sanc-
tions were applied from 1963 onward, they did not have signi-
ficant impact. "South Africa has demonstrated remarkable skill
over 20 years in circumventing and defying sanctions. . . . Most
sanctions have been relatively mild, enforced only loosely."
[Ref. 20:p. 357]
Third, the South African government has been united on the
question of Namibia. The cohesion among white South Africans
is high, and their perceptions that Namibia is essential to
their security is a major resource for resisting outside
pressure. Similar to the Zimbabwe case, external diplomatic
and economic pressure further united the white population.
The UN's strategy was to apply diplomatic pressure on
South Africa. As noted earlier the use of the ICJ back-fired,
116
and the ruling had in effect diluted the UN's authority. The
ICJ ruling on Namibia from 1950 to 1960 was a major limitation
for the UN. A second limitation facing the UN was their ina-
bility to pressure the white regime in Pretoria with the
threat of military intervention. There was no support in the
UNSC for this option, and therefore the UN had little hope of
coercing South Africa into conceding. The only option open
to the UN at this time was to try to bring the full force of
the UN General Assembly (UNGA) upon South Africa.
As noted, in October 1966, the UNGA passed Resolution 214 5
which terminated the original mandate, and established the
UN Council for Namibia. By 1970, frustrated in its attempts
to pressure South Africa into conceding, the General Assembly
referred the issue to the Security Council hoping to focus its
diplomatic resources through the lens of the council. The
Security Council adopted Resolution 264 which recognized the
General Assembly's termination of the mandate and stated that
continued occupation of Namibia by South Africa was illegal,
and accordingly requested that South Africa withdraw from the
territory.
To support its resolution, the Security Council again asked
the ICJ for an advisory opinion, hoping to clarify the illegality
of South Africa's continued presence in Namibia. In June
1971, the ICJ ' s decision was in favor of the UN. The court
concluded, "that the mandate was revocable and that the United
Nations possessed the necessary authority to do so." [Ref. 39:
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p. 224] In effect, the Court reaffirmed its earlier decision
of 1962 and strengthened the UN's overall position.
While this resolution and subsequent ICJ rulings did not
immediately alter South Africa's willingness to concede, it
did have the effect of building support for the UN and added
momentum to the UN effort to resolve the dispute. It was
clear that up until 1966, UN pressure alone was insufficient
to force South Africa into conceding, and that the costs of
standing firm for South Africa were still relatively low.
However, with the growing political activity of Namibia's
black nationalists, the costs to South Africa will change.
F. THE BLACK NATIONALISTS
The black nationalist movement, started in 1959, had begun
by 1966 its campaign of organized violence in Namibia. Both
SWAPO and SWANU had been unsuccessful at pressuring South
Africa through political means and they decided their only
option was to launch a guerrilla war against the white regime.
From the late-1960's to the early-1970's neither SWAPO nor
SWANU was able to seriously increase the cost to South Africa
of standing firm. There were two main reasons for this.
First, the SADF is a well-equipped, highly trained organization
capable of confronting any force or combination of forces in
the region. For any group to challenge the SADF, intense
training and support would be necessary, and SWAPO and SWANU
could not at this point, obtain either of these resources.
118
Second, tribalism and factionalism among the nationalists
prevented them from consolidating their power and resources.
In 1973, SWAPO will emerge as the most influential organiza-
tion and will receive the most support from both the Organi-
zation of African Unity (OAU) and the UN. UNGA Resolution
2145 recognizes SWAPO as the "sole and authentic representa-
tive of the Namibian people" and granted it permanent observer
status in the UN. [Ref. 38 :p. 629]
The UN and SWAPO have a synergistic relationship. SWAPO
through UN recognition is given legitimacy and can use the
forum of the UN to gain support from other states. Conversely,
the UN uses SWAPO as a resource to pressure South Africa into
negotiating. Through mutual support each organization's posi-
tion in the conflict is enhanced, while singly their ability
to influence South Africa is reduced.
1974 marks a turning point in the Namibian conflict. The
April coup in Lisbon prompted Portugal to relinquish control
of its colonies in Africa, and Mozambique and Angola became
independent states in 1975. The changing realities in the
region influenced South African perceptions and affected
its resources
.
South Africa was beginning to reconsider its strategy
based on several changing perceptions. First, Great Britain
decided to accept the ICJ ruling that South Africa was illegally
occupying Namibia. This combined with increased pressure from
the other Western states was forcing Pretoria to rethink its
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strategy. Second, "Angola's independence had shattered the
aura of invincibility that had bolstered the self-confidence
of whites in southern Africa." [Ref. 35:p. 67] Third,
Angola's independence not only had a psychological effect but
a practical one as well. SWAPO now could use bases within
Angola, with the support of the MPLA government in Angola, to
train its guerrillas and stage raids across the border into
Namibia. As a result, the level of violence in the region
increased and further polarized the conflict.
The combination of these perceptions will influence Pretoria
to adjust its strategy. South African Prime Minister, B. J.
Vorster agreed in principle to the OAU and UN positions on
Namibian independence. He claimed that Pretoria was now
committed to transferring power in the territory. However, he
stated that South Africa would not accept the UN's authority
and that his government would transfer power directly to the
participants of the upcoming (South African sponsored) consti-
tutional conference. [Ref. 35:p. 68]
This was the beginning of South Africa's strategy of resolv-
ing the question of Namibia through an "internal solution."
Between September 1975 and March 1977, representatives from
various political and ethnic groups attended the Turnhalle
Conference. The makeup of the conference did not accurately
reflect the political composition of the territory and highly
favored the white regime in the region. In March 1977, the
conference produced a draft constitution and set 31 December
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as the target date for independence. Dirk Mudge, the leader
of the white delegation stated that South African troops would
remain in Namibia following independence, and that Walvis Bay
would remain a part of South Africa. [Ref. 41 :p. 695] SWAPO
denounced the conference and declared that all of the proceed-
ings were illegal. Following the conference, the groups that
had participated formed themselves into the Democratic Turn-
halle Alliance (DTA) , with Dirk Mudge as their leader.
The primary goal of this strategy was to eliminate the UN
from the independence process in order to ensure South African
control over the government in Windhoek. Since any white
government in Namibia would rely heavily upon Pretoria's
assistance in maintaining its security and developing its
economy, continued South African control of Namibia was assured
and South Africa's security maintained.
By 1978 the UN had also adjusted its strategy. In order
to forestall South Africa's internal settlement, the UN
stepped up its diplomatic efforts. The Western members of the
Security Council formed the Western Contact group, whose main
objective was to promote negotiations between South Africa
and the UN. In 1978, the contact group presented the South
African government with a draft proposal of a settlement based
on Resolution 385 which was adopted earlier by the Security
Council. The resolution and the subsequent proposals called
for: (1) One-person, one-vote elections to be supervised by
the UN. (2) Withdrawal of South African administration and
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its military forces. (3) Transfer of power to the Namibian
people. [Ref. 36:p. 782]
In April, South Africa accepted a revised form of the
proposals. They agreed to the general provisions of Resolution
385 but added that the withdrawal of South African troops
from Namibia would occur only after SWAPO completely ceased
all hostilities in the territory. [Ref. 38 :p. 630] In
September 1978, the UN formalized the "Western plan" by adopt-
ing UNSC Resolution 435 which (1) reiterated the illegality
of South African occupation in Namibia, (2) established a
United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) to ensure
early independence for Namibia, (3) declared that unilateral
action by South Africa in relation to the electoral process
was illegal, and (4) welcomed the preparedness of SWAPO to
cooperate in observing the ceasefire provisions. [Ref. 36:
pp. 915-916]
There is one major flaw in both Resolution 385 and 435,
in that neither contains a timetable or deadline for South
African compliance. In this way South Africa is under no real
pressure to take positive action and can go through the motions
of fulfilling the provisions while not actually doing so.
Pretoria can use the resolutions to deflect pressure, and
stall for time in order to pursue its internal solution.
From 1977 until about 1981, South Africa followed a two-
pronged strategy. This strategy involed negotiating with the
UN while simultaneously laying the framework of an internal
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solution. In September 197 8, South Africa conducted internal
elections in Namibia. The DTA won 41 out of 50 seats on the
advisory assembly. The new assembly agreed to UN-supervised
elections to be held in 1979, and in May, the advisory assembly
was reconstituted as the National Assembly. South Africa
proceeded to consolidate the internal government, centralizing
the civil service and edging the territory towards complete
independence. However, the important areas of defense, foreign
affairs, police, and national security were not handed over
to the transitional government of the DTA. [Ref. 38 :p. 631]
During this period. South Africa was also negotiating with
the UN. South Africa had agreed in principle to Resolution
435, however, there were still three main issues preventing
implementation of a settlement: (1) the mechanisms of the
electoral process and the UN role in those elections. (2)
the conditions of the ceasefire, including the composition of
the UNTAG, and (3) the structure of the government following
independence [Ref. 37:p. 105]. These issues would be diffi-
cult to resolve even under ideal circumstances. And given the
hostilities felt on both sides, along with South Africa's
unwillingness to make any serious compromise, it is not sur-
prising that efforts at obtaining a settlement failed.
While these issues prevented further movement towards a
settlement, there were two more fundamental elements that
prevented a settlement. First, the UN by recognizing SWAPO
as the sole and legitimate representative of the Namibian
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people, has clearly displayed its partiality. Pretoria's
perception that the UN cannot be an impartial judge in the
conflict is not unfounded. South Africa's lack of trust in
the UN is a primary factor in preventing a settlement.
Second, as a result of the poor showing of Bishop Abel Muzorewa
in Zimbabwe's January 1980 election. South Africa was fearful
that the DTA would suffer the same fate if put up against
SWAPO in free elections in Namibia. Thus, South African per-
ceptions for the need to steer clear of UN-supervised elections
was reinforced. [Ref. 42]
In January 19 81, talks were held in Geneva, and although
both South Africa and SWAPO agreed to the terms of Resolution
435, the talks ended within a week in total failure. It is
evident in retrospect that South Africa had attended the talks
as a logical extension of its two-pronged strategy. In fact
the talks were a small victory for Pretoria in that the DTA's
role as a central political player in the conflict was firmly
established with little cost to South Africa. Moreover, any
future all-party talks would include the DTA. [Ref. 43:
p. 702]
During this entire period, SWAPO was continuing its
guerrilla effort. While the conflict had intensified it did
not reach the level of violence that occurred in Zimbabwe.
SWAPO ' s strategy has been to apply steady pressure on South
Africa, and build its own strength rather than push for a
decisive military victory over South Africa. [Ref. 34:p. 167]
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The size and strength of the SADF would make an outright
military victory for SWAPO unlikely, and attempting to win
militarily against such an overwhelming foe would be an
impractical expenditure of resources.
SWAPO receives much of its support and aid from the
Frontline states. They desire a quick settlement in Namibia
for self-interest reasons. First, the Frontline States are
in a dilemma with regard to South Africa. On the one hand,
they are all individually linked to South Africa economically,
while on the other hand they are openly supporting nationalist
movements in Namibia and among South Africa's own black
nationalists. A quick resolution to the conflict in Namibia
will result in an overall decrease in the level of hostility
in the region and will free up some of the resources that they
are currently diverting to SWAPO. Second, establishing an
alliance with an independent Namibia under SWAPO control, the
Frontline States could begin to tip the balance of power in
the direction of the black African states in the region.
Third, the sooner a stronger regional alliance among black
states is established, the sooner the Frontline States will
be able to diminish their economic reliance on South Africa.
The Frontline States have been effective at pressing SWAPO
into negotiating. Realizing that its principal lifeline is
connected to the Frontline States, SWAPO has acceded to their
requests to negotiate and have supported the Frontline States'
negotiating effort. In fact, the Frontline States have
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displayed a remarkable flexibility, and have been a positive
contributor to the negotiating process.
However, Frontline pressure to resolve the conflict quickly
reduces the latitude that SWAPO has in negotiating with South
Africa. In effect. Frontline pressure is a resource for South
Africa in that they can make more aggressive proposals knowing
that Frontline pressure will induce SAWPO to consider them
seriously.
In sura, while SWAPO is able to apply steady pressure on
South Africa, it has not raised substantially South Africa's
costs of standing firm.
G. "THE BIG STALL"
1981 marks the second major turning point in the Namibian
conflict. Based on evoling perceptions and changing resources.
South Africa adopted a policy that is designed to forestall
a settlement in Namibia. This new strategy was based on three
perceptions.
First, domestic unrest among South Africa's blacks was a
primary concern for Pretoria. A SWAPO victory in Namibia
might further encourage political militancy within South Africa.
In addition, negotiating with SWAPO has set a precedent, and
has encouraged nationalists within South Africa to push for
serious negotiations with the white regime. Defeating SWAPO
in Namibia would slow down the nationalist momentum within
South Africa.
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Second, from June until September 1981, Assistant Secre-
tary of State for African Affairs, Chester A. Crocker, put
forth a set of proposals for Namibian independence. A key
element in Crocker's proposals involved the simultaneous
withdrawal of the SADF from Namibia and Cuban troops from
Angola. The de facto linkage between the resolution of the
conflict in Namibia to Cuban troop withdrawal has caused an
impasse in the negotiating process. South Africa has claimed
that its security is threatened by the continued presence of
Cuban troops in Angola. Whether this is actually the percep-
tion held by Pretoria or whether it is just a negotiating
tactic, the result is the same— the negotiations are stalled
and South Africa gains more time to implement an internal
settlement.
Third, South Africa has used the "threat of communism" in
the region to gain US support. In May 19 81, South African
and US officials "began bilateral talks about the relaxation
of restrictions on the sale of arms and the extension of the
long term cooperation in atomic energy developments." [Ref.
43 :p. 703] In addition, the US veto of a UNSC resolution that
attacked South Africa for a SADF raid into Angola [Ref. 43:
p. 703] further strengthened South African perceptions that
US support was increasing. This increased support boosted
the morale of the white regime and influenced Pretoria in pur-
suing a more aggressive policy. In 1982, taking into consider-
ation these perceptions. South Africa embarked on a new strategy
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specifically designed to stall any progress in Namibia. The
primary goal of this strategy is to avoid SWAPO control of an
independent Namibia. This is a notable adjustment in goals
and reflects the changing perceptions of South Africa.
As noted, South Africa jumped on the linkage bandwagon as
a tactic for stalling the negotiations. There were two main
reasons for this. First, South Africa needed time to strengthen
the internal parties in Namibia. Pretoria was discontented
with the DTA's ability to construct a credible non-SWAPO national
political organization [Ref. 44], If South Africa is to pursue
an internal solution, they must develop a broader-based party
in order to gain recognition for the new government. Having
failed to accomplish this. South Africa requires additional
time. South Africa also sought to boost the DTA's credibility
by attempting to obtain from the UN the same status for the
DTA that the UN confers upon SWAPO [Ref. 35:p. 82].
Second, South Africa attempted to weaken SWAPO ' s military
and political base of support. Even though the war was be-
ginning to slow down, disengaging SWAPO troops would allow the
guerrillas to regroup and strengthen. It was still in South
Africa's interest to maintain a low level of conflict in order
to check the growth of SWAPO. From 19 81 to 19 84 South Africa
continued the war effort through the SADF and UNITA, and have
maintained a presence inside Angola. [Ref. 45 :p. 114] There
are two aspects to this strategy. First, continued South
African military pressure can galvanize the nationalist spirit
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in Namibia and in fact provide SWAPO with increased recruit-
ment and support. Second, increased attacks on SWAPO inside
Angola threatens the MPLA's sense of security and may rein-
force their perception that retaining Cuban troops in Angola
is necessary to ensure their security.
Taken at face value, this increases the threat to South
Africa's security in the region. However, if part of Pretoria's
strategy is aimed at forestalling a settlement in Namibia, then
the continued presence of Cuban troops in Angola, within the
context of the linkage issue, provides South Africa with an
"acceptable" excuse to maintain the SADF in the territory.
In turn this continues to reinforce the stalemate over a
settlement.
Thus far South Africa's strategy has been successful in
preventing SWAPO from gaining control in Namibia. From 19 83
to 1985, the UN has been unsuccessful at pressing South Africa
into implementing a settlement based on UN terms. By 19 84
Pretoria had already accepted the provisions of Resolution 435,
however. South African Prime Minister Botha was clearly un-
happy with the arrangement and was looking for a way out of
implementing a final settlement in Namibia. [Ref . 46]
In February 19 84, a ceasefire agreement was reached in
Lusaka. The accord called for the withdrawal of South African
troops from Angola, and in turn, Angola was to ensure that
neither SWAPO nor Cuban troops would move into the areas
vacated by the SADF. Although the ceasefire was to be completed
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by 31 March 1984, South African troops remained inside Angola
after this date [Ref. 41 :p. 697]. SADF attacks in Angola and
Namibia persist, and South Africa shows no signs of forfeiting
its most reliable resource in the region— the SADF.
In November 1984, Angolan President Dos Santos conceded
the linkage issue following a phased South African withdrawl
from Namibia
—
prior to independence under UN Resolution 435.
This put the diplomatic ball "squarely in Pretoria's court."
However, South Africa is mainly concerned with advancing a
"coordinated regional maneuver to rid the sub-continent of
foreign troops . . . and (Pretoria's) plans have little to do
with Resolution 435." [Ref. 47] South Africa forged ahead
with its internal solution and established an interim govern-
ment in Namibia. It is clear that a pattern had developed in
the negotiations: the UN would put forth a proposal. South
Africa would then agree in principle to the proposals but
would object to the specific terms of the agreement. Then
either the UN or SWAPO would make an adjustment to the pro-
posals to make them more acceptable to South Africa, and
Pretoria would counter by pushing ahead with its own strategy
and plans. This pattern characterizes the Namibian negotiations
in the early 1980's.
By April 1985, South Africa had established the interim
government in Namibia. The MPC was to take over the adminis-
trative functions of the new government. The MPC received
support from several ethnic groups, however, it generally
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lacks credibility primarily because of its link with the DTA
and its inability to attract Ovambo support [Ref. 41:p. 698].
The main task of the interim government is to draft an inde-
pendence constitution that will be presented to the Namibian
people in a national referendum [Ref. 48] . South Africa is
hoping it can generate enough support for the new constitution,
including those Ovambos who are ready for a constitution with
or without SWAPO approval. In this way they may be able to
build some momentum in gaining international recognition for
an internal solution in Namibia.
What has been SWAPO ' s response to this and what has been
their, main strategy? SWAPO, like South Africa, has carried
out a two-pronged strategy. First, they have continued the
guerrilla war, applying steady, though low level, pressure
on South Africa. Second, they have pursued a diplomatic course
by supporting UN efforts to implement Resolution 435. By
following the diplomatic road they have been able to deflect
a good deal of Western criticism stemming from their Cuban/
Soviet connection in Angola.
By the end of 19 85, the conflict had evolved from the
initial objective issue of whether Namibia would be incor-
porated into South Africa or whether it would become an
independent state through the UN trusteeship system, to a
question of who would have control and the greatest influence
in an independent Namibia. A sub-issue over who will control
Namibia during the transition period is key to controlling
the territory following independence.
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As noted at the beginning of this chapter, one element of
the Namibian conflict is that it is similar to Zimbabwe in that
several external players and forces are involved. The most
influential external player up until this point clearly has
been the US. It is appropriate to briefly examine the impact
this player has had on the conflict.
First, the US has been a key player in supporting UN Reso-
lution 435. The US has continued to reaffirm its commitment
to resolving the conflict within the framework established
by 435. Chester Crocker has stated that, "As originator and
sponsor of Resolution 435, the United States has no intention
of backing away from it." [Ref. 49 :p. 2]
Second, although supportive of 435, the US has constructed
a major stumbling block to resolving the conflict by introduc-
ing the "linkage" of Namibian independence to Cuban troop
withdrawal in Angola. The linkage issue has been a continuing
source of criticism for the Reagan Administration, but it has
remained firm on this issue. The word from Washington is
that, "the main issue is now resolving the practical question
of the timing of Cuban troop withdrawal in relation to Resolu-
tion 435." [Ref. 48 :p. 2] This points to the increased
influence US goals in the region have on the Namibian conflict.
The introduction of the linkage issue has had three princi-
pal effects. These include: (1) This issue has reduced the
cohesion and effectiveness of the Western Contact Group. In
fact, France's dissatisfaction with US intransigence on the
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linkage issue has caused that state to withdraw from the group.
In addition, the role of other states in the group have
diminished. (2) By minimizing the role of other states in
the Contact Group, the US has become virtually the sole Western
arbiter in the conflict. (3) In a larger context, the linkage
issue elevates the regional nature of the conflict to the
arena of East-West competition.
In sum, the US has expanded its role as an external actor
in Namibia, and by doing so has added another dimension to the
conflict. In fact, the US has occupied a unique position in
the conflict, balanced on the line separating primary and
secondary players.
It is clear at this point that conflict, not negotiation,
is preferred by both SWAPO and South Africa. What then are
the elements that have thus far prevented a settlement in
Namibia?
H. FACTORS PREVENTING A SETTLEMENT
There are five principal factors that have contributed thus
far to preventing a settlement in Namibia. The following is
a brief review of these factors.
1. South Africa faces a dilemma in Namibia. On the one
hand, by agreeing to a settlement in Namibia, South
Africa could appease other black states in Africa
and improve its relations with those states. This in
turn would relieve some of the external pressure
directed at South Africa for its domestic apartheid
policies. On the other hand, a settlement in Namibia,
that included SWAPO would encourage South African
nationalists, and would serve as an example of the
efficacy of employing violence as a tool for obtaining
political goals. Since South Africa's domestic
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security takes precedence over its relations with
other black states, it is difficult to see Pretoria
accepting a settlement that included SWAPO . In addi-
tion, while a SWAPO victory in a weak Namibia would
not pose in itself a threat to South Africa, the
perception that the walls were closing in on South
Africa's white regime would prevent Pretoria from hand-
ing over control of Namibia to a black regime. In
all, the costs of conceding a SWAPO victory (military
or electoral) in Namibia are still quite high to South
Africa.
SWAPO ' s military strategy has not been completely
effective. SWAPO military pressure (the stick)
coupled with UN inducements (the carrot) would appear
to be an intelligent strategy, however, neither
SWAPO pressure nor UN inducements have been great
enough to either increase South African costs of
standing firm, or decrease the cost of conceding.
Either the UN would have to make the terms of a
settlement more attractive or SWAPO would need to
intensify the guerrilla war before it is likely that
South Africa would agree to a settlement.
As cited earlier, the linkage issue is a main barrier
to a resolution of the conflict. US and South African
intransigence on the issue, coupled with continued
South African objections to the practical implementa-
tion of Resolution 435 has been a key factor in pre-
venting further movement toward a settlement. In
effect, the US has through the introduction of linkage,
provided South Africa with an "excuse" to avoid the
main issues in the Namibian conflict and further
strengthen its own position in the region.
The fourth element preventing a settlement has been
South Africa's basic distrust of the UN. The UN has
tried to be the mediator, primarily through the Western
Contact group. However, the overwhelming support for
SWAPO and the implied contempt displayed toward South
Africa by the General Assembly only reinforces Pretoria's
perception of the partiality of the UN. Thus it would
be difficult for the UN to assume the role of an
effective third party mediator. The US has tried to
assume this role but also has been unsuccessful mainly
because of its intransigence on the linkage issue.
Although the linkage issue has been cited as a
major stumbling block of producing a settlement, it
really represents the fundamental element of South
Africa's deep distrust for the other players involved
in Namibia. Until trust is built between all of the
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players, it is unlikely that the Namibia conflict will
be resolved by a negotiated settlement.
5. The fifth element preventing a settlement in Namibia is
the inability of any player, or group of players, to
substantially raise the costs to South Africa of
standing firm. "In fact, almost every major change in
South African policy toward the territory has been
the result of changes in the international political
climate. [Ref. 35:p. 84] It would follow that one of
the factors that has prevented a settlement is the ina-
bility of external players to apply focused pressure
and in sufficient quantities on South Africa to produce
the desired result. South Africa has been remarkably
resilient in resisting external pressure by making
only small concessions and by adjusting its strategy.
And although there have been concerted efforts in the
UN to pressure South Africa, this has not been the
right kind of pressure. Diplomatic and economic measures
are the only realistic options open to the UN for
pressuring South Africa. Diplomatic pressure is rela-
tively ineffectual on a pariah state such as South Africa
Larger doses of diplomatic force must be applied to
South Africa to produce results similar to those cases
where states are concerned with maintaining a positive
international reputation. As noted earlier, economic
sanctions also have not produced substantial political
results in South Africa. Therefore it would seem that
the UN is simply not equipped with the necessary tools
to deal with South Africa in the Namibian case.
These five elements together have prevented further
progress in resolving the conflict in Namibia. The amount of
influence that each of these elements have on preventing a
settlement varies over the course of the conflict, but com-
bined, they build a formidable barrier to a settlement in
Namibia. Thus any concerted effort to resolve the conflict
must first address each of these elements.
I . SUMMARY
The Namibian case involves several actors both internal
and external. The initial objective issue in this case has
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evolved, but the subjective issues have essentially remained
the same. Unlike the guerrilla insurgence in Zimbabwe, the
guerrilla war in Namibia has not raised South Africa's costs
of standing firm high enough to induce concessions from Pre-
toria. South Africa has established a general pattern in
its two-pronged strategy. Pretoria agrees in principle to
the provisions of a settlement while disagreeing with the
specifics. This in turn has stalled the negotiations on
several occasions, and has enabled South Africa to strengthen
Namibia's internal parties and press on with an internal
solution
.
The bottom line is that South Africa is still very much
in control in Namibia, and only when South African costs of
standing firm increase or the costs of conceding decrease,
will there be a resolution of the Namibian conflict.
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V. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THREE CONFLICTS
Thus far this thesis has examined three conflicts in Africa:
the Sudan civil war, the Rhodesia/ Zimbabwe independence con-
flict, and the continuing dispute in Namibia. Each case has
been analyzed through the framework of the conflict resolution
checklist, and the key elements that have defined the course
and outcome of each conflict have been identified. This chap-
ter will provide a comparative examination of these key elements
and will attempt to draw some conclusions that relate to
conflict resolution in general, and as it applies to the unique
political and military environment of Africa.
The various elements will be reviewed in the same order as
they are presented in the checklist. Several questions arise
during each step of the checklist and each segment of this
chapter will examine the key questions posed in each step.
A. PLAYERS
Several questions regarding the role of players as unitary
actors and the role individuals play in a conflict immediately
arise in the first step. As a note of reference, at various
points in this chapter for the purposes of analysis, players
are sometimes referred to as the "weaker" or the "stronger"
player. In general, the black nationalists in Zimbabwe and
in Namibia, along with the southern rebels in Sudan have been
grouped into the former category, while the white Rhodesians,
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the North in Sudan, and South Africa in Namibia, have been
placed in the latter. This grouping is based on the overall
relative position of the primary players in the early stages
of each conflict. This does not reflect the changing positions
of the players as each conflict developed.
The determination of weak and strong players was based on
five principal factors. They are: player cohesion, military
ability, external support, legitimacy of action, and leader-
ship. This chapter closes with an examination of these factors,
but a brief review of each of the conflicts studied would indi-
cate that in the Sudan conflict, the North had a high degree
of military ability and a moderate amount of external support,
and possessed low player cohesion and minimal leadership.
Conversely the South had insignificant external support and
legitimacy and only a moderate degree of military ability,
player cohesion, and leadership. In Zimbabwe, the white
Rhodesian government possessed strong player cohesion and
leadership, and held only a minimal degree of external sup-
port and legitimacy. ZANU/ZAPU on the other hand had a great
deal of external support, leadership and legitimacy, and held
only a moderate amount of military ability and player cohesion.
In Namibia, South Africa is strong in player cohesion, mili-
tary ability, and leadership, but it is very low in legitimacy
and external support while SWAPO suffers mainly from a lack
of support and low military ability.
In sum, this relative determination of factors applies
to the initial phase of each conflict in indicating stronger
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and weaker players, and as each conflict progresses, these
variables change. In each of the conflicts, these variables
will contribute to the course and outcome of the conflict.
In addition, it will become clear that the relative importance
of each specific factor will vary between each player. This
variance will in part account for the resolution of the con-
flicts in Sudan and Zimbabwe and will contribute to the
failure of producing a settlement in Namibia.
In each conflict players initially assumed either primary
or secondary roles. In both the Zimbabwe and Namibia con-
flicts secondary players (in both cases the black nationalists)
assuined the role of primary players as the conflict developed.
What elements contributed to this adjustment? In both con-
flicts a nationalist movement had been forming. However, in
both cases the shift to primary player was preceded by an
event prompted by an external force. In the case of Zimbabwe
this external force was the 1972 Pearce Commission, which
sought to measure the acceptability of the Smith-Home Agree-
ment among Blacks in Zimbabwe; and in Namibia this external
force was the ICJ rulings that weakened the UN's overall
position and changed the perceptions of the black nationalists.
In Namibia the frustration that the black nationalists
were experiencing with obtaining a political solution was
magnified after the ICJ had, in effect, strengthened South
Africa's hand. Up until 1965 the conflict in Namibia was being
fought outside the territory in the forum of the UN. Here
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South Africa was at its weakest and was in the worst position
to resist external political pressure. However, South Africa
was able to stand firm and the effectiveness of external
political pressure had limited value. In October 1966,
following the ICJ rulings, SWAPO announced it would launch
an armed struggle against South Africa [Ref. 38:p. 628]. The
guerrilla war was a long time coming and the perception that
political means were ineffective reinforced the need to carry
Athe conflict directly to South Africa.
In Zimbabwe the Pearce Commission had the effect of
politicizing blacks throughout the country in response to
the Smith-Home Agreement. Just after the Pearce Commission
reported its findings, ZANU and ZAPU announced they would launch
a major airmed offensive against the Rhodesian government [Ref.
19 :p. 12]. While these plans had been previously drawn, the j
politicizing of blacks created "an environment more receptive i
to guerrilla activity [Ref. 19 :p. 13J .
In both conflicts external forces added to the momentum
and sharply changed the course of development of each player.
This is not to say that these nationalist movements would have
been unable to assume the role of primary player without this
external influence, but instead points to the catalyzing effect
these externally generated forces have on secondary players.
Because of the relative absence of external players in
the Sudan conflict and because the secondary players never
assumed greater roles, the Sudan case does not provide us
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with an appropriate example of external force. Instead, the
growth of the Anya-Nya in Sudan indicates that even without an
external force, an indigenous nationalist movement can develop
But in retrospect, the Anya-Nya may have been able to develop
into an effective organization much sooner had external sup-
port been available.
All three cases provide us with some insight into the role
that individuals play in a conflict. The role individuals
have in a conflict can take two basic forms. First, indi-
viduals can mirror the perceptions, goals, and ideals of the
group with which they are identified. Second, and perhaps a
more central point, individuals can also become an active
force within the conflict itself. That is to say, because of
the influence they carry over their respective groups and
due to their individual perceptions and goals they hold which
differ from that group, they are able to alter the course and
outcome of the conflict.
In Sudan the perceptions that Colonel Jafar Nimeiri held
toward the "Southern Problem" coupled with his specific need
to solve the conflict to consolidate his power and solidify
his control in Sudan were elements that directly contributed
to the timing of a settlement in that conflict [Ref. 9:p. 4]
.
Whereas previous Sudanese leaders--Khalif a , Magoub , and Abboud
neither had an urgent need to solve the problem, nor possessed
first-hand experience fighting in the South, Nimeiri brought
to his office a unique set of beliefs and requirements that
set the stage for a settlement.
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Two other key individuals had direct bearing on the con-
flict in Sudan. First, Colonel Joseph Lagu, who effectively
united southern political and military power, played a key
role in the resolution of the conflict. As noted in Chapter
II, by 1972 the South ' s goals had evolved to where they were
seeking complete independence. Lagu perceived Nimeiri's ef-
forts to resolve the conflict as a sincere attempt at recon-
ciliation and Lagu was pleased with the role his Anya-Nya
guerrillas would secure in Sudan's armed forces. This enhanced
role of the Anya-Nya, coupled with his position as a central
leader, in a south Sudan previously plagued by incohesion,
were decisive elements influencing the South 's acceptance of
Nimeiri's offer. It should be noted that many southern leaders
at first balked at Nimeiri's attempts, and it is quite possi-
ble that without Lagu ' s individual leadership at this critical
moment, the Sudanese conflict would have continued past 1972.
Although Colonel Lagu played a key role, another individual,
Abel Alier was also a critical figure in the Sudan conflict.
Alier was Joseph Garang ' s replacement as Nimeiri's Minister
of Southern Affairs. Highly respected and widely trusted among
many southern leaders, Alier was able to convince many skep-
tical southerners of Nimeiri's earnest intentions in the
South. Alier was also a key figure in the Addis Ababa Con-
ference and was directly involved in establishing the talks
through the World Council of Churches.
In addition, although he did not have great bearing on
the course of the conflict itself, Ethiopian Emperor Haile
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Selassie had direct impact on the negotiations, intervening
at critical points to ensure the success of the talks.
[Ref. 2:p. 165]
The Zimbabwe case also provides examples of key individuals
influencing the conflict. Here two key individuals had as
much to do with guiding the conflict to a conclusion as they
did with preventing a settlement. As noted in Chapter III,
the split between ZANU ' s Robert Mugabe, and ZAPU's Joshua
Nkomo had occurred not because of any intense tribal or
political differences, but was based in part on Nkomo ' s indi-
vidual leadership of ZAPU [Ref. 18:p. 55J . This division had
been a principal factor preventing the black nationalists in
Zimbabwe from raising the costs to whites of standing firm
in that country and from obtaining a resolution more favorable
to the nationalists.
In addition, Mugabe's ability to rally tremendous support
in the 1980 pre-independence elections in the face of great
electoral pressure from Nkomo and Bishop Muzorewa, had for
the time being, averted a potentially divisive situation from
developing that would have threatened the nationalists' hard-
won victory in Zimbabwe. However, in the post-independence
period, Mugabe again will be faced with the political dissen-
sion among the nationalists.
The role that Rhodesia's Prime Minister Ian Smith played
in the conflict was that of a mirror of white Rhodesian
aspirations and perceptions, and functioned as central rallying
143
figure. And his own unique personal perceptions and solid
leadership skills greatly influenced the conflict. Through-
out the dispute, right up until the Lancaster House Settlement,
Smith was continually seeking to influence the course of
events to gain the most for the white community. In retro-
spect, the ability of the white Rhodesian government to sustain
its position over a great period of time is a reflection of
Smith's skill as a leader, however, the outcome in Zimbabwe
reflects the realities of the conflict.
Two other individuals in the conflict had peripheral
influence. US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger was very
effective at changing Prime Minis.ter Smith's perception of
the costs of standing firm in the conflict [Ref . 19 :p. 24]
.
As noted in Chapter III, changing perceptions were a key
element in the conflict in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe. Smith's implicit
trust in Kissinger, in part, paved the way for an acceptance
of the white Rhodesian 's declining position. However, Kissin-
ger's ability to sway Smith's perceptions was grounded in
the realities of the conflict.
A brief mention of the Chief mediator in the Lancaster
House Conference, Lord Carrington, is appropriate. As noted,
Carrington displayed exceptional diplomatic skill during the
course of the negotiations, but his ability to exert leverage
over both the Patriotic Front and the white regime stemmed
from the relatively weak position each of these players had
in resisting external pressure from the Frontline States and
144
South Africa respectively. Carrington is an individual who
exploited the realities of the environment and reflected the
concerns of his respective group. In Lord Carrington 's case,
he represented the cumulative interests that Great Britain
held for 14 years following UDI.
Lastly, the Namibian conflict is interesting in that it
points out the limits even dynamic individuals have in a con-
flict. Of specific note is the role of SWAPO ' s leader Sam
Nujoma. Nujoma is an effective leader and his ability to
unite the Namibian nationalists would suggest his leadership
ability matches that of Nimeiri, Lagu , Mugabe and Smith. Why
then, is it difficult for him, through his individual efforts,
to push the conflict closer to a settlement? Put simply, the
realities of the conflict and the strength of South Africa's
overall position overshadow any substantial impact that Nujoma
may have. The relative ethnic cohesiveness of SWAPO may in
part account for Nujoma 's ability to unite the nationalists.
And Nujoma 's inability to spark a forceful surge in the
nationalists efforts in Namibia may be a factor preventing a
resolution of the conflict. This points to the limits that
an individual can have on a conflict. That is, an individual's
personal ability must fit the realities of the situation to
have a great impact on the conflict. However, in the case
of Nujoma, it can be said that his individual efforts have
been critical in maintaining SWAPO ' s position in a conflict
where it is obviously the weaker player. It is clear that
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an influential individual can shape the realities of the con-
flict and guide that conflict along a course that best reflects
his respective group's goals.
In sum, three general points can be drawn from the role
that individuals play in a conflict. First, individuals can
have substantial influence on the course and outcome of a
conflict. Second, this influence can have both a positive
and a negative effect on the process of conflict resolution.
Third, there is a limit to the influence an individual has on
a conflict based on the realities of the situation.
The last element to examine in the "player" section- is
the role that external players as unitary actors have on a
conflict. Both the Zimbabwe and Namibia conflicts contained
elements of external forces influencing the conflict. And
although there was a relatively low level of external involve-
ment in the Sudan conflict, there are a few examples from
this case as well.
When examining the three conflicts together it is possible
to formulate a general conclusion as to the effect of external
players in a conflict. There are three main ways in which
external players influence a conflict: (1) they influence
perceptions, (2) they contribute resources and limitations to
the primary internal players, and (3) they can pressure other
players from the outside.
First, in each case the actions and statements of external
players can directly influence the perceptions of the primary
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players. Angola's independence, the US ' s initial "Tar Baby"
policy, then later its shift to support majority rule, passage
of the Byrd Amendment, and South African withdrawal of mili-
tary support—each of these contributed to the changing per-
ceptions of Ian Smith and the white community in Rhodesia.
In Namibia, the US policy of "constructive engagement" and
its promotion of the linkage issue, increased South Africa's
perception of its ability to deflect continued pressure from
the UN and the Frontline States. In both instances, external
players influenced the course of the conflict through their
contribution to the primary players' perceptions.
Second, as noted later in this chapter, resources had
tremendous impact on the relative strengths of each primary
player. Often external players bring to the conflict outside
resources that are not intrinsic to the conflict itself. The
resources that the Anya-Nya received from Chad, the Congo,
and the OAU bolstered the South ' s position in Sudan. In
Zimbabwe, both ZANU and ZAPU would have been limited in their
ability to increase the costs to whites in Rhodesia without
the resource of Frontline State support and Soviet and Chinese
arms and assistance. And in Namibia, a key element maintain-
ing SWAPO ' s position in that conflict is the support they
receive from the MPLA in Angola. It is clear that without
these resources, the tenor of each conflict would have been
different.
Third, a key element external players bring to a conflict
is their ability to pressure primary players. The most
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notable example of this was the ability of both South Africa
and the Frontline States to pressure Smith and the black
nationalists respectively, into serious negotiations at
Lancaster House.
In Namibia the situation is somewhat different. Here it
is the inability of the UN, the Frontline States, and Angola
to pressure South Africa coupled with the US ' s unintentional
role in aiding South Africa in deflecting pressure that has
contributed to the failure to resolve this conflict. Inas-
much as external players can exert pressure on primary players,
they can also contribute to the ability of primary players
to deflect other outside pressure.
It is difficult to judge in which way external players
have the greatest impact on the conflict. However, it would
appear that an external player's ability to influence percep-
tions has the most value. For example, the white community's
position in Rhodesia had been steadily declining, however it
was not until both South Africa and the US convinced Smith
of the gravity of this fact that he adjusted his strategy in
the conflict. The UN's acknowledgement of SWAPO ' s leadership
of the black Namibian nationalists in that territory influ-
ences the perception of SWAPO ' s legitimacy among other players
in the international community. This perception is a key
element in maintaining SWAPO ' s morale and perseverence in
this conflict. Without SWAPO the conflict in Namibia would
be quite limited.
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In sum, external players can have great influence on a
conflict. This influence stems from their ability to alter
perceptions, provide resources, and pressure the primary
players. In general, the ability to alter perceptions has
the greatest impact.
B. ISSUES
Did the objective or subjective issues change in the con-
flicts examined? Was there a common element among the three
that prompted any changes? In both the Sudan and Zimbabwe
conflicts the objective issues remained unchanged. However,
in the Namibian conflict the objective issue has evolved.
Initially the objective issue centered on whether South West
Africa (Namibia) would be annexed by South Africa or would
gain its independence under the UN trusteeship program. Over
the course of the conflict the objective issue has shifted
to--who will have control in an independent Namibia--the
black nationalists or a South African-sponsored white regime?
Why then did the objective issue shift in Namibia and not in
the other two conflicts?
It is difficult to identify one specific element that
sets the Namibia conflict apart. However, there are two
elements that can provide some insight into how the issues
of the Namibia conflict differ from Sudan and Zimbabwe.
First, both the Sudan and the Zimbabwe conflicts were re-
solved in a period of time that did not span all of the
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changes their respective regions underwent, whereas, the
dispute over Namibia has its beginnings in the mid-1940 's
and over this time period the character of the southern
African sub-continent has changed. As such, the issues have
also undergone a change. Unlike Zimbabwe where the initial
issues of the conflict contributed to the shifting realities
of the region, the issues in the Namibian conflict were
formed prior to this period. In addition, Sudan had remained
relatively isolated during the conflict, and the elements
that did change the tenor of the conflict originated in the
country itself and most often in Khartoum.
Second, in Namibia there is an interesting shift in the
subjective issues for South Africa. The shift in South African
perceptions has influenced their subjective issues and goals,
which in turn has affected the objective issue of the conflict.
For all practical purposes. South Africa has retained control
in Namibia, and control vice complete annexation is the new
goal for Pretoria. In the face of mounting external pressure
South Africa has in effect adjusted the objective issues of
the conflict. This deflects some external pressure and pro-
vides them with another tactic for retaining control--the
"internal solution."
Therefore, this would suggest that the changing objective
issue in Namibia is attributable in part to the shifting fac-
tors that were not present when the conflict developed. How-
ever, the point can be made that in any instance where the
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overall political, military and social environment is shift-
ing, there exists the possibility that the objective issues
will also shift. The second part to this section addresses
the nature of shifting subjective issues.
In the introduction to this thesis, it was assumed that
because of the nature of subjective issues they would be
"subject to several adjustments." However, this has not been
the case. The subjective issues of the primary players in
each conflict have remained stable. Even in the case of
Namibia and Zimbabwe, where black nationalists assumed the
role of primary players, the subjective issues were only
slightly adjusted to reflect their change of position in the
conflict. The only case where subjective issues were altered
substantially for a single player is again in Namibia. Here
South Africa's initial subjective issue of its right to annex
the territory evolved to an issue of security-through-control
for South Africa in the region.
Thus, the subjective issues have remained relatively
stable, and did not undergo drastic alterations in two of the
conflicts studied. The next section will relate the role of




In Chapter I it was assumed that each player's goals are
defined by his subjective issues. It was also assumed that
within a player's range of goals, his maximum goals would
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reflect an optimistic viewpoint and that his minimum goals
would reflect a realistic point of view.
Following an examination of the three conflicts two conclu-
sions can be drawn. First, the initial goals coincide with
the maximum obtainable goals sought by each primary player.
In addition, as stated in Chapter I, maximum goals generally
reflect an optimistic point of view. For example, in Sudan
the North's desire to Arabicize the entire country, including
the African-oriented South, did not take into consideration
the immense problems this policy would encounter. In Zimbabwe,
UDI as an operational goal was for the white regime the maxi-
mum goal obtainable, based on an optimistic view of the reali-
ties in the region. South Africa's goals in Namibia also
reflect optimism on the part of Pretoria.
It is interesting to note that the goals of the weaker
player were far more realistic, and with the exception of the
southern Sudanese rebels, remained relatively unchanged. This
appearance of a realistic point of view may be the result of
analyzing the conflict through the advantage of hindsight,
and it is easy to see the South ' s goals in Sudan and ZAPU/
ZANU goals in Zimbabwe as realistic since they managed to
obtain them. The black nationalists in Namibia and Zimbabwe
sought the establishment of majority rule as both their maxi-
mum and minimum goals. These goals remained constant through-
out the Zimbabwe conflict and persist today in Namibia. The
exception is that the Sudanese rebels shifted their goals
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roughly halfway through the conflict from obtaining autonomy
based on a Federal structure to obtaining complete independence
from the North. However, in the end, the rebels accepted
the Federal structure—something less than independence.
The second conclusion is that there was a greater adjust-
ment in the stronger players' initial goals. In Sudan, the
North had to amend its goal of Arabicizing the entire country,
and in the end settled for a united Sudan based on a Federal
structure. In Zimbabwe, the white community had to relinquish
control and had to accept black nationalist rule in the coun-
try. However, the white community's minimum goal of maintain-
ing their security has been obtained for the time being. South
Africa has had to adjust its goals in Namibia. The goal of
annexing the territory is no longer a realistic goal; main-
taining practical control is the new goal, and even this goal
is evolving.
In sum, the greatest adjustment in goals was made by the
player that was in the stronger position at the start of the
conflict. And by comparison the goals of the weaker player had
remained relatively unchanged throughout the course of the con-
flict. This is in part attributable to the ability of the
"weaker player" to strengthen each of the five factors affect-
ing his relative position in the conflict. For example, the
black nationalists in Zimbabwe were weaker in military ability
and player cohesion, and by increasing the level of these
two factors strengthened their position relative to the
Rhodesian government. Conversely, the white community found
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it very difficult to gain external support and legitimacy.
The result was that by comparison, the nationalist's position
improved, and the white Rhodesian government's position declined
D. STRATEGY
As noted in the first chapter, strategy is the way in which
a player employs his resources to obtain his goals. A com-
parative analysis of the three conflicts reveals several common
strategic patterns. At the start of each conflict, each of
the primary players employed a strategy that emphasized politi-
cal and diplomatic efforts. In Sudan, the North used only
limited military force to contain the immediate effects of
the 1955 Equatoria mutiny. In fact the South had also relied
on a political strategy, and when Sudanese political parties
were banned in 1958, southern political leaders carried on
in exile, establishing the political roots of Sudan African
National Union (SANU) . It was noted earlier that southern
political leaders even as late as 1962 were still seeking to
obtain autonomy through political means.
In the Rhodesia/ Zimbabwe conflict, both Great Britain
and the Rhodesian government looked to resolve their dispute
through political means. And in fact, Wilson specifically
ruled out the use of military force. It is possible that had
Great Britain used force in Rhodesia, the government in Salis-
bury would have responded in kind. In Namibia, political and
diplomatic strategies were used by both South Africa and the
UN for 20 years in an effort to resolve that conflict.
154
Why were political strategies first used? First, none
of the primary players had the tactical need, nor second,
the will to use military force in the conflict. Moreover,
each player believed that he could obtain the best settlement
through political means. In the Namibia conflict. South
Africa was in its weakest environment dealing with the UN
in the international political arena. This is attributable
to South Africa's realization that it had already established
effective control of the Namibian territory, and that what
it now required was the international political recognition
of this fait accompli.
The second common pattern in strategy is that in each con-
flict a military strategy was employed by one and then both
primary players. Two main elements promoted this shift.
First, in each case the weaker of the two primary players
(the South in Sudan, and the black nationalists in Zimbabwe
and Namibia) initiated the shift in strategy. This shift can
find its roots primarily in the changing perceptions of these
"weaker players." In Sudan, the South frustrated by its
attempts to gain a political settlement used the growing Anya-
Nya force to pressure the North. In Zimbabwe, the nationalists
had consistently pressed for a political settlement with the
white regime, and like southern leaders in Sudan began to
sense the futility of using a political strategy. However,
in the case of the black nationalists in Zimbabwe, the after-
effects of the Pearce Commission had provided them with a
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resource by fostering a nationalist consciousness. As noted
earlier in this chapter, SVJAPO ' s choice to launch a guerrilla
war against South Africa was in part based on the perceptions
generated by the non-definitive ICJ rulings on Namibia in
1966. Thus one element prompting a shift to a military
strategy was the changing perceptions of the weaker player.
Second, in each of the three cases examined, the player
that initially occupied the stronger position responded to
this shift in strategy by also employing military force. In
an effort to curtail the activities of the southern Anya-Nya
guerrillas, the North, at that time under the leadership of
General Abboud, responded by actively pursuing a military
solution in the south. The response by the Rhodesian govern-
ment and South Africa to guerrilla movements in their indi-
vidual conflicts was much the same as Northern Sudan's. Unlike
the shift to a militant policy by the weaker player, which was
prompted by changing perceptions, this shift by the North
Sudan, the white government in Rhodesia, and the government
of South Africa in Namibia was based on a change in its
opponent's strategy. Moreover, this adjustment was based on
changing realities rather than on changing perceptions.
The most striking aspect of these shifts in strategy is
that the initial shift was initiated by the weaker primary
player (especially in a military sense) in each conflict. One
conclusion that can be drawn from this observation is that
perceptions have tremendous effect on the course of a conflict.
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As a guide to. policy, this would suggest that the stronger
player should adopt a policy that includes influencing the
perceptions of the weaker player. This holds true for these
conflicts set in the African environment, and should also be
valid for conflicts that possess the same dynamics of the
three cases presented here.
The final shift by each primary player is to a balanced
"dual strategy." This is not to say that during the military
phase political means for resolving the conflict had been
abandoned, but instead military means were the primary strategy
used by the weaker player to increase the costs to his opponent
of standing firm. In the unresolved conflict in Namibia,
SWAPO and South Africa continue to exercise a military strategy
in conjunction with pursuing a political settlement. For
SWAPO political strategies are carried out within the framework
of UN Resolution 435, and for South Africa a political settle-
ment assumes the form of an internal solution in Namibia. In
both the Sudan and the Zimbabwe cases a settlement was reached
through political vice military means.
In sum, a general pattern had been established in all
three cases. First, political means are used by primary
players to obtain goals. Second, as a result of shifting per-
ceptions among the weaker primary player, a military strategy
is employed. Third, from this shift in strategy, the stronger
player responds in kind. Fourth, the conflict comes full
circle and a political settlement becomes possible.
157
One observation that might be drawn from this is that in
Sudan and Zimbabwe (cases where the conflict was resolved)
the shift to a balanced strategy incorporating military and
political means was employed. This would suggest that since
the unresolved Namibian case has also followed this pattern,
movement toward a solution may be forthcoming. However, this
presupposes two factors: first, that SWAPO guerrillas have
increased the cost to South Africa of standing firm; second,
that South African political moves are a genuine attempt at
resolving the conflict and are not designed to forestall a
settlement under the framework of Resolution 43 5. If one be-
lieves that these two factors have been fulfilled, then this
pattern would indicate that the stage should be set for a
settlement in Namibia. Also, new developments injected by
external players, most notably the US and Angola, may well
establish new conditions that will require an additional phase
in strategy to reset the stage one more time.
Thus far an opponent's strategy and the perceptions of
each player have been examined for their role in defining
strategy. But what role do resources have in this equation,
and what type of resources were the most effective in the
three cases examined?
E. RESOURCES AND LIMITATIONS
Chapter I presented resources as any political, psycho-
logical, economic, or military means that a player possesses
to either implement his own strategy, or resist the strategy
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of his opponent. In each of the conflicts examined a variety
of resources were used by each player. This section will
briefly review several types of resources that the three
conflicts have in common.
One resource used in the three conflicts was that of
player cohesion. The degree of unity attained by several
players in the conflict affected their ability to implement
an effective strategy. What impact did this resource have
on the course and outcome of that conflict?
In Sudan, the tremendous factionalization and the politi-
cal divisiveness among northern leaders prevented the North
from ..concentrating on the "southern question," and limited
their ability to implement an effective strategy in the South.
Only when Nimeiri united the North, and brought the divergent
political parties under the control of the Sudan Socialist
Union (SSU) did the North have the cohesiveness to press
ahead with a settlement in the South.
The Sudan case points to the limitation imposed on a player
who suffers from a lack of cohesion. Division among the
southern rebels had long prevented them from substantially
raising the costs to the North. The divisiveness among the
South was in part attributed to the tribal composition of the
rebels. However, it is interesting to note that within seven
months of Colonel Lagu's political and military unfication of
the South, the Sudan conflict was resolved. As noted earlier,
the individual concerns and perceptions held by Nimeiri
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influenced the timing of the settlement, but assuredly southern
unification contributed to Nimeiri's perceptions.
This is even more striking when the unification of ZANU
and ZAPU military forces (ZIPRA and ZANLA) is considered. It
is true that ZANU and ZAPU had been politically united in
1974, however, it was not until May 1979 that their respective
guerrilla forces were combined. It is interesting to note
that here too, within seven months the conflict ended in Zim-
babwe. This is not to suggest that increasing player cohesion
was the principal catalyst in resolving these conflicts. In-
stead the unification may have acted as a resource that
altered the perceptions of the opposing player, which in turn
prompted him to reconsider his position. Conversely, continued
failure to obtain their goals may have prompted these players
to become unified and drew each of the competing factors to-
gether by necessity.
In Namibia, both the nationalists under SWAPO and South
Africa have exhibited strong cohesiveness . Thus, the effects
of increased cohesiveness may not have the same effect. Al-
though it is quite possible that an increase in the cohesive-
ness among secondary players, most notably the Western contact
group, may have an effect on the conflict in Namibia by alter-
ing the perceptions of South Africa.
The cohesiveness displayed by the white community in Rhodesia
and by South Africa in the Rhodesia and Namibia conflicts
respectively, demonstrates that player cohesion is a valuable
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resource. The solid cohesion within the white community in
Rhodesia contributed greatly to its ability to stand firm in
the face of tremendous international pressure. This helped
Smith limit the concessions he would have to make in a settle-
ment in Rhodesia/ Zimbabwe.
In sum, player cohesion is a key factor that strengthens
a player's position and abilities, and the lack of cohesion
can function as a principal limitation. Thus, taking steps
to limit the cohesiveness within an opposing player, and to
bolster one's own cohesiveness, would be a viable tactic for
strengthening one's overall position in a conflict. Thus the
old dictum, divide and rule is still significant.
Military forces were another resource utilized by the
primary players in each conflict. Earlier in this chapter it
was noted that the weaker player initiated a shift in strategy
from one based on political means to a strategy that emphasized
military force. However, this strategy shift would have been
meaningless without a military resource to support it. How
did military force affect each player's strategy?
Two conclusions can be drawn by comparing the three con-
flicts examined. First, those players in each conflict that
were initially in a stronger position primarily used their
military resource to deflect the pressure directed at them
from their opponent's military strategy. That is, the mili-
tary resource was used defensively to contain the actions of
an aggressor. For example, some analysts would argue that
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in Namibia, South Africa is continuing to employ this resource
in this manner. Pretoria is not seeking an outright military
victory, but instead is limiting the ability of SWAPO to
increase South Africa's costs of standing firm, while simul-
taneously pursuing a political solution.
Second, those players in each conflict that were initially
in a weaker position used their military resource to increase
the costs of standing firm to their opponent. The Patriotic
Front in Zimbabwe, and the southern rebels in Sudan used their
military resource to pressure their opponents into making con-
cessions and into altering their perceptions. What prevents
the stronger opponent from employing this resource in the
same manner?
This is partially attributable to the nature of the con-
flicts examined. The black nationalists in Rhodesia and
Namibia, and the southern rebels in Sudan have very little to
lose. There are few costs that these players have not already
incurred in their respective conflicts. However, for South
Africa, the white Rhodesian community, and the North in Sudan,
to employ their own military resources to increase the costs
to their opponents would have been more difficult. Finding
appropriate targets and crushing the guerrilla movement is
defensive in nature and winning a conclusive military victory
is unlikely.
Thus the way in which each player employs his military
resource depends upon his relative position in the conflict.
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What this suggests is that resources have different uses in
the hands 'of different players. And that the value of a
specific type of resource varies among players. In every
conflict there is a shifting of resources. Players periodically
gain and lose resources as the conflict progresses. What
effect do shifting resources have on the course of the three
conflicts examined?
When a player gains or loses a resource, there is a
corresponding shift in either his (or his opponent's) strategy
or perceptions or both. However, the shift in perceptions
and strategy does not usually occur immediately following a
change in resources. For example, in Sudan the unification of
the North under Nimeiri, coupled with the relatively calm
relations Sudan was experiencing with its neighbors provided
Nimeiri with the opportunity to pursue a political strategy
in the South. In addition, the factionalization in the North
had long been a southern resource. When the North was unified,
this resource for the South evaporated, and as a result the
South ' s perceptions of the North began to change.
Changing resources were also a factor in Zimbabwe. The
white Rhodesian government slowly began to wane as it began
to lose resources in the form of external support from South
Africa. As the black nationalists received additional mili-
tary support from the Frontline States, their position improved.
This simple correlation of resources to relative strength is
easy to recognize. However, simply gaining a resource is not
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in itself enough to change a player's position. The way in
which a player employs a resource has more effect on his
relative position.
In Namibia, the US policy of constructive engagement is,
in effect, a resource for South Africa in that it can utilize
US support and the "linkage issue" to pursue its internal
strategy. As noted in Chapter IV, the UN provides SWAPO with
one of its most valuable resources--legitimacy through
recognition.
In sum, resources can affect both a player's strategy and
perceptions. It is clear that one player's limitation is his
opponent's resource, and that a player can lose and gain re-
sources over the course of a conflict.
F. TIME AS A DYNAMIC ELEMENT
The last element to be examined in this chapter is the
effect of the passage of time in the three conflicts. Time
can often serve as a resource for a player. For example, in
Zimbabwe, UDI was a strategy used in part by the Rhodesian
government to provide it with more time to both wait for a
more favorable administration in London, and to give it time
to formulate an alternative solution. In Namibia, one side
effect of the linkage issue is that it allows South Africa the
time to expand white political power in the territory, and
to implement its internal solution.
Two general observations can be made concerning the effect
of time on the weaker players in each conflict. First, the
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cohesiveness of the black nationalists in Namibia and Zimbabwe,
and the southern rebels in Sudan, improved with the passage
of time. Second, these players' military capability also
improved. In the case of the Anya-Nya, and of ZAND and ZAPU,
their military effectiveness was increasing right up until
the time that a settlement was reached. In Namibia, SWAPO '
s
ability to challenge the SADF had increased in the late 1970 's
and early 1980 's, however, in the past few years this trend
has diminished.
The effect of time on the stronger primary player seems to
have been the reverse. Although it is difficult to identify
a pattern in the cohesiveness of these players over time, in
general their military capability decreased as the conflict
evolved. Again the exception is in Namibia where the SADF
has remained in control of the territory.
Where the UN and Great Britain were involved as initial
primary players, in Namibia and Rhodesia/Zimbabwe respectively,
their roles varied over time, whereas the role of the black
nationalists steadily increased. For the UN its role in the
Namibia dispute diminished and has since leveled off. Great
Britain's role in the Rhodesia conflict diminished during the
1970 's and then increased toward the conclusion of the con-
flict. This may be due in part to the responsibility that
Great Britain realized it had toward its former colony. This
pattern may be unique to the African environment and the
dynamics of decolonization. However, this pattern could
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possibly occur in any instance where an indigenous group has
not yet reached maturity as a political and military force in
the conflict, and where an external force shared the same
interests and has the will to represent them in the early
stages of the conflict.
In sum, as the Sudan and Zimbabwe conflicts progressed
those players initially in a stronger position found their
strength diminishing over time, and conversely, those weaker
players found that as the conflict progressed their position
generally improved. In Namibia, this is not the case. South
Africa has retained a commanding position over both the UN
and SWAPO. This may be attributable to the fact that the two
weakest variables for South Africa—external support and
legitimacy, have only marginal impact on their position. South
Africa's need to increase these factors is inconsequential.
Conversely, SWAPO ' s inability to substantially improve its
military ability and cohesion, coupled with the problematic
leadership among SWAPO 's ranks may be preventing it from
strengthening its position.
G. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
Each of the conflicts presented here are complex and each
contain several dynamic elements that contributed to the over-
all course and outcome of each conflict. But there are a few
general observations that can be made about the three conflicts
taken as a whole.
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Perceptions played a fundamental role in each conflict.
The role that Nimeiri's perceptions played in Sudan, and the
shifting perceptions of the white community in Rhodesia directly
led to a resolution of those conflicts. South Africa's per-
ceptions in relation to Namibia is a primary factor preventing
a settlement in that conflict.
Perceptions have had great impact on the selection of
strategy and goals of each player. As adjustments to percep-
tions occurred, adjustments in goals and strategy followed.
Perhaps the primary area where perceptions had the greatest
impact on each of these conflicts, and is perhaps the central
element in all three cases, is in the cost-benefit relationship
of standing firm or conceding.
In Sudan and Zimbabwe, the cost-benefit relationship for
each of the primary players was similar. In Sudan had Nimeiri
not conceded a form of autonomy to the South, it is quite
possible that his ability to consolidate his political power
would have been decreased, and he would have found it difficult
to retain control in Sudan--a high price to pay. Relief from
the economic burden of war, the relatively high level of
country-wide political cohesiveness , and the strengthening of
Sudan's regional position are just a few of the benefits the
North received as a result of its compromise with the South.
The South had also benefitted from the settlement. The tre-
mendous increase over the control of southern affairs that
Southerners received under the Addis Ababa Agreement is a
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primary benefit for them. Southern costs of standing firm in
order to gain greater concessions from the North are high •
compared to relatively small increases in benefits. Had the
South succeeded in breaking from the North, new problems
brought on by a sudden shift to independence might have out-
weighed the benefits gained in a Federal structure with the
North.
In Zimbabwe, the costs of standing firm for both the white
community and the black nationalists, were magnified through
the lens of outside influence. Prime Minister Smith and the
white community, stood firm in the face of mounting external
and internal pressure. Only when they perceived the costs
of standing firm as outweighing the benefits were they forced
to concede control of the territory to the Blacks. It is
important to note that the main issue of the white community
was security. Continued inflexibility would have further
eroded their security past the point acceptable to most Whites
Once they perceived that their physical and economic security
would be maintained, they began to realize the advantages of
conceding. Those Whites that felt that their security would
be threatened under black rule left the country. In addition,
a player's ability to resist the strategy of his opponent is
an important factor. The Rhodesian government's diminishing
ability to resist external pressure and contain the PF '
s
guerrilla forces influenced their perception of standing firm.
Once they recognized this reduced ability they began to
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reassess the costs and benefits of standing firm and linked
this- to their ability to stand firm. This in turn forced
them to reevaluate the benefits gained by conceding.
Lastly, this chapter has pointed out many of the simi-
larities between the two conflicts that have been resolved
(Sudan and Zimbabwe) and the continuing conflict in Namibia.
However, many critical dissimilarities exist between these
two groups of cases. Many of these differences occur in the
five factors that defined each primary player's initial posi-
tion. Table 2 is a matrix of the five factors determining
each player's initial position. The factors in the matrix are
as follows: [1] Player cohesion, [2] Military strength/ability,
[3] External support, [4] Legitimacy of action, and [5] Leader-
ship capabilities. The factors for each player were ranked
in relation to his opponent and a player was either stronger
(+) , weaker (-) or roughly equal (=) in each factor.
As indicated in the matrix, among the weaker players one
common factor that is at a relatively lower level than the
stronger player in the initial phase of the conflict is their
military ability. In Sudan and Zimbabwe, the weaker players
were able to increase their military ability and either match
or surpass the military ability of the stronger player. In
the case of SWAPO, they have clearly been unable to meet the
SADF with the same force and effectiveness.
Also in each conflict the initial leadership capability
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Sudan and Zimbabwe conflicts the leadership on each side was
roughly equal. In Namibia Nujoma's efforts and the efforts of
his leadership cadre have not been able to match the skillful
political and military leadership in South Africa.
It is important to note that SVJAPO in Namibia and the PF
in Rhodesia possessed a great deal of legitimacy of action,
whereas the southern rebels in Sudan did not have this same
moral legitimacy. However, in the case of ZAPU/ZANU they were
able to exploit this resource and in Sudan theAnya-Nya effec-
tively circumvented this limitation. In Namibia SVJAPO has
been unable to use this resource in the same manner as ZANU
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and ZAPU, and conversely South Africa has ignored its lack of
international, moral and legal legitimacy.
The quantitative aspect of each factor is a subtlety
that is not found in the matrix. For example, in Sudan the
Anya-Nya did receive some external support but this was only
slightly less than the support rendered to the government in
Khartoum. However, since the conflict operated in relative
isolation, external forces were not a critical factor. In
Zimbabwe external forces played a significant role and the
mustering of external support from the Frontline States and
the OAU for the black nationalists was a great asset for them.
However, in Namibia, SWAPO has from the start received the
largest amount of external support, but in comparison to the
amount of resources that South Africa is able to generate for
itself, this support is not enough.
As a final point, it was noted earlier that the pattern
in strategy among the primary players in Sudan and Zimbabwe
ended in a "dual strategy" and that this shift in strategy
signaled that the conditions for a settlement were perhaps
met. At several times in the late 1970 's and early 1980 's
there seemed to be positive movement toward a settlement in
Namibia, however, external realities prevented a final resolu-
tion. Most notably the linkage issue has been a major stumbling
block to such a settlement.
What this points to is that SWAPO is unable to raise the
costs to South Africa of standing firm. SWAPO ' s inability
to do this is the result of a number of factors previously
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reviewed in Chapter IV. Moreover, in order for the conflict
in Namibia to be resolved, either South Africa or SWAPO will
have to adjust its goals. For without common ground on which
a settlement can be negotiated, a resolution of the conflict
is remote.





1930 - "Southern Sudan" policy established by the British'
Civil Secretary. The Upper Nile, Bahr el Ghazal,
and Equatoria provinces adminstered separately from
the North.
194 6 - "Southern Sudan" policy reversed. The North and the
South now bound together.
1948 - Legislative Assembly Ordinance enacted. Legislative
Assembly created in Khartoum, out of 93 seats, 13 go
to the South.
1951 - March—Governor General appoints Constitutional Amend-
ment Commission. Composed of 13 Sudanese, only 1
representative from the South included.
1952 - May—Conference held in Cairo between Britain, Egypt,
and northern Sudan political parties to discuss nature
of Sudanese independence. No southern representatives
present.
19 53 - February--Anglo-Egyptian Agreement. Recognition by
Egypt of Sudanese right to self-determination.
1954 - January--First Sudanese Parliament established. Ismail
el-Azhari elected Prime Minister. The National Union
Party (NUP) dominates the Assembly.
19 55 - July--Trial of a southern Liberal party member of
parliament opens in Yambio. Demonstrations and riots
with the police break out. Workers strike in Nazra,
in Equatoria province.
August—Mutiny of soldiers in the Equatoria Corps.
Soldiers refuse the orders given to them by their
northern commanders. Many armed soldiers disperse
into the surrounding countryside.
1956 - January 1--Sudan becomes an Independent Republic. At
this time southern representatives given assurances
that greater autonomy for the south would be considered
June--Members of the Khatmiya sect defect from the
NUP to form the People's Democratic Party (PDP) . The
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PDP and the Uirma Party join to form a coalition
government headed by Abdullah Khahil . He received
support from the Ansars and Khatniya
.
1951 - April--All missionary schools in the South taken over
by the government.
June 30--National Assembly dissolved to make way for
new elections.
19 58 - February--National Assembly elections held. Umma
party receives 63 seats. The Umma-PDP coalition
dominates the assembly. Stanislaus Paysama was able
to organize southern members of the assembly into an
effective voting bloc. The south won 37 out of 173
available seats.
During 1958 the Umma-PDP coalition became strained
over the issue of Egyptian influence in Sudan. The
idea of federation for the South was rapidly spreading
and begins to find favor in certain groups in the
North.
November 17--General Ibrahim Abboud leads a military
coup. The assembly is dissolved. Abboud claims that
his government is only transitional. Supreme Council
established to conduct government business. Council
consists of 7 military officers and 5 non-party
civilians
.
1962 - February--Sudan African Closed Districts National Union
(SACDNU) formed in Kinshasha, Zaire; Joseph Oduho
,
president, and William Deng, secretary-general.
Policy of SACDNU is to obtain complete independence
for southern Sudan through diplomatic and political
means. SACDNU changes its name to the Sudan African
National Union (SANU) in 1963.
May-- 'Missionary Societies Act' enacted.
November--Expulsion of missionaries in the South starts.
Missionaries accused by Khartoum of encouraging southern
hostilities towards the North.
November/December-;—Members of the old "southern corps"
regroup and prepare to attack northern troops
.
1963 - September--Anya-Nya guerrilla force formed. First
serious guerrilla attacks occur in Pachola in Kajo
Kaj i
.
1964 - February--The government forces all missionaries to
leave the South.
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September—Throughout 1964 Anya-Nya movement develops
into an effective guerrilla force. By September
SANU, realizing the potential of Anya-Nya, retracts
its "peaceful policy." At this same time, Abboud
appoints a commission of inquiry to study factors
affecting the southern problem. The government allowed
open debate in the hopes that a solution to the
"southern problem" would be found. The open debate
led to general criticism of the government.
October--General strikes spread throughout the country.
Political parties that had been banned began to
resurface
.
November 15—Abboud resigns, replaced by Mohammed al-
Khalifa, this marks the return to party politics.
Two major parties dominate in the South, SANU led by
William Deng and Saturnine Lahure, and the Southern
Front, headed by Gordon Abiei.
1965 - March 16--Representatives from the North and the South
meet at the Round Table Conference to work out a
resolution over the conflict in the South. Only an
interim agreement over minor issues reached.
March—Elections held in the North. Southern poli-
ticians boycott the elections. Election results:
Umma Party 75, NUP 54, Communists 11, Beja Tribal
Association 10, Islamic Charter 5, PDP 3, and inde-
pendents 15.
June--The Southern Front, now headed by Clement Mboro
,
becomes a formally registered political party.
July--Increase in Anya-Nya guerrilla activity. The
Umma Party and the NUP establish a coalition government
led by Mohammed Ahmed Mahgoub . The new government
launches a major military counter-offensive against
the guerrillas in the South.
July--Sudan ' s border with Ethiopia secured. Kenya and
Tanzania promise to crush any secessionist activity.
During 1965, factionalization in SANU resulted in the
formation of two additional political parties in the
South, the Azania Liberation Front (ALF) , and the
Sudan African Liberation Front (SALF)
.
1966 - January—The Sudan war begins receiving increased
attention in the British press. Throughout 1966 the
Anya-Nya increases the scope and force of its guerrilla
activity, however, the group is still lim.ited in its
ability to obtain arms and ammunition.
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July— Split in Umma party between the traditionalists
and the moderate wings. Sadiq al-Mahdi selected new
Prime Minister.
1967 - March--Parliamentary elections held in 36 constituen-
cies in pacified areas in the South. The Sadiq wing
of the Umma party gained 15 seats while SANU won 10.
May—Further division in Sadiq 's Umma wing coupled
witn the withdrawal of NUP support causes the Sadiq
government to fall. Mahgoub is renamed Prime Minister.
August—Southern leaders meet in eastern Equatoria and
form the Southern Sudan Provisional Government (SSPG)
.
The SSPG has difficulty assuming control of Anya-Nya.
1968 - April/May--Elections held throughout most of the South.
William Deng assassinated by government troops. The
Democratic Unionist Party (formed from a merger of the
NUP and the PDP) and the Umma party form a coalition
government, with Mahgoub retaining his leadership.
Throughout the rest of 1968 Mahgoub ' s government is
weakened by continual division among the major parties
in the North.
1969 - Several splinter groups emerge from the SSPG: Anyidi
Revolutionary Government, Zande Separatists, Sue River
Revolutionary Government, and the Sudan-Azania Govern-
ment in East Africa.
May 25--General Jafar Nimeiri heads a quick, bloodless
coup.
June--New government announces plan of regional autonomy
for the South. A ministry of state for southern
affairs is created. Nimeiri forms the Sudan Socialist
Union (SSU) in order to establish a single national
political movement.
August—Nimeiri acknowledges that there is no military
solution to the problem in the South.
1970 - March--Nimeiri attempts to visit Abu Island to talk
with Immam al-Hadi. He is blocked by rioting Ansars.
Throughout 1970 Nimeiri is preoccupied with controlling
communist influence in his government.
1971 - March--Nimeiri announces that the SSU will subsume
all other political parties in Sudan.
May/June--The World Council of Churches and the All
African Conference of Churches begin exploring the
possibility of opening North-South talks.
176
July 19-22--Nimeiri survives an abortive coup. The
Sudan Communist Party blamed for the putch. Nimeiri's
Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) rounds up more than
100 communists and dissident officers in an effort to
crush the communist influence in Sudan. Former minis-
ter of southern affairs, Joseph Garang is executed for
his part in the coup attempt, he is succeeded by Abel
Alier
.
August—Colonel Joseph Lagu consolidates all military
and political power in the South. Creates the Southern
Sudan Liberation Front (SSLF) , which gains the support
of nearly all exiled southern politicians.
October—The SSU established as the only legal politi-
cal party in Sudan.
1972 - February—Meeting between Abel Alier and high-level
delegations from the SSLM begins in Addis Ababa.
Initially, many SSLF leaders were opposed to the agree-
ment reached between the government and the SSLM. How-
ever Joseph Lagu approved of the arrangement and a
- cease-fire operation was put into effect.




1923 - Southern Rhodesian settlers were given the choice of
either becoming incorporated into the Union of South
Africa, or becoming a separate entity in the British
Empire.
October 1—Constitution of the Crown Colony of Southern
Rhodesia went into effect.
1930 - Land Apportionment Act of 1930 designates specific
areas for whitesettlers and black Africans.
Late 1940 's - During the last half of the 1940 's an average of
10,000 white settlers arrived annually.
1950 - All blacks that were previously allowed to live in
white designated areas were forced to move to areas
designated as Native Reserves.
1955 - George Nyandoro and James Chikerema (black activists)
form the Youth League. The League demands direct
representation for blacks on municipal councils.
1957 - The Youth League combines with the African National
Congress to form the Southern Rhodesian African National
Congress (SRANC)
.
19 59 - The SRANC is banned by the White Rhodesian government.
1960 - The Black political group, the National Democratic
Party (NDP) formed.
1961 - December--The NDP banned by the Rhodesian government.
1962 - September—The NDP is reformed as the Zimbabwe African
People's Union (ZAPU), under the leadership of Joshua
Nkomo
.
1963 - The Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) is formed
by members of ZAPU who split from Nkomo.
19 64 - Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland become the independent
states of Zambia and Malawi.
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April--Prime Minister Winston Field replaced by Ian
Smith. Smith's Party, the Rhodesian Front, dominates
the 1965 elections, winning 50 of the first roll
seats in the Assembly.
19 65 - November 11—Southern Rhodesian government issues a
Unilateral Declaration of Independence.
19 66 - April--First encounter between government troops and
Black guerrillas.
December—The UN Security Council imposes mandatory
selective sanctions on Rhodesia.
1968 - Almost all guerrilla activity ceases due to factionali-
zation among black nationalist groups.
May—The UN passes a resolution that calls for compre-
hensive mandatory sanctions against Rhodesia, this
bars all trade except for medical supplies. South
Africa and Portugal do not comply with the UN resolu-
tion and continue to trade with Rhodesia.
1971 - November--The US passes the Byrd Amendment which per-
mits the US to import certain strategic minerals from
Rhodesia.
November—The British reach a settlement with Smith.
The settlement known as the Smith-Home Agreement included
a large number of British concessions.
1972 - The British government dispatches the Pearce Commission
to Rhodesia to ascertain public opinion on the terms
of the Smith-Home Agreement. The commission reports
that the overwhelming majority of blacks in Rhodesia
oppose the settlement.
1974 - ZANU and ZAPU unite to form the Patriotic Front (PF)
.
April--Military coup in Lisbon topples the Portuguese
government.
1975 - Revolutionary government in Portugal begins decoloni-
zation, Angola and Mozambique gain independence.
January— UK and US warn Rhodesia that if the war
continues that they would not provide aid.
August—Talks between Smith and black nationalists
convened at Victoria Falls. Talks break down in their
second day.
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1976 - April/September--The US becomes active in Southern
Africa. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger was able
to change some of Smith's perceptions. Smith's govern-
ment agrees in principle with majority rule.
October--An all-party conference held in Geneva; Smith,
Mugabe, Nkomo , Sithole, Muzorewa, and representatives
from the US and Great Britain attend.
1977 - Bilateral talks between Smith and Muzorewa begin.
Smith is seeking his "internal settlement" in Rhodesia.
March--Byrd Amendment repealed.
September—A detailed Anglo-American plan proposed.
Neither the nationalists nor the Smith government re-
jects the proposals.
1978 - Smith announces his internal settlement. Elections
are to be held based on the newly adopted constitu-
tion. The internal settlement and the new constitution
are denounced by the PF.
July 27--The Case-Javits Amendment adopted by the US
Congress
.
December— By the end of 1978 ZANU ' s and ZAPU's military
arms, the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army
(ZANLA) and the Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army
(ZIPRA) have become effective guerrilla organizations
capable of confronting government forces
.
1979 - April--Elections held, Muzorewa elected Prime Minister.
Effective control of the government still retained by
Smith and the white regime.
May--ZIPRA and ZANLA unite to coordinate guerrilla
activities
.
September--Talks convened in London at Lancaster House.
The Zimbabwe/Rhodes ian government was represented by
Smith, Muzorewa, Sithole, and Peter Walls; and the
nationalists were represented by PF leaders Nkomo and
Mugabe- The conference was headed by British Foreign
Secretary Lord Carrington.
December—Lancaster House Settlement reached. UN
Security Council endorses the settlement and calls




1880 - Walvis Bay colonized by Great Britain.
1884 - South West Africa (SWA) colonized by Germany.
1915 - SWA invaded by South Africa on behalf of the Allies.
1920 - League of Nations founded after Versailles. SWA
placed under class "C" mandate, administration super-
vised by the League.
1933 - South Africa pressed for SWA incorporation into South
African territory. This was never agreed to by the
League
.
194 5 - UN founded, mandate system superceded by UN Trustee-
ship system.
1946 - Dispute between UN and South Africa over SWA begins.
1949 - SWA incorporated into Republic of South Africa under
the South West Africa Administration Act.
1950/1955/1956 - International Court of Justice (ICJ) asked
for an advisory opinion on South West Africa. The
court found that South Africa was not legally obliged
to place the territory under the UN trusteeship pro-
gram, but that it was not competent to unilaterally
alter the legal status of South West Africa.
1960 - Ethiopia and Liberia argued in the ICJ that apartheid,
the system under which South Africa governed South
West Africa, was inconsistent with the League mandate.
1961 - South Africa refuses to submit reports on South West
African administration. Council of 24 set up to
compile reports.
1963 - Britain ends utilization of port and base facilities
in Republic of South Africa. RSA withdraws from the
Commonwealth.
1966 - The ICJ decided that apartheid was not in question
and that Liberia and Ethiopia had no standing before
the court even though in 19 62 the court had acknov»/l edged
their standing.
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South VJest Africa Peoples Organization (SWAPO) announces
it will launch an armed struggle for the liberation of
the territory.
UN revokes South Africa's Mandate/Trusteeship over
SWA. South Africa is now considered to be illegally
occupying SWA.
1967 - Creation of "Bantustans" in Ovamboland.
19 68 - UN General Assembly renamed South West Africa, Namibia.
South Africa in complete control of Namibia's defense.
1969 - South West Africa Affairs Act authorized South Africa
to take control of mining, labor, revenues, industries,
etc
.
1970 - August—Creation of Okavangoland
.
1971 - June--Advisory opinion by ICJ, "the continued presence
of South Africa being illegal, it is under obligation
to withdraw its administration from Namibia immediately
. . . members of the UN must refrain from any actions
or dealings which might imply recognition of legality
of South African administration or presence in Namibia."
1972 onward - Confrontations between guerrilla groups and
South African troops increase. Namibian border with
Angola is the area of heaviest fighting.
1972 - January--South African troops into Namibia to break up
strikes in the Tsumeb mine area, Walvis Bay and Windhoek,
February 4— UNSC Resolution 309, Directs Waldheim to
initiate contacts to resolve the conflict.
March--Dr. Alfred Escher, on a 17-day tour of Namibia,
meets with 74 delegates: outcome—Escher believed that
the majority called for end to South African rule and
for the complete independence of Namibia.
October 30— Escher meets with B.J. Vorster (South
African Prime Minister) and Dr. H. Muller (South
African Foreign Minister) . The outcome of this meeting
was that progress on Namibia required settling of 3
points: (1) South Africa's unequivocal clarification
of a policy for independence of Namibian people. (2)
Discontinuation of the homelands policy. (3) Abolition
of the discriminatory measures in the territory.
November—Vorster portrayed that the discussions with
Escher represented an agreement. Waldheim issued a
statement denying this.
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November—SWAPO and SWANU declare that the advisory
council is unacceptable, however, they would accept
a consultative body on an interim basis provided it
was supervised by the UN.
1973 - February--South Africa said it would proceed with the
Constitution of the advisory council.
March 23--Advisory council meets, mainly pro-government
chiefs and headmen (two whites). Basters, Kaulovelders
,
and majority of Heroro refused to nominate representa-
tives. David Meroro (national chairman of SWAPO) did
not attend.
March—The National Convention (9 political parties
including SWAPO & SWANU) states that its nine member
organization would fight for the total and complete
freedom of the people of the territory.
April--Waldheim reports to UN Security Council: South
Africa has still not provided unequivocal clarification
of its policies and South Africa's position did not
coincide with the UN. Muller issued a statement that
South Africa would not delay any action for self-
determination .
1973 - Sam Nujoma, president of SWAPO, rejects further diplo-
matic contact with South Africa.
May—OAU voted to end talks with South Africa.
December 11--UN Security Council votes unanimously to
end the attempt to establish meaningful talks with the
South African government. Following this the General
Assembly voted to recognize SWAPO as the authentic
representative of Namibia. UN Security Council set
May 1975 as the time for South Africa to announce its
withdrawal.
1974 - South Africa proposed a new plan that would subdivide
Namibia. Ovambos would be free to mingle across the
border in Angola. Others would be grouped into smaller
states. UN and black nationalist movements denounce
this effort. 1974 overthrow of Caetaro government in
Portugal brought new problems. Border conflict required
the stationing of South African troops in northern
Namibia
.
1975 - UN Security Council establishes the Western Contact
Group as a negotiating mission with a specific time-
table to discuss free elections. The African states
in the UN call for an immediate mandatory arms embargo
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to South Africa. Britain, France and the USA vetoed
this resolution.
1975 to 1977— SWAPO was pushed back by South African troops.
SWAPO linked in the north with the MPLA, South African
troops with UNITA. Jonas Savimbi (UNITA president)
had underwritten requests by Zaire and Zambia for
South African military intervention. When the MPLA
starts gaining ground, South Africa announces a with-
drawal of forces.
1975, September to March, 1977--Turnhalle Conference convened.
SWAPO does not take part.
1976 - August--Turnhalle Conference designates 31 Dec 1978
as target date for Namibian independence.
1977 - By this time 4 5,000 South African troops mobilized to
fight in the north.
March—Turnhalle Conference produces a draft constitu-
tion. Includes the provision that South African forces
would stay in Namibia, Walvis Bay would remain part of
South Africa. This was denounced by both the UN and
the OAU.
1977 - Mandatory UN arms embargo adopted.
September--South Africa indicated it would still seek
an internal settlement. The newly drafted internal
constitution supported by DTA (Democratic Turnhalle
Alliance), but is rejected by SWAPO.
1978 - April 5—The Western members of UN Security Council
propose UN supervised elections of a Namibian consti-
tution and assembly but carried the proviso that
South African troops would remain in country pending
complete cessation of SWAPO hostilities. Walvis Bay
excluded from proposal.
September--South Africa announces that it is going
ahead with its own internal solution and is going to
hold elections in December. Out of 50 seats, 41 went
to the DTA. This new assembly agreed to UN supervised
elections in 1979.
September—UN Security Council Resolution 435 adopted.
The resolution called for UN sponsored elections,
established a UN Transition assistance group, and
declared that unilateral actions taken by South
Africa in Namibia are illegal.
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1979 - May—Advisory assembly reconstituted as National
Assembly based on December South African sponsored
elections.
1979 - Duel strategy followed by South African government.
Internal Namibian government was to be consolidated
while at the same time South Africa agreed to plans
for a settlement under Resolution 435.
1981 - November— SWAPO accepts a settlement proposed by the
UN.
1982 - February—DTA loses support of Ovambo constituent group.
1982 - April--Most effective guerrilla operations by SWAPO
against South African troops.
1983 - April--UN conference on Namibia criticizes Contact
Group for US position on the "linkage issue." France
withdraws from Contact Group.
August—UN Security Council visits Namibia holds talks
on implementation of Resolution 435.
November--Multi-Party Conference (MPC) formed. SWAPO
refuses to join.
1984 - February--Talks between US Assistant Secretary of State
Chester Crocker and South Africa called for joint com-
mission to monitor withdrawal of all South African
troops from Angola. Angola would assure that neither
SWAPO nor Cuban troops would occupy area vacated by
South Africa.
March--Herman Toivo ja Toivo, founding father of SWAPO
released by South Africa.
March--Talks in Lusaka, Zambia. Disagreement between
SWAPO and MPC. Talks failed.
June--Talks held in Rome. South Africa's attitude
about linkage are unchanged,
1983 to 1985 - US/Angola/South Africa/SWAPO involved in dis-
cussions on a settlement. Other western groups are
noticably absent.
1985 - South Africa establishes an internal government in
Namibia. It turns over the administration of Namibia
to the new government headed by the MPC. However, South





A REVIEV7 OF THE CONFLICT RESOLUTION CHECKLIST
It is appropriate at this point to examine briefly the
effectiveness of the conflict resolution checklist. The
following is a review of some of the positive and negative
aspects of the checklist.
There are three positive aspects of the checklist. First,
it was an invaluable tool for analyzing the three conflicts
presented in this thesis. The checklist provided a central
frame of reference and made it easier to distinguish simi-
larities and differences among these conflicts. Second, the
checklist was useful in examining unfamiliar conflicts. That
is as a negotiator facing a conflict that is new to him, or
a conflict in which he has only a passing familiarity, ob-
taining a working understanding of each of these somewhat
complex conflicts is made easier through application of the
checklist. Third, as an adjunct to this, the checklist assisted
in identifying only the most salient elements in each conflict.
There are also three drawbacks to the checklist. First,
there is no substitute for judgment. The checklist does not
provide a formula for determining the value of the various
elements in each conflict. It is up to the analyst to apply
his own values to the framework of the checklist. In this
project assigning values to different factors was made easier
186
through a comparison of the three conflicts. In this way a
relative value for each element was established and the most
important variables surfaced. Second, once the initial and
main elements of the conflicts were established, the checklist
did not function very well as each conflict evolved. The
checklist was not effective in identifying adjustments made in
a player's goals, strategy, and resources. And third, it has
limited value as a guide to negotiating. However, it is use-
ful as a tool for identifying key elements in a conflict so
that a negotiator can attempt to influence these elements to
his advantage.
In sum, without the checklist the problems with undertaking
this type of comparative analysis would have been magnified.
As an academic tool it is of value, and can contribute an
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